TELOS

Number 80 Summer 1989

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Democratization in China — *Edward Friedman*

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

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Subscription Rates

One-year Individual . . . $26.00 One-year Institutional $60.00

Two-year Individual . . . $52.00 Two Years Institutional . . .$120.00

(Foreign Subscribers, including Canadians, add 10%)

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Back Issues available: ns. 13, 17-79 at $7.50 each ($15.00 for institutions). Foreign orders, add 10%. All payments must be in U.S. currency. Out of print issues (ns. 1-12, 14-16) can be obtained in microform or facsimile through University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, MI 48106, U.S.A.

Telos no. 80 corresponds to vol. 22, no. 2. ***Telos*** is published in the Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter by Telos Press Ltd., 431 E. 12th Street, New York, NY 10009. Second Class postage paid at New York and additional mailing offices.

Telos
431 E. 12th Street
New York, NY 10009 U.S.A.

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ISSN 0090-6514

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Individual one year subscriptions cost $20.00 in the US and $22.00 elsewhere. One year institutional subscriptions cost $45.00 in the US and $49.50 elsewhere. Make checks payable in US funds, drawn upon US Banks. Back issues are $7.50 each. Institutions pay $15.00 Send all correspondence to: Telos Press, 431 E. 12th St., New York, NY 10009.

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Introduction

The myth of the causal relation between the determining structure (forces of production) and the determined superstructure (relations of production) has long since been dismissed by all but the crudest Marxists. It remains, however, deeply rooted in Western conventional wisdom. As a result, the otherwise predictable brutal repression deployed by the Chinese rulers to restore "law and order" in early June caught almost everyone by surprise. Somehow, it was assumed that the economic reforms vigorously pursued during the past few years automatically created the objective conditions for a subsequent political liberalization, whereby China would gradually move towards a form of government very similar to Western capitalist countries.

The few earlier analyses of China published in *Telos* all invariably pointed out the purely instrumental character of economic reforms, the persistence of an unflinching Marxism-Leninism and the urgent need "to come to terms with its Stalinist mortgage," without which "the inherent tendency of the Chinese model is not only increasingly toward bureaucratic collectivism, but also toward Stalinism and its irresolvable internal conflicts" (*Telos* 35 [Spring 1978], pp. 50-51). More Recently, Edward Friedman explicitly warned that: "in 1985 the initiative was not in the hands of reformers, let alone their democratic faction . . . ." He went on to emphasize not only that "the conservatives have won but that their entrenched power in the post-Mao era puts grave limits on the reformers" (*Telos* 65 [Fall 1985], p. 46).

Even without theoretical insights, however, the eventual outcome could have been foreseen by simply paying closer attention to Chinese policies in Tibet *exactly* at the time demonstrations were heating up in Beijing. As Ronald D. Schwartz indicates in his reconstruction of recent developments in Tibet, the whole series of events, beginning with toleration of waves of demonstrations and culminating in their brutal repression, could almost be interpreted as a carefully-staged conspiracy to consolidate the conservatives' already solid hold on power within the Communist Party — a Party growing less and less ideological and increasingly coming to resemble the ruling elites of Latin American military dictatorships. In fact, Chinese policies toward Tibet are essentially colonial in character, and the regime in general is becoming indistinguishable from traditional Fascism — with its emphasis on nationalism, modernization and a cynical instrumentalization of traditions.

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Such is also the interpretive direction of Friedman's analysis of recent Chinese events. Unlike Fascism in Europe, which benefited from the efficiency of a capitalist economy, however, this new neo-Stalinist version is burdened by a "socialist" economic system and its terminal pathologies. Consequently, the end of the economic modernization strategy — dependent on a no longer readily available Western technology as well as integration in the world market — will also mean a relapse into the economic *rigor mortis* typical of centrally planned economies. The popular unrest this will inevitably generate — no matter how often it is repressed — means that a Chinese *perestroika* can be postponed but not ultimately avoided. The days of Marxist-Leninist dictatorships are numbered. The passing of the present octogenarian generation of leaders will immediately raise the possibility of a Chinese Gorbachev, even if, as it happened in the Soviet Union, it will have to be mediated by a few pathetic transitional figures such as Andropov and Chernenko.

Appealing in theory, *perestroika* is very difficult to implement in practice. As Lucio Leante shows, this is not due simply to the conservatives' entrenched resistence, but also to the fact that most of its immediate negative consequences are felt directly by those social groups who have already suffered the most from "socialist" planning. The paradoxical result is that, as reforms begin to have a social impact, they tend to generate an increasing popular opposition which fits right into the conservatives' political agenda. As Jadwiga Staniszkis describes, this is already happening in Poland, where the political integration of the old Solidarity leadership has led to a qualitatively different political realigment pitting a working class increasingly burdened by unavoidable austerity measures and uncomfortably allied with the most doctrinaire and conservative wing of the Communist Party, aganst the old Solidarity leadership collaborating with the reformist wing of the Party and the new capitalists. Contrary to most optimistic rhetoric about political prospects, the outlook for the foreseeable future is only continued crisis, stagnation, new disruptions and a slow slide into full Third World status.

Within such a context, calls for massive international aid have only limited validity. The fundamental problems are structural in character, and throwing big bucks at them is either not enough or altogether counterproductive. As Milovan Djilas points out in discussing the predicament of "really existing socialist" societies, foreign capital, either in the form of loans, joint-ventures or outright grants, is only likely to reinforce the Party's hold on power and thus lead to further procrastination concerning the inevitable phasing out of the Party-state. Given this state of affairs, Miron Wolnicki argues that the best one can hope for at this point is the development of some variety of the Yugoslav model — everyone's second-best choice — as a compromise. Given Yugoslavia's track record, this is clearly no answer. The failure of the workers' council model cannot be explained simply in terms of lingering Party encroachment, underdevelopment, or other external conditions. Rather, it also has to do with its very structure. At any rate, there does not seem to be sufficient political

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support for such a program within any sector of the Polish political spectrum, and its deployment would only be a stop-gap measure.

What is often overlooked is that Marxist-Leninist regimes have done almost irreparable damage to the economy and social fabric of the countries they have ruled. Thus major problems remain long after the introduction of drastic institutional changes. It is impossible, after over 40 years of "socialist" muddling of socio-economic relations (or, in the case of the USSR, over 70 years) to simply return to a *status quo ante* whose preconditions have been destroyed. As Jacek Tarkowski shows, even corruption cannot be readily eliminated and, at best, simply *changes* its character.

In order to provide a phenomenological sense of the depth of the problems these societies face, this issue includes a translation of two items which appeared over a year ago in the Soviet press, allegedly concerning the quality of Soviet salami, but actually dealing with the very nature of the production system as such. "The Cat knows Best" appeared as a result of complaints about the deteriorating quality of salami — so bad that even cats eventually refused to eat it. The report of an inspection of a Moscow salami factory revealed working conditions in the Soviet meat-packing industry that make Upton Sinclair's descriptions in *The Jungle* look like a significant improvement. The ultimate industrial imperative to mechanically fulfill the Plan at all costs leads to a complete disregard of quality which, under the inflexible centrally-determined pricing system, deteriorates to the point that what is produced is useless waste. Since producers need not worry about selling their products, if cats do not like "socialist" salami any more they simply will have to catch more capitalist mice. And so do Soviet citizens, by increasingly relying on and participating in the second economy which ends up disrupting all economic life.

In this case also, it is not a matter of simply blaming cynical bureaucrats and administrators (who obviously deserve all the wrath heaped upon them) but of the pricing system itself. How is a manager to make ends meet when the costs of his supplies and equipment rise, while the prices of his products remain unchanged because of political imperatives? He fudges with the only thing he can: the quality of the products. Here the bureaucrats' response to public outrage generated by the publication of the article is typical. It resorts to secrecy. Thus, while he publicly accepted responsibility, the administrator in charge privately made sure that inspectors would henceforth be kept out of salami factories. Had it not been for *glasnost* which, much to the chagrin of entrenched bureaucrats is disrupting every time-honored "administrative" practice, business would have gone on as usual (at last report, however, Felix and Morris in Moscow would still rather catch mice than eat the local store-bought salami).

During the heydays of the disarmament movement in the 1950s and 60s it was commonplace to argue that, while it is difficult in the US to convert from military to civilian production (because of capitalist greed for super-profits, etc.), such is not the case in the USSR, thanks to the existence of central planning.

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That piece of applied naiveté bites the dust in Alexei I. Izyumov's discussion of problems of conversion in the USSR. Not only are the socio-economic problems within a centrally planned economy every bit as serious as within capitalism, they are further complicated by the fact that the two economies in the USSR run according to radically different technical standards. So, if anything, conversion is considerably more difficult.

This turmoil within the rapidly disintegrating Communist bloc is causing considerable disruptions in geopolitical relations. Thus the planned European economic unification for 1992 is being re-thought by all the countries involved — particularly France. Already paranoid about West Germany's power and suspicious of a potential eastward German expansion (the so-called "continental drift"), large sectors of the French elite are growing apprehensive. As Frankl Adler points out in a review of one of the most influential books published on the subject thus far, France's fear of losing her alleged European hegemony — something long since gone — generates a whole new set of conflicts likely to redefine European political realities in the next decade. The same can be said of West Germany, the strongest and most prosperous member of the community, which fears that its poorer partners will compromise and dilute its socio-economic achievements. This problem is particularly acute within the *SPD*, whose working class membership, along with all of West Germany, presently enjoy the highest standards of living and the most generous social benefits in Europe. In fact, as can be seen in Mario Telò's analysis of *SPD* internal discussions (and contrary to his intentions), this predicament may alienate a significant part of its membership and guarantee that the *SPD* will remain in the opposition for at least the rest of this century.

Perestroika in the USSR means *perestroika* everywhere, and while it may not immediately bear fruits within the communist world, it is having a major impact in those countries whose system is flexible enough to rapidly adjust to the new state of affairs.

Paul Piccone

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Reform and Repression in Tibet

Ronald David Schwartz*

Martial law was declared in Lhasa on March 8, 1989, following three days of riots during which thousands of Tibetans took to the streets to attack Chinese-owned stores and government offices. The riots broke out after unarmed demonstrators were gunned down by security forces in Lhasa's central square. In May, following demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of Chinese in support of hunger-striking students in Tiananmen Square, martial law was declared in Beijing. What is the connection between these two events?

The decision to impose martial law in Tibet appeared at the time to be an unprecedented development. In light of recent events in Beijing, it looks like a dress rehearsal for handling civil unrest throughout China. Martial law in Tibet laid the necessary "legal" foundation. It also provided the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police (China's paramilitary security force, separated from the Army in 1984 to handle civil unrest) with an opportunity to practice techniques for mobilization and deployment before using them in China's big cities. Politburo member and head of security for China, Qiao Shi, who announced during a visit to Tibet in the summer of 1988 that Tibetan protest was to be met with "merciless repression," was personally put in charge of Tibetan affairs. He now oversees the roundup of dissident Chinese by Public Security.

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* The author spent eight months in Tibet during 1987 and 1988, documenting torture and human rights abuses, speaking with dissidents, and collecting information on the social and political background to the current nationalist unrest. He was present when security forces opened fire on demonstrators and a crowd of bystanders on December 10, 1988. He was subsequently arrested and interrogated by Public Security, and expelled from China on December 16, 1988.

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In both crises the official justification for repression has been the need to maintain "unity and stability" (identified in the case of Tibet with suppressing separatism and preserving the "historical" motherland). But maintaining "unity and stability" is itself a code for protecting Party rule, which is what is really at stake. "Unity and stability" in the present context is defended as a prerequisite to economic development (which in Tibet has replaced socialism as the *raison d' être* for continuing Chinese presence). This explains the recent vogue among some Party leaders and ideologues for a "new authoritarianism" — an upbeat vision of an autocratic social system that looks to South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore as models of successful Asian development. The new authoritarianism was intended to reassure Party conservatives and the military that the reforms did not necessarily threaten the essential instruments of social control in the hands of the state and that these very instruments of repression might be called upon to serve the reforms. The students' demand for democracy — never clearly defined beyond the removal of the present leadership — indicates not so much the loss of legitimacy facing the Party as the ineffectiveness of the current approach to Party control. It has become something of a cliché that China has pursued economic reforms without corresponding political reforms. The point that needs to be made, however, is that the economic reforms are themselves part of a political strategy.

That strategy is now in ruins and its main architects face discipline and expulsion from the Party or worse. Along with Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, Yan Mingfu, head of the United Front Work Department, and many of the academicians promoted into positions of power to oversee the economic reforms have been singled out for punishment. A wave of mass arrests followed the declaration of martial law in Tibet. A similar fate awaits the tens of thousands of Chinese who took part in the democracy demonstrations. Supporters of the student demonstrations are being accused of both "counter-revolutionary" activity and "anti-Party" activity. The former charge has already been used in Tibet to sentence Tibetan nationalists to long prison terms for writing letters, putting up wall posters, and communicating with foreigners. The latter charge is even more serious. The last time it was heard was during the trial of the Gang of Four. Now it is being used against reformers. The June 4, 1989 Beijing massacre marks a point of no return for the power struggle within the Party as it magnifies the seriousness of the reformers' "crimes" and justifies a purge on a scale that has not been seen since the days of Mao.

What was that strategy for political control through economic reform and why has it failed? Tibet, which suffered some of the worst excesses of

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the Cultural Revolution, has been a main target for the new strategy since 1980. Land has been redistributed to farmers, monasteries have been rebuilt, and a huge amount of money pumped into the region for development. Tibet has been a major showcase for the "open-door" policy — where economic development guarantees social stability and the harsh apparatus of collectivization can be lifted without danger of popular unrest. The strategy has required the rehabilitation of leading individuals and families from pre-communist society, as well as intellectuals and cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution. It assumes that a new generation of Tibetan "professionals" can be trained to work side by side with Han Chinese recruited for service in Tibet.

Because this strategy leans heavily on the talents and cooperation of non-Party elements, it can be called "the United Front Strategy." In fact, the Party's United Front Work Department has played the guiding role in implementing the strategy in Tibet. It also oversees the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which has re-emerged as the centerpiece of the policy of rehabilitation for religious and national leaders. Tibet remains different from China, since virtually all Tibetans see their country as occupied and the depredations of communist rule as something done to them by an invader. But the reformers' self-serving optimism was such that even Tibet, the nightmare of Chinese communism, was expected to fall into line. The policy has been unravelling in Tibet since 1987, as a series of nationalist demonstrations have elicited an increasingly brutal response from the authorities. At the same time, the brief period of reform during the 1980's has given Tibetans an opportunity to begin rebuilding a civil society shattered by a quarter-century of communist rule. This is clearly more than either reformers or conservatives are prepared to tolerate. Now the strategy of the reformers has been abandoned and Tibet's rulers have returned to Mao-era repression. Tibet thus illustrates *in extremis* both the limits and the tragedy of China's post-Mao reforms.

The United Front Strategy

When Hu Yaobang came to Tibet in 1980 to survey the effects of two decades of communist rule, he is said to have been shocked by what he found. Forced collectivization had left the local economy in ruins, the Tibetan people completely demoralized, and a pitifully inadequate infrastructure in the hands of Han Chinese administrators totally dependent on support from China. He is reported to have said: "This reminds me of colonialism." Hu made a series of recommendations that became the

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basis for the new policy of "openess and development,"[1] which has been the official line throughout the 1980's. Hu's recommendations included the elimination of taxes for farmers and herders, the withdrawal of Han cadres from Tibet, and greater autonomy for the local government. The subsequent breakup of the communes and the return to private plots in agriculture reestablished traditional household forms of production, including traditional patterns of trade between herders and farmers and between regions, and freed labor previously commandeered by the state. From the government's viewpoint this has been a mixed blessing. Productivity has gone up but, at the same time, control by local officials has diminished. Tibetans are as likely to take their surplus and use it to rebuild the local monastery and restaff it with their own children as they are to participate in government plans for economic development. The rebuilding of monasteries is a potential source of political instability, since the cultural life that goes on in them (which is increasingly political as well) lies outside Party control.

This has not escaped the notice of the architects of economic reforms. During the Cultural Revolution, the backwardness of what the Chinese refer to as the Tibetans' "feudal" society was demonstrated by contrasting it with socialist collectivization. Since the advent of the reforms, the backwardness of Tibetan society is proven by its unwillingness to be transformed into a commodity economy. Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai Nanfeng, of the Beijing Institute of Economic Reform, have investigated extensively the resurgence of the "natural economy" with the relaxation of controls in backward regions of China, particularly Tibet.[2] They show that the massive and accelerating infusion of capital into Tibet during the 1980's has simply subsidized the importation of commodities from China, with no tangible returns in terms of market-oriented local commodity production. The Tibetan economy remains outside of the Chinese market economy. At the same time, administration and management costs have risen dramatically. In effect, this means subsidizing consumption for the growing army of Han Chinese cadres sent to Tibet to oversee its economic development and staff its administration (who almost entirely reside in large towns, especially Lhasa).

Wang and Bai conclude that more external aid is not the answer. Their proposals for Tibet include building new towns from scratch, with

1. See Jigme Ngagpo, "Behind the Unrest in Tibet," *China Spring Digest*, (Jan./Feb. 1988), p. 26. The author, studying in the US, is the son of Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, who, along with the Panchen Lama, has been a leading spokesman for current Chinese policy in Tibet.

2. Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai Nanfeng, *The Poverty of Plenty*, (Macmillan, forthcoming).

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an intact and transplanted social structure (of Han migrants), and developing the tourist industry. The former strategy is designed to literally overwhelm local social organizations and drag Tibetans into commodity relations. The latter strategy is recommended because it is high in "information content," communicating modern values and modern patterns of consumption. The Chinese see tourism as a device for transvaluating "Tibetanness" itself, turning it into a commodity which can be subjected to economic control and thereby defusing its political content. Government investment in the restoration of some of the major monasteries as tourist attractions has conformed to this formula — both as a carefully-managed exercise in "religious freedom" designed to force Tibetan Buddhism into the mold of acceptable private belief, and as a device for turning monasteries into profit-making enterprises.[3]

The kind of organization that best embodies the United Front strategy of consolidating political control through economic development is illustrated by the Panchen Lama's Kangchen organization, based in Shigatse, Tibet's second-largest town and the site of the Panchen Lama's own monastery. Until his death this year, the Panchen Lama, rehabilitated during the reforms and made a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, has been the main spokesman for current Chinese reform policy towards Tibet. He has pressed for greater religious freedom as well as a Tibetan language and education policy, while at the same time reiterating the historical "unity of the motherland." Most importantly, he has constantly reminded Tibetans of the contrast between the current policy of economic development and the Cultural Revolution's "mistakes." While consistently condemning "splittists," he has also been free to attack "ultra-leftists" as the main obstacle to development.

Kangchen is a business corporation that oversees a number of enterprises, solicits and channels international development funds, and exports Tibetan products. Its express purpose is to raise money to rebuild monasteries throughout Tibet. So far, most of this money has gone to the Panchen Lama's own monastery and to the Shigatse area. The organization is presented by the government as a model for development. It offers a way of absorbing and investing economic surpluses

3. The effect of tourism in Tibet has been almost exactly opposite that intended by the Chinese. Western tourists are generally appreciative and sympathetic toward Tibetans. This has given Tibetans a new confidence in themselves and their society, as well as providing a forum for their grievances against the Chinese. During the recent disturbances, tourists have been the main channel for information about the Tibetan situation to the outside world.

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(not to mention foreign aid), while at the same time consolidating social control and guaranteeing that political stability is not threatened by rising economic power. It exemplifies the United Front strategy precisely because its leaders are non-Party "big men" recruited from the ranks of the rehabilitated "feudal" leadership.

Capitalist development in Tibet that depends on mobilizing "feudal" institutions is just one of the paradoxical consequences of the post-1980 reforms (as is the elaborate cult that the Chinese sanctioned around the Panchen Lama before his death and have announced that they will continue through the search for his successor). The Kangchen shops in Lhasa were repeatedly attacked during the riots — not because of hostility toward the Panchen Lama, but because Tibetans recognize the "big man" scheme for what it is. These are people who have intimate ties with the Party apparatus and Public Security. On a smaller scale, a number of important families have been similarly rehabilitated and are in the process of building business enterprises under Chinese patronage. Some of these families have ties with the refugee community in India and hold out the promise of a prosperous future for those who return. In fact, retaining foreign business interests and channeling investment back into Tibet is quite in line with the policy of encouraging overseas Chinese to aid their kin in business ventures and invest in the motherland.

Another element in the United Front strategy for Tibet has been the announcement by the Chinese that they are willing to negotiate with the Dalai Lama. Communication preparing for these negotiations was handled from the Chinese side by Yan Mingfu personally. A precondition for the negotiations has been that the Dalai Lama renounce any claim to independence for Tibet. The announcement of the negotiations bitterly divided the exile community, with one side questioning the wisdom of abandoning the central theme of the Tibetan cause, independent nationhood, while promoters of the negotiations spoke optimistically of achieving democracy and autonomy for Tibet and halting the influx of Chinese settlers. In any case, though the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence are important symbols for Tibet demonstrators, the refugee community and the government-in-exile have played only a minor role in the current unrest and have had little contact with the demonstrators themselves (though many will acknowledge the Dalai Lama's government as their legitimate representative). The prospect of giving up the goal of Tibetan independence was not well received in Tibet, where there is general suspicion of Chinese motives and the announcement of negotiations was perceived as a propaganda exercise to quell the demonstrations.

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Expecting the Chinese government to negotiate real autonomy for Tibetans may have been unrealistic from the start. The Chinese have so far contemptuously dismissed all suggestions from the Tibetan side as "disguised independence." As far as Tibet is concerned, political enfranchisement of forces hostile to the Party/state is too great a risk. Real autonomy implies dismantling the Party in Tibet, since Tibetans see Party rule as synonymous with Chinese rule. But what the Chinese had expected from these negotiations was always clear. In the short run, they demanded that the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile intervene to halt the continuing nationalist demonstrations inside Tibet. In the long run, they expected that the return of the Dalai Lama and other leaders from exile could be forced to conform to the model of the Panchen Lama and his Kangchen organization. Their presence could be used to defuse the political situation, while their loyalty could be secured through the promise of special privileges and economic benefits.

Cadres: Old and New

Hu's demand that Han cadres be withdrawn from Tibet and that the government of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) be placed in the hands of Tibetan cadres has met only limited success. In the first place, many of the Tibetan cadres that Hu found on his visit to Tibet were, in current parlance, "ultra-leftists." This same group, which was Maoist during the Cultural Revolution, continues to occupy its positions within the regional Party structure. In fact, its members have moved up in rank to head Party committees as some of the old guard of Han cadres were removed during the 1980's. They pay lip service to the open-door policy and the current strategy of economic development, but their concept of Party rule remains the rigid and uncompromising approach of twenty years ago, with its emphasis on ideological orthodoxy as the surest guarantee of loyalty. During recent disturbances, they were the first to call for political campaigns to correct the masses' thinking and weed out troublemakers. This is also the group that resists many of the programs designed to "Tibetanize" the administration — such as the new language policy announced last year to make Tibetan the official language in the administration over the next ten years. These old Tibetan cadres are comfortable in Chinese and fear Tibetanization as an erosion of their own standing as political "translators" for Chinese rule.

The number of long-standing Chinese functionaries has indeed been gradually reduced since 1980. Many of these came to Tibet following the 1959 Tibetan uprising. Often they became attached to the military and stayed on to build careers in the Tibetan regional Party apparatus.

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Few have learned Tibetan, nor do they identify with Tibet or the Tibetan people. They are represented in every Party department and government office and constitute the backbone of the Party in Tibet, with a Tibetan staff beneath them. Some had their careers interrupted by the Cultural Revolution but, on the whole, they are ideologically neutral, ready to fall in line with the shifting currents of official policy. In periods of uncertainty they reemerge as the ones who can be depended on to keep the administration working. Thus, following the dismissal of the reformer, Wu Jinghua, after the independence demonstrations in 1987-88, Mao Rubei, a Han cadre in Tibet for over twenty-five years, took over as acting secretary of the TAR regional committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for a year until Wu's successor, Hu Jintao, another reformer and protegé of Hu Yaobang, was selected.

The head of the regional CPC in Tibet has always been Chinese, but the character of the leadership has changed with the reforms. Ren Rong, whose career as a political commissar of the Tibet Military Region goes back to 1965, also was the head of the regional Party from 1971 to 1980, until he was replaced on orders from Hu. His replacement was another long-time PLA political commissar in Tibet, Yin Fatang, whose career was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Finally, in 1985 Wu Jinghua came to Tibet as Party head, riding the wave of enthusiasm for economic reform and the open-door policy. During this period, Tibet opened to foreign tourism (and built half-a-dozen luxury hotels, including a Holiday Inn for foreign "guests"), solicited foreign aid and development funds, and actively courted the Tibetan exile community. That Wu's successor was also a reformer (as well as China's youngest provincial Party secretary and a proven technocrat) indicates that the reformers still had the say in determining policy for Tibet in spite of the growing nationalist protest and the increasingly brutal police response. Hu Jintao was in office only a few months before martial law was declared by Premier Li Peng and the State Council.

The number of Han cadres in Tibet has continued to increase as a direct consequence of the reforms. But now it is a new generation of technocratic reformers sent to carry forward economic development. Personally, many of them may resent being sent to Tibet, which in the Chinese imagination continues to be a savage frontier inhabited by barbarians (they live apart from the Tibetan population in modern concrete enclaves). But they share the same vision of economic development as social policy as their peers in China. As with any frontier, development is something to be done to the natives — or in spite of

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them. Rather than functionaries in the administration of an occupying army, these new Han cadres are the spearhead of a new form of colonial development; they are obliged to make Tibet a paying proposition, to have it show a return on the investment in infrastructure.

The reforms in Tibet have required the participation of the rehabilitated Tibetan leadership, the target of the United Front strategy. The organ that exemplifies this part of the strategy is the regional CPPCC. In fact, the CPPCC has no more real power than any of the other "people's" organizations within the Chinese political apparatus, but it is an essential advertisement for rehabilitation. The predominantly Tibetan composition of this non-Party organization now consists of some of the pre-1959 leadership or members of leading families from that era. Many of these are highly talented people — scholars, skilled administrators, religious leaders. Many suffered terribly during the Cultural Revolution and have spent time in prisons and labor-camps. They have been essential in creating the cultural institutions that the Chinese point to as evidence of modernization and reform — the new university, the Academy of Social Sciences, the Buddhist Association. Practically, their cooperation is essential for rebuilding Tibet. In political terms, their compliance and public acquiescence to Chinese rule are expected to defuse nationalist discontent and legitimate the new role of the Chinese in Tibet as modernizers rather than oppressors.

These cultural institutions are just façades. The university is primarily a branch-plant operation for Chinese students and faculty (most of the faculty are Chinese, as are the majority of students, many coming from other provinces because there are openings there). The Academy of Social Sciences remains under the political control of the Party and cooperates with Public Security. The religious leaders who sit on the Buddhist Association command no respect from the young monks and nuns, who are rapidly developing a politically-active form of Tibetan Buddhism. Simply preserving the forms of Tibetan religion is not acceptable to the younger generation, who look up to Buddhism both as a source of national identity and as a resource in their struggle against the state repression they have known since birth. Some of these rehabilitated leaders are aware of how they are being used, but apply what leverage they can to further the Tibetan national cause. They must publicly assent to the "unity of the motherland" and denounce "splittism," but in their scholarly research and publications, for instance, they go as far as they can in contradicting the official Chinese version of Tibetan history.

The Tibetan Studies department at the University, the one department

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out of seven where Tibetan is the language of instruction and where all of the students are Tibetans, was initiated to carry on research in Tibetan language, literature, and philosophy, but the Tibetan students in the department have joined with the monks and nuns in political protest. Political posters frequently appeared on campus. The students demonstrated in December 1988 in support of the monks and nuns shot earlier that month in a demonstration on International Human Rights Day. They also demanded "Tibetanization" of the university and the government and the disarming of the police, though they were careful not to display the symbols of Tibetan independence, such as the banned national flag. Lobsang Tenzin, who was sentenced to death in January, 1989, for the murder of a Security officer during the riots in March, 1988, was subsequently voted "most popular student" by his classmates in the department. The best-known Tibetan dissident, Yulu Dawa Tsering, was a philosophy professor in the department, member of the CPPCC and the Buddhist Association. He was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for "counter-revolutionary propaganda" in January, 1989.[4]

The decisive group in terms of the Party strategy are the young Tibetan cadres who have been educated in China and have come back to Tibet to work in government offices. They, too, have recently demonstrated in support of monks and nuns in Tibet. In fact the first demonstration in Tiananmen Square in recent years, also a protest against the shooting of unarmed demonstrators in Lhasa, was by Tibetan students from the Central Minorities Institute in December, 1988 (a week later Muslim students from Xinjiang staged their own nationalist demonstration). The young Tibetan cadres pose the greatest dilemma for the Party. There is a long history of resistance and sabotage of Chinese rule by Tibetan cadres going back to the 1950's. At the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, some Tibetans became Red Guards as a way of striking back at local Chinese functionaries. But the political campaigns of the past, which demanded ideological rectitude and total participation, were an effective way of weeding out potential dissidents.

These new Tibetan cadres reflect the current policy of recruiting more Tibetans for service in Tibet. They share with young Chinese cadres contempt for Maoism. Yet they discover in Tibet that many of the Maoists still in power, the old-guard, are Tibetan. They also discover that their own life-chances are blocked by newly-arrived technocratically-minded

4. Yulu Dawa Tsering has been adopted as a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. His "crime" was discussing Tibetan independence with foreign tourists. He was arrested in December 1987, following the first wave of demonstrations.

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Chinese cadres brought in for economic development. Their careers are blocked not because they lack the necessary skills, but because they are Tibetan. As Tibetans they cannot be trusted, and they must always be overseen by Chinese. To the extent that Maoist ideology no longer operates as the touchstone of loyalty to the Party, there is no effective way to certify loyalty.[5] These young Tibetan cadres are especially well-represented in occupations like journalism, broadcasting, the arts and cultural affairs, and tourism. They are almost universally Tibetan nationalists, though they are equally committed to modernization and reform (the fruit of their education by the Chinese). They, too, have become politically active in the last two years, supporting the demonstrations by the monks and nuns. As a group, these young Tibetan cadres probably have the most in common with the democracy movement among Chinese. Yet their experience as an ethnic minority within the Chinese state apparatus has convinced them of the unworkability of the entire system as far as Tibet is concerned, regardless of its apparent liberalization.

Militant Monks and Decollectivization

The first organized demonstrations to take place in Tibet began in autumn, 1987. Monks from the Drepung monastery marched through the streets of Lhasa on September 27 displaying the Tibetan national flag, praising the Dalai Lama and demanding independence. They were attacked and beaten by police, arrested, and taken to prison. On October 1, monks from the Sera monastery staged a similar demonstration. They too were arrested, beaten by police, and taken to a nearby police station. An angry crowd burned down the police station in an attempt to free the monks. For several hours police shot indiscriminately into the crowd, killing at least eight people and wounding many more. Since 1987 there have been two dozen such demonstrations by monks and nuns in Lhasa. The police response has varied, but on the whole has become increasingly brutal, with orders to fire on demonstrators without warning in

5. Lucian Pye has commented on the dilemma facing China with ethnic minorities on its strategic frontiers. He notes that "the leveling of cultural differences can lead to greater ethnic tensions as economic and political power considerations are elevated in relative importance." At the same time, the security problem facing China means that, "whereas in industrializing societies it is possible to diffuse power toward ethnic groups as they become more assimilated, in China it may be hard to yield significant power to minorities as they can hardly be trusted as the ultimate guardians of the borders." See his "China: Ethnic Minorities and National Security," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan eds., *Ethnicity — Theory and Experience*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1975), pp. 510-11. It should be added that the Leninist Party/state is itself responsible for the problem of the untrustworthiness of minorities Pye mentions.

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the most recent demonstrations. Prisoners are routinely tortured, partly to extract confessions, but also increasingly as a form of intimidation.[6] Dissident activity includes distributing banned political literature, poster campaigns, and the creation of a loosely-knit network of underground organizations.

Demonstrations by the monks and nuns from the big monasteries around Lhasa have been the symbolic focus of protest. To the extent that the monasteries exert influence over Tibetans, the official Chinese line is that they are vestiges of "feudalism." The Chinese referred to the monks as "lamas," whereas the traditional Tibetan sense of this term was old, respected, and powerful religious leaders, of whom very few remain alive today in Tibet. The lamas that do remain and have been allowed to return to their monasteries are targets for the United Front strategy of cooptation.

Most monks and nuns are young people in their teens and twenties from rural backgrounds. Born during the Cultural Revolution, their political education has been entirely in Chinese hands. The retreat of the political bosses from the villages following the reforms (political control is now exercised from the county level) has opened a space in Tibetan society for the reconstruction of the monasteries as the one cohesive institution that Tibetans are able to identify as their own. This is an extraordinary development, since support for the monasteries is voluntary (with the exception of state-sanctioned tourism in the case of a few larger monasteries). The monasteries do not, for instance, own land as they did in traditional Tibetan society. Much of the specialized ritual of the traditional religion is simply lost, the specialists gone. Villages decide on their own to rebuild local monasteries and staff them with their children. They signify Tibetan self-determination and a re-emerging civil society. The rebuilding of monasteries is frequently an explicitly political act. One monastery in Lhasa was dubbed the "youth temple" because Lhasa youth had taken on the project of restoring it with their own labor and contributions. Prayers on behalf of the Dalai Lama are offered by laity and monks alike, not because he has gained in ritual significance, but because he is identified with Tibetan independence and prayers for him are seen as an act of rebellion (perhaps because

6. Both Asia Watch and Amnesty International have accumulated a considerable body of evidence on torture in Tibet. Prisoners are held in three prisons around Lhasa — Sangyip, Gurtsa, and Drapchi. The most frequently reported forms of torture include repeated electric shocks from "electric sticks," beatings with sticks, rifle butts and iron rods, and suspension by ropes tied to the arms and lashed behind the back (the "flying airplane").

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he remains a distant figure, there may be more unanimity among Tibetans inside Tibet on the symbolic role of the Dalai Lama than outside).

The most important function that the monasteries fulfill now is educational. Many of the young monks and nuns have no education, neither in Chinese nor Tibetan. In the monasteries they learn to read and write Tibetan along with their religious duties, and over the last several years they have also received a political education. The Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence are important symbols, but by no means exhaust the scope of what they think about and discuss. Banned books on Tibetan literature and history are circulated. Monks have taken copies of a democratic constitution for Tibet back to their villages, using it as an example of what an independent Tibet could be like. The Chinese have imposed quotas on the number of monks that can stay in large monasteries around Lhasa, and since 1987 have officially admitted no new monks. As a result, although they are forbidden to be taught and live under constant threat of expulsion, a large number of illegal monks reside in monasteries

If the monasteries represent the spontaneous reconstruction of Tibetan institutions, the apparatus of social control on which Chinese communism in Tibet had come to depend has been rendered largely ineffective. The breakup of the communes during the early 1980's and the release of labor from control by the state considerably weakened the Party's hold over the countryside. Without the all-pervasive control over daily life that collectivization provided, the Party had no way of maintaining effective surveillance. Efforts at indoctrination and forced political participation had become largely perfunctory. The breakup of the communes also set loose a transient population, no longer tied to work-units, many of whom migrated to Lhasa to set up businesses and engage in trade. Independent truckdrivers move goods and people from the Nepali/Indian border in the west to the borders of Sichuan and Gansu provinces in the east and Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) in the north. Many Tibetan truckdrivers are villagers, driving trucks bought by one or several families as an investment. They have played an important role in disseminating information (as well as participating in protests). The reemergence of exchange between nomads and the settled population has also contributed to the population's general mobility. The net effect has been the creation of networks of contact between different groups and different regions that lie completely outside Party control.

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The Anti-Splittist Campaign

Following the demonstration and violence on October 1, 1987, the People's Government of Lhasa issued a proclamation that marked the beginning of attempts to deal with separatist protest by means of the apparatus of Party control — propaganda, political meetings, indiscriminate arrests, and forced confession and self-criticism. Foreign journalists who had arrived after the first demonstration on September 27 were thrown out. The official account of the shootings had Tibetan "troublemakers" seizing guns from the police and shooting each other. The discrepancy between foreign accounts of what had taken place and the official Chinese account did not bother the authorities. Nor did it matter that no one in Lhasa believed the official account. Partly it was meant to influence Tibetans outside of Lhasa, partly to provide a palatable version of events for Chinese consumption; but primarily it set the stage for the ensuing political campaign. The greater the discrepancy between the people's own experiences and the official line, the more effective the mechanism of confession and self-criticism in public meetings and interrogation sessions. Those who rejected the official version are all the more easily spotted as potential dissidents.

The proclamation of October 1 called on units within the Party structure and the administration to initiate "ideological work" for improving the thinking of cadres and workers, as well as their families, children, and relatives. It also called on neighborhood committees and work-units to do the same with city residents. The neighborhood committees, whose antecedents during the Cultural Revolution were a means of intimidating the population, had become a moribund institution. Now they were to be reactivated to combat nationalist unrest. Likewise, departments and committees were expected to immediately report on individuals suspected of involvement in the unrest, and all residents were to be encouraged to do the same. The unrest itself was blamed on "secret manipulations of a few counter-revolutionaries and separatists." This "conspiratorial" theme, so effective during the Cultural Revolution, works by making an example of those selected for punishment, while dividing the rest of the population as they struggle to affirm their loyalty and avoid punishment.

Political meetings began within a few days. There were "group discussions," where participants were encouraged to give there ideas, others were encouraged to discuss them, and finally the political leader would provide "helpful" criticism. Each family living in the Tibetan areas of Lhasa was required to have a member attend. Special political

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units were organized and sent to the monasteries as well, which were periodically closed for weeks at a time for political reeducation. Initially, the purpose of these meetings seems to have been to enforce loyalty and ideological orthodoxy. Tibetans were required to publicaly denounce the demonstrations and Tibetan independence, affirm the unity of the motherland, and criticize the Dalai Lama. The last demand was quickly dropped, since virtually no Tibetans were prepared to comply. The other demands frequently met with resistence, as individuals would make jokes or look for excuses for not participating in the discussions. The monks made the most trouble for the authorities. In a reeducation meeting at one monastery they told the political cadres they had nothing to confess and proceeded to make paper airplanes out of the sheets of paper they had been given for writing their self-criticisms. A few days before October 1, Chinese National Day, in 1988, when the authorities were expecting Tibetans to attempt to demonstrate in Lhasa, the monks at another monastery all "volunteered" to be thrown out of the monastery if it would "please" the government.

The names of those who refused to cooperate in the meetings were noted by political workers, and a few of the most vociferous ones (especially in the case of monks) were arrested on the spot. In subsequent demonstrations, however, they were among the first to be arrested. Those few Tibetans who did cooperate or provide public statements that could be used for propaganda were ostracized by their neighbors. Without the total apparatus of collectivization, political indoctrination through public meetings seems to be largely ineffective. What individuals confess in public they will be held accountable for by their neighbors in private. If anything, the political meetings were solidarity-building exercises for Tibetans. Efforts by political workers to organize staged pro-Chinese counter-demonstrations also proved unsuccessful. As the demonstrations continued through 1988 and into 1989, and as the suppression of dissent became more and more brutal, Tibetans actually became more courageous in the reeducation sessions (and also under interrogation), and in some cases actually attacked the political workers.

The other theme stressed throughout the anti-splittist campaign was modernization. This has largely displaced socialism as the main justification for the Chinese system (and Chinese rule) in Tibet. Tibetans were reminded of how they had suffered through the "mistakes" of the Cultural Revolution and how much better things were now that Tibet was modernizing. Of course, the political meetings were themselves a reminder of how things had been. In longer historical perspective, Tibetans were told they had once been a hopelessly feudal society, a fate from

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which the Chinese have rescued them. Thus demonstrations and protests threaten modernization. This theme alternates throughout the campaign, with suppressing counter-revolution — a kind of carrot-and-stick approach. It also suggests lines of cleavage within the Party apparatus. The theme of modernization dominated the meetings and the official propaganda, after the first wave of arrests in autumn 1987 had subsided and most of those arrested were released in a display of "leniency."

But modernization is not an effective ideological substitute for socialism: first, because socialism is more than an ideology, it is also a system of social control, and second, because talk of modernization under the Chinese only serves to heighten the Tibetans' perceptions of their own relative disadvantage. Tibetans perceive the benefits of modernization distributed very unevenly, with the larger share going to Chinese settlers. To that extent, modernization increases rather than diminishes nationalist sentiments, since Tibetans see it as something that belongs to them by right and which the Chinese presence actually denies them. Thus, when they discuss these things among themselves, they focus on what the Chinese system has never delivered and cannot deliver — human rights, democracy, civil liberties (which are all glossed by the Tibetan term for "independence").

From the viewpoint of Party control, the anti-splittist campaign was a total failure. Throughout 1988 and into 1989 demonstrations continued and the scope of dissident activity broadened. Anti-Chinese riots took place in March of 1988 and again in March 1989. Following the demonstration and riot in March 1988, widespread and systematic torture became commonplace in the prisons. Hundreds of Tibetans were arrested, beaten and tortured in prison, then released several months later with no charges. Accounts from released prisoners indicate that torture was used during interrogation sessions primarily to intimidate and create an atmosphere of fear — not to extract confessions or gain information. By October 1988, the main message being communicated in neighborhood committee meetings was that demonstrators would be gunned down in the streets. This promise was kept in December, when security forces opened fire without warning on a small group of demonstrators and a crowd of bystanders. Early in 1989, the Party appeared to have called a halt to political meetings. Clearly they were not having the desired effect. In their place is a policy of brutal repression, killings, and imprisonment unknown for over a decade in Tibet. Unlike in the past, there is no attempt to legitimate repression through ideology — or to use ideology as an instrument of social control. As the last foreigners

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were forced to leave Lhasa in March 1989, following the declaration of martial law, they reported a wave of mass arrests. Martial law remains in effect in Tibet and, considering events in the rest of China, is not likely to be lifted soon.

The Future of Repression in Tibet and China

It is worth comparing the anti-splittist campaign in Tibet with the campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" set in motion in China following the resignation of Hu Yaobang as Party secretary in 1987 (during which intellectuals like Fang Lizhi were purged). Examining the themes of the campaign against bourgeois liberalization,[7] their most striking feature is their essentially *fascist* character. The campaign was not so much an attack on the goals of modernization and economic development, but on the "unhealthy social practices" and cultural decay that had accompanied the reforms. Individualism, "bourgeois freedoms," decadence and "moral weakness" are constantly recurring themes. What China — and especially the Party — require are "iron men" with selfless devotion to the nation. Neither was the campaign against bourgeois liberalization an attack on decollectivization. Critics of the reforms complained that the loyalty of Party members was being eroded and that Party institutions were losing power. What they demanded was a return to ideological orthodoxy within the Party and greater supervision of the masses through political education. Thus the debate within the Party was never over capitalism versus socialism, but between two styles of administration and social control.

Like the anti-splittist campaign, the campaign against bourgeois liberalization was also a failure. Though responsible for purges within the Party itself, it had considerably less impact on society as a whole. The resurgence of the student movement within just a couple of years is one indication of this. In institutions allied to the reforms the campaign was either ignored or downplayed. Chinese could not believe that the institutional changes wrought by the reforms could be undone — and that society could retreat into the harsh repression of the past. The conservatives who led the campaign correctly perceived that the reforms could not guarantee Party rule. What they failed to recognize at the time was that, by themselves, neither could ideological orthodoxy nor Party discipline.

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7. For a summary of these themes see Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Assault on the Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberalization in China, 1985-86," *China Quarterly* (June 1988).

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The problems facing the Leninist system in both Tibet and China are similar. The reforms created an opportunity for rebuilding a civil society brutally suppressed during decades of communist rule. Reformers within the Party believed they could manipulate reforms to achieve their economic goals without at the same time losing control of the social forces they had set in motion — i.e., without allowing an autonomous civil society to emerge that would ultimately threaten their own hold over society (allowing Tibetans instead only a stage-managed, showpiece version of Tibetan society). Empty slogans declaring democracy and human rights to be "feudalism" and "the return of the serf-system" fall on deaf ears in Tibet, just as do slogans attacking democracy and human rights as bourgeois decadence. It is the people's own experience in recent years in rebuilding society from the ground up that gives these terms meaning.

But the option of appealing to native sentiments and patriotism does not exist for Party conservatives in Tibet, as it does in their propaganda campaign against democracy in China. For Tibetans who have no other experience of the Leninist Party/state except as the political arm of an occupying power, the rebuilding of civil society, Tibetan Buddhism (with the Dalai Lama as its symbol), and independence are all synonymous. This is true because for virtually all Tibetans Buddhism and a sense of nationhood remain common mobilizing symbols after decades of Chinese rule. It has also proven an effective strategy, since Tibetans have been able to seize onto religious freedoms offered by the reformers and use the institutions of Buddhism as a base for disseminating information and mobilizing the population. On this basis a variety of different groups within Tibetan society have been able to find common cause in their opposition to Chinese rule. Thus the reforms were appreciated for the freedoms they allowed — freedoms all too easily revoked. Something like the United Front strategy could probably be made to work (as seems to have happened in Poland), but it would involve identifying the real political lines of cleavage in Tibetan society and coopting different interests from within the opposition as they became a threat. This Leninist Party/state in China, obsessed with its own power, is unable to do.

Short of recollectivizing Chinese society, the reactionary vision of a disciplined social order uncorrupted by individualism can only be realized through the police-state. It is possible to regard what happened in Tibet, and then a few months later throughout China, as a chain of events carefully stage-managed by the conservatives. The authorities' response to demonstrations in Tibet was to an extent unpredictable. The apparent tolerance of some demonstrations actually seemed to

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encourage protest; the brutality of the response, when it came, took many by surprise. The same pattern characterizes the response to the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. But if it was planned all along that the demonstrations would provide a pretext for the seizure of power within the Party, as well as an opportunity to mobilize the security forces and consolidate their hold over the society, then the logic of the response to the protests is clear. Now there is no turning back. Only continuing police repression will hold society in its present form. Those who believed that China was making the transition from socialist collectivization to democratic capitalism were sadly mistaken. The real transition seems to be from Leninist socialism to a less ideological form of military dictatorship (if the likes of Jeane Kirkpatrick are to believed, this may indeed constitute progress). The future of repression in China may follow the pattern of the great military dictatorships of Latin America.

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Published by SAGE from 1987

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Democratization and Re-Stalinization in China

Edward Friedman

When, in order to legitimate its repression, Deng Xiaoping's regime denounced the May-June 1989 democracy demonstrators as counter-revolutionaries seeking to violently replace a socialist revolution with a reactionary democratic bourgeois dictatorship, the question of revolution tragically resurfaced. Surprisingly, the demonstrators were not urging a violent overthrow of the government. Many regretted the original revolution which brought Mao Zedong to power. Yet, they feared that a violent clash would intensify dictatorial tendencies on both sides and hinder a transition to a democracy capable of limiting state power and guaranteeing civil rights. They sought a gradual reform — a process that could last as long as an entire generation.

According to well-placed Party democrats, there were many government and army leaders who disagreed with Deng's decision to violently suppress the demonstrators. But Deng's defense that blood had to be shed or the leaders' heads would roll showed that, like Mao, he still identified with Robespierre in believing that, unless terror was used to ward off the Thermidorians, the revolution's gains would be lost. Once Deng, as supreme leader, insisted on defining the democrats as class enemies, no one dared oppose him. While the military was divided on many issues, including the power-grab by General Yang Shongkun's clique, rumors of army units fighting each other were pure fiction. The rulers feared that if the Party leader were opposed after committing himself, then the entire Leninist system could come unglued. During the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong forged a similar false unity at the Lushan Plenum in 1959 by dismissing as a rightist Peng Dehuai — the only leader courageous enough to raise the issue of the starvation

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caused by Mao's policies. Then, as now, the rulers' top priority was the system which guaranteed their positions.

To understand how illegitimate the Deng regime had become by Spring 1989, it is useful to recall how much Beijing residents had come to fear any disorder in the streets. When students demonstrated for democracy in December 1985 and December 1986, they were isolated from the populace. Urban dwellers turned their backs on them because any disorder seemed to threaten a return to the vigilante violence of Mao's Cultural Revolution. In 1985 and 1986 even the demonstrators' parents begged their children to stop meeting and marching, arguing that such acts could only provoke the reactionary old guard in the regime to make things worse. Consequently, the massive outpouring of urban support in May 1989 for students who began a hunger strike was unexpected and signalled a rapid change in public opinion. The regime was now perceived as hopeless. It was testimony to popular outrage that people started saying not even the Japanese occupiers were as bad as the current regime — even Mao was not as bad as Deng. This transformation of public opinion turned a student demonstration for minimal democratic reforms — dialogue, legalization of the independent student union, a press free enough to report on the finances of leaders and their family members — into an attempt to overthrow the government and proceed as rapidly as possible toward democratization.

Participation in the orderly, non-violent general urban insurrection ran the gamut from reporters from the Party's Central Committee newspaper to petty thieves who showed up asking to demonstrate. The organizers eventually approved the underclass participation, insisting, however, that, as all others, they too must identify themselves by place and occupation. On the banner identifying the group as "petty thieves, Beijing city," was written a somewhat rhythmic eight character couplet: *zhichi xuesheng, batou san tian* (in support of students, no theft for three days). But even before the broad, yet peaceful, insurrection, Deng had opted for suppression to preserve the "gains" of socialism.

Deng's regime legitimated itself using a potent nationalism linked to military successes: "We succeeded in developing certain things, such as the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb and even intercontinental ballistic missiles."[1] In addition, frightened that reforms which threatened

1. Deng Xiaoping, *Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), p. 176. At the Mao Museum in his home region, the only claim left for the 1960s accomplishments is China's first atomic bomb explosion. See Paul Theroux, *Riding the Iron Rooster* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1988), p. 262.

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guaranteed minimums could alienate urban factory workers and lead them to join democratic intellectuals against the regime as in Poland's Solidarity, Deng in the late 1980s blocked badly needed price reforms, thus intensifying the economic crisis. Threatened by both reformist action and conservative inaction, the Deng regime is unlikely to resolve the deepening crisis however it shifts the burden, because the fears and interests of ruling groups make difficult and dangerous any head-on confrontation with the political or economic causes of the crisis, the delegitimated one-party tyranny with its associated corrupt and inefficient command economy.

In addition, Deng and his associates perceived democracy and human rights as exploitative and treasonous. His ideological soulmate Huang Hua had earlier denounced human rights as follows: "Bourgeois countries often use human rights . . . to conceal the capitalists' ruthless exploitation of the laboring people . . . It makes no difference who is in power: he always stands for the interests of the bourgeoisie . . . is it really necessary for the countries under the dictatorship of the proletariat to give human rights to a few saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries? Lenin pointed out: 'All countries tend to use brute force, the only distinction being whether this brute force is used against the exploiters or the exploited' . . . only by resolutely oppressing a handful of class enemies can the broad masses of people be protected."[2]

After 1979, Deng himself, ever more vigorously and viciously, denounced democratizers in order to maintain the loyalty of the conservative old guard in and out of the military who were unwilling to allow people without a "socialist" consciousness to decide on rulers or budget. These ruling groups monopolized power while stigmatizing democracy and imprisoning democrats in 1979, expanded the number of political prisoners in 1981, and pushed their anti-democratic drive to the level of a campaign in 1983. Against democrats, ridiculed as Westernizers, even before the 1989 events, Deng declared: ". . . bourgeois liberalization . . . exponents worship the 'democracy' and 'freedom' of the western capitalist countries . . . This cannot be allowed. China . . . must absolutely not liberalize . . . the struggle against liberalization will have to be carried out not only now but for the next ten or twenty years. . . . Firm measures must be taken against any student who creates trouble at Tienanmen Square . . . No concessions should be made . . . if any of them disturb public order or violate the law, they must be dealt with unhesitatingly. We cannot do without dictatorship . . . If we . . . back down, we shall only

2. Huang Hua, *Issues and Studies* 14.2 (February 1978), pp. 81-84.

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have more trouble down the road. We should not be afraid that it will damage our reputation abroad . . . the trouble-makers amount to just 1 or 2% of all college and university students. The democracy in capitalist societies is bourgeois democracy — in fact, it is the democracy of monopoly capitalists."[3]

Many Chinese support opposition to Western capitalism, seeing it as the institutional cause of the imperialism which plundered China and other poor nations. Currently, the rulers have a popular base for chauvinist manipulation — a resource not available to opponents of reform in much of Eastern and Central Europe. Solidarity would not have had its popular base if West German leader Willy Brandt had not first succeeded with his *Ostpolitik*, surrendering German claims to Polish territory and thus transforming the Polish government from a provider of Soviet protection against Germany to an unjust oppresser of the Polish people. For ruling groups in states whose people have been persuaded that socialism liberated them from imperialist exploitation, legitimacy requires holding on to the mantle of nationalism. Mao Zedong defended his inability to deliver the material blessings of the modern world with an ever more vicious chauvinism.[4] So powerfully legitimate are Leninist states whose nationalist credentials seem based on an authentic independence struggle that the competition for power in China remains locked within a narrow nativism established by Mao.

Because of this perceived need to prove one's patriotism, the 1989 Chinese urban insurrection never called itself "a democratic movement." It invariably dubbed itself a *patriotic* democratic movement, shouting "patriotism is not a crime" and became extremely angry when called unpatriotic by Premier Li Peng. The demonstrators never questioned the state's bloody repression of peaceful demonstrators in Tibet and never noticed in May that both the capitals of Tibet and the People's Republic, Lhasa and Beijing, were under martial law. Neither did the movement support opponents of atomic testing which endangers ethnic minorities in China's far west. For the students, patriotism had priority. The patriotic insurgents denounced reactionary rulers for selling out the country's treasures to foreigners, pointing for proof to the scores of imported Mercedes-Benz which rolled into the control of top officials and

3. Deng, *op. cit.*, pp. 81, 38, 35, 30, 113-114. 153, 155, 163-164, 165, 188, 192.

4. See Edward Friedman, "Maoist and Post-Mao Conceptualizations of the World Market" in Samuel Kim, ed., *China and the World* (Boulder: Westview Press, second edition, 1989); Allen S. Whiting, "The Politics of Sino-Japanese Relations," *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy*, June Teufel Dreyer and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., (New York: Professors World Peace Academy, 1989), pp. 135-165.

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the widespread practice among rulers of placing family members in cushy posts where they could make lucrative deals with foreigners.

But these anti-foreign emotions can be turned against the democrats with the argument that international capitalism could join with national capitalists to bleed a poor and suffering people. Although Deng so far has resisted reactionary proponents of such analyses, his continuing attacks on democrats and all-out reformers have increasingly left him — and China — committed to people who prefer to mobilize nativism against capitalist imperialism in order to return to more autarkic traditional Leninist policies. The 27th army demonstrated the explosiveness of this conservative opposition on June 7, 1989, as it marched toward foreign residences and a hotel for foreigners shouting, "sha, sha, sha" (kill, kill, kill) and opened fire. Troops also fired upon the major Chinese investment organization. Attacking successful small entrepreneurs and corrupt members of highly placed families who opposed the repression will prove an irresistable temptation, a means to display the Deng regime's opposition to corruption.

The ruling groups have tried to brand the urban patriots as traitors by claiming that Marx's theory, Lenin's Party and Stalin's policies and institutions all harmonize with Chinese tradition, while democracy and human rights are a purely foreign imposition linked to Hong Kong money, Taiwan secret agents and American incitement. There are, of course, philosophers on the other side who argue instead that rights and popular will as the basis of governance are ancient Chinese concepts.

The task of conservative or moderately reformist Chinese rulers is to open up to the material benefits of the world economy and modern technology while holding on to conservative authoritarian policies. Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang tried to re-energize reform efforts along these lines in late 1988 with the help of a theory known as "the new authoritarianism." Proponents claimed to be following analysts such as Sam Huntington, Herman Kahn,[5] and Dwight Perkins.[6] Huntington concludes that developing countries lack institutions strong enough to respond to too many popular democratic demands and that authoritarian development is therefore the only alternative to disorder and decline. Meanwhile, Kahn and Perkins see a common yet unique and authoritarian Confucian culture as central to the success of the newly industrialized

5. Herman Kahn, "The Confucian Ethic and Economic Growth," *The Gap Between Rich and Poor*, Mitchell Seligson, ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 78-80. Huntington, by the way, disowned this use of his work in China. The Spring 1989 publication of that fact in China further delegitimated the Deng government.

6. Dwight Perkins, *China: Asia's Next Giant?* (Seattle: U. of Washington Press, 1986).

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economies of the Pacific Rim. These proponents of "the new authoritarianism" opted for a strong central dictatorship as the only road to modernity. From this perspective, democracy was, at best, irrelevant.

At the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 meetings were held all over urban China, especially in colleges, to discuss "the new authoritarianism" and its implications for Chinese culture. If China were inherently Confucian, then a new authoritarianism rooted in Chinese traditions was the road to economic modernization. If Confucian traditions were instead cruelly feudal, then a new democratic culture, democratic institutions and openness to the international world of science and what other peoples had to teach should be on the agenda. For the new authoritarians, Confucianism was defended as a tradition of rational governance in the interests of the people, hence at one with socialism and proof that the legacy of Marx and Lenin could meld with Chinese culture.[7]

By early 1989, the Chinese press was highlighting the trends toward multi-party democracy in Poland and Hungary. Democrats argued that the Deng regime was doing virtually nothing to undermine a feudal culture which predisposed people to follow all powerful leaders and prove their loyalty by ruthlessly attacking its enemies. Dismissing comparisons with small places like Singapore and noting recent South Korean developments showing the decay of militarily imposed stability, Chinese democrats called for a reassessment of values, i.e., education in democracy and Western civic virtue. Democrats argued that it was precisely this attitudinal change which Japan's great Meiji era reform theorist, Yukichi Fukuzawa, successfully urged when he helped persuade Japan's rulers to base its modernization on a universal education in non-feudal values. China's reformers, aware of the strength of conservative forces in Chinese ruling circles, insisted that without democratization "a decade of reforms could be wiped out in a day."[8]

Ironically, this debate occurred as China prepared to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the new culture movement which exploded on May 4th, 1919, in popular patriotic student demonstrations for democracy and science and against national betrayal and feudal Confucian culture. The new authoritarians argued early in 1989 that even seventy years earlier civil rights led to disorder, weakening the state and facilitating foreign encroachment. Accordingly, what mattered most was a strong state

7. Liu Danian, "Marxism and Traditional Chinese Culture" *Qiushi (Seeking Truth)*, No. 7 (Aprll 1, 1989), translated in JPRS-CAR-89-052 (24 May 1989), pp. 12-15.

8. Lilun Xinxibao (*Theoretical Information*), February 20, 1989, translated in JPRS-CAR-89-082 (June 14, 1989), p. 8.

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capable of getting things done and not rule by or for selfish individuals. The Party denounced bourgeois freedoms as a "deceit for the working people" — "in essence a bourgeois dictatorship."[9]

What many Chinese students saw during this debate over Confucian culture and "the new authoritarianism" was a similarity between the rationalizations of tyranny in 1919 and in 1989. Those who opted for enlightened dictatorship at both times were defending an existing order which privileged a few and marginalized the overwhelming majority of citizens. Then, as now, rulers argued that virtuous heroes should lead and that the citizenry were children, too emotional and ignorant to enact laws and likely to choose non-virtuous politicians ready to sell out to foreigners.

The anti-democrats responded at length in the May 1, 1989 issue of the Central Committee's journal *Qiushi* (*Seeking Truth*). They mocked the May Fourth Movement's anti-feudalism as unpatriotic, arguing that the movement nihilistically rejected everything in Chinese culture — traditional medicine, ideographic writing, Beijing opera, the Dragon Boat and Mid-Autumn Festivals. While the May Fourth revolutionaries sought Western culture (i.e., bourgeois democracy), conservatives claimed the Chinese people were not suited to Western political institutions. Instead, for the purpose of self-realization, China need only stress education and industrialization, not all-out Westernization. The anti-democrats argued that today was very different from seventy years ago because Chinese socialist successes since May 4th had eradicated the threat of feudalism. Instead of discarding the national heritage, conservatives contended that China should build confidence and national cohesiveness. Learning from Japan meant recognizing that Eastern culture could give rise to successful modernization and that liberal democracy had to be shunned. In fact, they argued that it had been shunned in the high growth regions of Pacific Asia since 1960. The anti-democrats did not mention the democratization movements in Taiwan and in the Korean peninsula, let alone the competitive pluralism of Japan.

Culture became a political issue because the rulers were imposing self-serving forms of cultural propaganda on the people. With the police crack-downs on both popular culture (for being superstitious and feudal) and on high culture (for being foreign and bourgeois), the Deng era conservatives can only promote sanitized traditions (Beijing opera, Mid-Autumn festival) and vacuous mementoes of innocent purity

9. Xu Zongmian, "An Investigation of Those Who Failed: The 1913-1915 Discussion on Democratic Politics in China," *Social Sciences in China*, no. 3 (1988), p. 159.

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(Cultural Revolution opera). Everything from hard-hitting essays and realistic stories to popular poetry and creative filmmaking have become suspect for conservative rulers, with the creators seemingly headed for labor camps. The conservatives' highest aspiration is not to offend old-fashioned values — an ideal unlikely to win the young who see Party members as careerists and opportunists.

One unintended result of these debates was that early in 1989 Chinese students saw their rulers as unsuited for the modern world. Many students concluded that they must remove the poison in China's traditional culture if the Chinese people were to stop worshipping Confucian authoritarians. It was in this context of rapidly changing political perceptions that former Party Secretary Hu Yaobang died. He had been ousted two years earlier by Deng and the reactionary old guard for allowing the December 1986 democracy demonstrations, and his death sparked a national student movement favoring an opening to democracy.

In May 1989, when the students called for a hunger strike to the death, they proved their sincerity and galvanized the entire urban populace. Acting to take one's life in Chinese culture can be a morally acceptable way of blaming others who have acted unjustly. During the Cultural Revolution a scientist who had been persuaded in 1949 to return to China and work for the government which now was torturing him went to the home of the man who had recruited him in 1949 and hanged himself on the low roof before the recruiter's front door. In like manner, the hunger strike laid blame on officials whose tyranny had forced the young to be willing to die. While virtually no one foresaw the savagery Deng Xiaoping unleashed in June, the students expected that, should they be suppressed, some would be beaten to death and many would end their lives in China's Gulag province of Qinghai. Also, in response to the December 1986 democratic protests, Li Ruihan, mayor of Tianjin and a beneficiary of top level personal ties, told students at Nankai University that he would have the head of any Tianjin student who would demonstrate for democracy. Li held out his hands as if to hold a chopped off head and invited a student to demonstrate so that he could have his head then and there. In the wake of the Beijing Massacre of June 4, 1989, Li was elevated by Deng to the Politburo, demonstrating Deng's earnestness in surroundlng himself with like-minded colleagues committed to suppressing democracy in order to consolidate the achievements of the socialist revolution.

Spring 1989 in Beijing was reminiscent of Poland on the eve of martial law when, "Almost no one believed that Polish soldiers could be

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used against Polish workers."[10] Even demonstrators in Tienanmen Square commented as the first bullets flew that they had to be merely rubber bullets. Beijing residents told each other soon after the tanks and troops rolled in that the soldiers had been drugged with uppers by doctors claiming to inoculate the troops against diseases carried by the garbage in Tienanmen Square. It was also rumored that the troops were ethnic minorities and that a tank commander who refused to fire was publicly executed, thus frightening the troops into wanton killing. With the regime seemingly so isolated, the Beijing residents found it incredible that Han soldiers would kill their own people. Ironically, the pervasiveness of this attitude facilitated acceptance of the Deng group's propagandistic claim that the troops acted in self-defense.

Using Jaruzelski's suppression of Solidarity as a model and arresting independent union leaders even before the massacre, Deng proved himself a fundamentalist. No longer mobilizing the people against foreign enemies and for secure economic minimums, the socialist system has lost so much legitimacy, even among villagers, that Beijing residents mocked Deng's fundamentalism with a joke in which Mao's widow insists that, since Mao's speechwriter Zhang Chunqiao has been released from house arrest, that she too should be released. When the jailor insists Zhang is still under arrest, she angrily answers that she is no fool and does not like being lied to. She has been reading speeches in the press and it is obvious that Zhang Chunqiao is once again ghost writer for China's rulers. This is no laughing matter. As Mao loudly distinguished China's correct socialist path from supposed Soviet and European revisionists, so, quietly, has Deng.

Ultra-conservatives equate democracy with disorder and a selling out of the nation to the West — especially to international banks. With the recent increase in the foreign debt, the drying-up of two billion dollars a year in tourist trade, and the flight of money and talent from Hong Kong (the source of one third of its hard currency), China also may soon face a serious debt crisis as loans and investments fall, allowing blame for China's economic misery to be placed on foreign imperialism.

The rulers know they must reform, but they fear that basic reforms will cut their power and lead to disorder. Though Chinese peasants would be very open to a democratic mobilization,[11] (some democrats in 1988 predicted rural outbreaks would occur before urban ones), conservative forces will find ways to mobilize popular support for their cause.

10. Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison* (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1985), p. 31.

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In Chinese society — a very conservative society challenged by rapid modernization — the cultural ambiance of the students in Tienanmen Square must have seemed scandalous to many. The Woodstock-like euphoria in Beijing in Spring 1989 may have been liberating to China's repressed youth but it is frightening to most of their elders. Taking advantage of popular anxieties and pointing the finger at price hikes and bribing entrepreneurs, conservatives will blame social disorder, inflation and corruption on the reformers. Their media is full of facts on the inhuman horrors of bourgeois life in the West — the prevalence of divorce, parents abandoned by children, children paying rent to parents, elderly dying of frost when the heat is turned off, crime, juvenile delinquency, teenage pregnancy and drugs. Even Americans of Chinese descent, who tend to be socially conservative, on returning home to China will give voice to similar fears about social disintegration in the West, making it possible for conservatives to blame bourgeois pollution from outside for China's prostitution, crime and generation gap. If socialism can be presented as able to keep out such evils, it would be very attractive in a conservative society such as China.

But the drive for democracy has not ended. The opponents of reforms cannot resolve the economic crisis, and Deng cannot live forever. The anti-democrats will scapegoat one group and burden another and try to maintain growth, stability and chauvinistic legitimacy. Whenever this juggling act or the leadership falls apart, the democratic citizenry will see opportunities and act. As Adam Michnik in prison under martial law wrote in 1982 of the democratic project in Poland, "there are no final defeats."[12]

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11. A Cambridge University economist of China, Peter Nolan, most optimistically concludes that this peasantry will "demand democratic rights and ensure that the party 'withers away' through popular pressure from below, whatever the views on the matter held by the party leadership." See his *The Political Economy of Collective Farms* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 11.

12. Michnik, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

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The Obsolescence of Solidarity

Jadwiga Staniszkis

For years, the conflict within the socialist system has been between two monolithic forces: state and society. Things are now more complicated, owing to the fact that the two formerly monolithic forces have openly split. The scope and extent of this process vary from country to country in Eastern Europe, depending on the previous organization of state and society, and on the seriousness of the collision of interests, which is linked to the intensity of the crisis and the kind of reforms implemented from above. Generally speaking, however, the trend is the same everywhere: from polarization to conflict; from universal values (with society struggling against the state for its own sphere of influence) to a differentiation of interests within society itself. The result is a new center composed of more entities than the Communist Party alone.

Economic interests within society are beginning to diverge, creating a political split between a nascent class of owners and those groups bearing the costs of the crisis. As a result, both a new center establishment and a new populist opposition have developed in Poland from segments of Solidarity and the Communist Party. While the new center has been constituted from the alliance between the reformist wing of the Communist Party and the old Solidarity leadership, the populist groups opposed to the new center include both the orthodox wing of the Communist Party and that segment of Solidarity which perceived Walesa's entrance into the new center as a "betrayal." These two opposition groups differ from each other in immediate political interests, but they appeal to similar social groups and manifest a similar anti-elitist orientation in their attacks on the center.

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The disintegration of the former configuration of political forces has ushered in a dramatic *change of language*. On the one hand, the part of the former opposition willing to enter the new center is abandoning the use of language colored by ethical values or the "politics of rights" (the appeal to the inalienable rights of the individual), which in the past cemented this opposition and transformed an atomized society into a collective subject. On the other hand, part of the power apparatus electing to enter the new center is abandoning its "historical right" to rule in favor of joint control over reforms, hoping thereby to "minimize risks"[1] during the period of transformation. In addition to concessions on both sides, which are a condition for the formation of the new center, there are attempts to articulate specific interests of selected participants in the production process. This second phenomenon is perhaps even more important than the formation of a new political class, since never before have economic interests in postwar Eastern Europe functioned as a factor of politics.[2] The appearance on the public scene of economic interests is combined with a collision of roles in the production process. This conflict intensifies with the progress of reforms that are creating "owners" in the state sector.

The above situation is complicated by the fact that the ideology rejected by the new center is returning in the populist factions of both wings: a "class" ideology in the splinter group of the former power bloc; a fundamentalist ideology in the Solidarity wing of the new opposition. This return of ideology complicates the articulation of economic interests of the respective social bases of each wing. Sometimes, however, this language is treated instrumentally in the realization of these interests. A second factor complicating the public scene is the still considerable role of organizational subjects and interests. Sometimes they break up and divide the emerging new configuration; sometimes they become intertwined with the interests of particular factions of the former political classes. Thus an alliance is being formed between the populist wing of Solidarity (the "Working Group") and the trade union structures set up after the delegalization of Solidarity (All-Polish Association of Trade

1. Pronouncement of Prime Minister M. Rakowski at the Xth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP (*Trybuna Ludu* [Jan. 18, 1989]).

2. The public scene was dominated by material claims (the same for all) or by symbols mechanically taken over from tradition or, finally, by "theoretical interests" (e.g., the call for ownership reforms, despite the lack of personal material interest, for in theory such reforms promote more rational economic management). Previous protests chiefly concerned distribution and consumer claims (real wages). See the chapter on 1956 as a "ritual drama" in my book, *Poland: the Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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Unions — OPZZ). A similar alliance is emerging in the new center as well, composed of part of the old opposition and the workers' self-management movement. Promotion of this idea allows this part of the old opposition to postpone taking a position on ownership changes in the state sector that might divide its present social base.

The aim here is to make a more thorough analysis of 1) the new configuration of forces and the political representation of some economic interests; 2) the severance of generational continuity in the power elite and the opposition; and 3) the post-fundamentalist mentality of young workers during the 1988 strikes.

The New Configuration of Forces

The appearance of the new center is coupled with divisions both in Party circles and in Solidarity. The new political class, composed of parts of formerly opposing camps, is a group with similar social status (education, prestige, affluence) united by a feeling of responsibility for social peace and by support for economic reforms from above. The segment of the old power apparatus entering the new center does this for reasons such as rationality of control. It needs the "constructive" opposition as a shock absorber of social tensions and a source of impulses (challenges) for the routinized executive power apparatus. Solidarity (as one can see from the reactions of part of Solidarity[3] to the Xth Plenum of the Central Committee)[4] is willing to play this role in exchange for the legalization of trade union pluralism and even limited political pluralism.[5]

The first reaction of the old power elite to the economic crisis was to search for avenues of reform without recognizing Solidarity[6] By consenting to the fusion of power and capital, it sought to strengthen the pro-reform executive apparatus (as Gorbachev is doing) and make it materially worthwhile for part of the power apparatus to accept ownership reforms in the state sector. It agreed to remove politics from the management of the economy and exclude the Party (as well as the opposition) from the workplace. However, the clear resistance of the Party apparatus to its loss of economic role as well as the formation within this apparatus of a populist faction attacking both the fusion

3. Statement of the National Executive Committee of "Solidarity," Jan. 22, 1989 (*Trybuna Ludu* [Jan. 23, 1989]).

4. *Trybuna Ludu* (Jan. 20, 1989).

5. Corporate solutions and more seats in the Sejm, but not a legalized multiparty system as in Hungary.

6. Interviews of M. Rakowski, among others, in Austria. See *The Independent* (London: Nov. 25, 1988): "Democracy Can Develop without 'Solidarity'."

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of power and capital[7] and the depoliticization of workplaces (indicating readiness to eventually support the opposition postulate to legalize Solidarity[8]) forced the Jaruzelski-Rakowski circle to change its strategy and look for contacts with the "constructive opposition."

This is how a new center began to emerge. The common philosophy of the ruling group and of opposition splinter groups in this new center is based on the *liberalization of group interests*, i.e., a system of laws that would be neutral with respect to various competing ideas and allow individuals and groups to articulate their interests (e.g., individual adaptation to the economic crisis) as long as they do not encroach upon the freedoms of others and threaten the stability of the state. The public good here is understood in terms of individual interests, the stability of the state, the rejection of paternalism toward selected groups, and the pursuance of *a priori* ideological goals. In order to work out such a system of rights, the ruling group seems willing to give up the clause in the constitution concerning the "leading role" of the Communist Party and abandon the emphasis on the special role of the working class.[9] The loyal opposition is willing to desist from demanding state paternalism, to curb its more radical groups, and to reduce the threat of destabilization by supporting the "consolidation plan" and its substantial social costs.[10]

The populist wing (both in the Party[11] and in the opposition)[12] expresses the interests of those social groups likely to benefit the least by marketization. It demands preferences, state paternalism and the right to express dissatisfaction even at the cost of stability.[13] The social composition of these factions consists of young workers (and young people in general), pensioners, groups that cannot benefit from profits in the new relations of production, and poor people who fear the inflation that will become difficult to control as the state withdraws from

7. Speech of W. Baka at the Xth Plenum, in *Trybuna Ludu* (Dec. 21, 1988). On the position of the workers' self-management forum against the law on enterprises as the property of the state treasury (the first step in the separation of ownership) see *Trybuna Ludu* (Jan. 14, 1989).

8. The position of A. Miodowicz at the ILO session (Geneva: October 1988) in response to the Xth Plenum in *Trybuna Ludu* (Jan. 21-22, 1989).

9. *Trybuna Ludu* (Dec. 1988).

10. The consolidation plan was presented in the Sejm on January 30, 1989.

11. OPZZ, part of the Party apparatus, the group from the Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the PUWP (around Prof. P. Wojcik), and the Wroclaw journal *Sprawy i Ludzie*.

12. The Working Group of the National Committee of Solidarity established in Gdynia on December 18, 1988. The declarations were reprinted in *Polityka* (Jan. 1989).

13. See the position of the Gdynia group expressed by A. Gwiazda in *Poza Ukladem*, no. 1 (1989).

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the economy.[14]

In this context, it is worth considering the problem of *radicalism* in the new center. On the one hand, there is *extremism without radicalism* and, on the other, *two varieties of radicalism*. The part of the ruling group entering this center is more willing to introduce market mechanisms and accelerate the creation of new owners (also from its own ranks) while the "constructive opposition" puts more emphasis on the liberal vision of law and legality[15] and less on the necessity for abandoning state paternalism in the economy. This part of the opposition also tends to favor the expansion of workers' self-management and the development of the traditional private sector rather than ownership reforms in the state sector,[16] while the Working Group of the former National Committee of Solidarity"[17] (former trade union organizers at the plant level, chiefly lower-level technical supervisors) defends the right to extra-institutional political protest (politics of the street, "fighting squads") for those groups that have no chance in the market game proposed by the center. The Working Group also opposes the creation of owners from the former *nomenklatura* and represents worker experiences in this question.[18] It also questions the expansion of workers' self-management, which seems to be supported by the opposition faction in the new center. The Gdansk faction of the Working Group, led by Andrzej Gwiazda, is particularly interested in a so far enigmatic "third way." Owing to the ambivalence of this project, along with firm opposition to the social effects of the market reform, this group can be described as *extremism without radicalism*. Regardless of its intentions, its effects seem limited because it supports "classical" state-controlled socialism, with the state as owner. It is ready to fight with the state, as did Solidarity, over the distribution of funds, but *within* the existing

14. A similar configuration of forces is emerging in Hungary and, with modifications, the USSR, where, in addition to social problems, there are nationality problems; in the new center, where Gorbachev is supported, the reforms are coupled with a defense of the political order in the name of stability, impeding the expression of nationality aspirations.

15. The Report Five Years after August (prepared by experts of Solidarity); also, the pronouncement of the Citizens' Committee (Dec. 18, 1988).

16. The position of Solidarity advisors, now parliamentarians, Ryszard Bugaj and Andrzej Wialowiejski, as expressed in an influential 1988 article.

17. The position of the Working Group in *Poza Ukladem*.

18. Gwiazda is employed in a cooperative that paints chimneys. A member of this cooperative is the managing director of a factory producing scarce paints, who receives a high salary for placing it on the distribution index. Thus power over goods in short supply generates capital.

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system. This faction evokes the myth of Solidarity in order to emphasize the "betrayal" of the Walesa group now entering the avant-garde of the establishment. The Working Group finds itself in a typical historical situation conducive to the rise of extremist movements.[19]

The other populist wing, made up of part of the former political class close to the ruling group, is less homogeneous. It embraces the populist apparatus of the new trade unions (OPZZ), members of the Party who see a betrayal of socialism in the ownership reforms and recognition of the opposition and, finally, the executive power apparatus that regards the "policy of understanding" as a manifestation of the center's disloyalty. This last group has no vision of an alternative and is not even concerned with the interest of the Party as a whole. As studies have shown,[20] its objections are due to fear of uncertainty and loss of face, while its vision of the situation is based more on limited experience of work in some department of a Party committee than on ideological premises. As in the case of the wing from the opposition, it perceives a threat to its position, a crisis of identity, and disintegration of its political reference group. There is no myth to which this group can appeal.[21]

Paradoxically, the above situation is not a zero-sum game; each side wins something. This does not apply to each side's social base. There are groups which cannot win — the distribution of benefits and costs is

19. See Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason* (New York: Harper-Row, 1970), pp. 484-515.

20. P. Georgica, *Postawy sekretarzy szczebla wojewodzkiego PZPR* (Attitudes of Provincial Secretaries of the PUWP). Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the PUWP (manuscript, 1988).

21. Daniel Field, *The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). This recalls the situation during the abolition of serfdom from above in Russia. Serfdom had been regarded as a pillar of autocracy that needed no justification; similarly, until recently, the "leading role of the Party" needed no justification. In both cases the reaction is the same. The change by the czar of his position on serfdom and by the Communist power elite on the role of the Party is met with silence by the gentry and apparatus respectively — both dependent on the state, unaccustomed to expressing their own position and caught in the trap of their own calls for "reforms." There is another analogy with czarist Russia, but it is from the later period of Stolypin's reforms (1906). Here as well an attempt was made from above to create conditions for economic growth and even for radical changes in the system. Here also the control functions of rural communities (with their egalitarianism, self-control and redistribution effect) were lessened in favor of the new middle class and its economic interests — as in Eastern Europe today. A law on associations was passed and there was greater participation in rule through a new Duma. Finally, a populist opposition also arose (and eventually won out through a tangle of revolutionary processes with the anarchy of war). Law on Associations, March 1906 (see Gregory L. Freeze, *From Supplication to Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 197 ff.

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much more uneven than among participants in the political sphere. For instance young unskilled workers can benefit from the reforms only by escaping this lot, i.e., learning some skills.[22] In the political sphere, the Party elite gains (while the apparatus loses) because it acquires a new identity as the "initiator of reforms"; the government acquires a buffer/stabilizer for the difficult economic reforms and the enfranchisement of the *nomenklatura*. Even if the legalized opposition did not play this role, the temporary lack of stability (owing to the competition of two trade unions within the enterprise) also could benefit the government: there is a rumor that COMECON partners plan to purchase the Polish debt, and social unrest pushes prices down. There is also talk about the purchase of part of this debt by Western financial circles pressuring for liberalization. Finally, Solidarity is legalized; and OPZZ gains a reputation as a radical defender of the working class.

Recent surveys conducted in industry[23] show that the newly emerging configuration of political forces does not have very strong support in society. Paradoxically, there is greater support for the populist wings than for the new center. Though everyone supports reform, each group understands it differently. Workers do not want a market but they do support the opposition (they are not, however, in favor of the liberal model of democracy); managers support ownership-market reforms but are against trade union pluralism (owing to tensions in the enterprise), though as a rule they favor political reforms. Though these studies confirm the thesis often cited to legitimate the new center — that Party members differ little in their attitudes from non-Party members and believers — this only supports the conclusion that the new political class has no social base. Its program is much more attractive for itself than for the rest of society, which in its various groups and for various reasons supports only some fragments of this program and rejects the rest.

What can be the outcome of the emerging configuration of forces? An important factor is that, for the members of the new center, ownership changes in the state sector are more a "theoretical" than a "real" interest. They will not become the new owners, who, for the most part, will be recruited from the executive power apparatus. The support of this new

22. Owing to the educational policy of the 1970s and the low level of technology in the backward structure of Polish industry, only about 60% of elementary school graduates each year manage to finish factory-run vocational schools.

23. B. Cichomski, *Sprawiedliwośc społeczna w przemyśle (opinia-pracowików, grudzień 1988)* (Social Justice in Industry [Workers' Opinions], December 1988), Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, manuscript.

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class of owners is not politically decisive and may even become troublesome if populist attacks intensify. In such a situation, one could expect the point of compromise to be shifted to an expansion of workers' self-management in the economy. Such a solution would blunt the conflicts connected with the creation of owners in the state sector and for this reason may seem politically advisable to the members of the new center, though it is an economic blind alley. Augmenting the probability of such a development is a well-organized workers' self-management movement — the only one that has a hierarchy acting in unity from the Sejm to the enterprise[24] as well as a good theoretical basis. The economic interests of both wings also might restrict ownership changes in the state sector.

Thus at present the emerging new configuration of political forces does not have, at least in the economic field, much potential for change. The predominance of political interests (preservation of identity and expansion of spheres of influence), combined with lack of clarity as to the preferences (and even composition) of the social base, may lead to the self-management solution, which is economically disastrous but politically advantageous to most public figures. Only when ownership changes in the state sector create a national market and a strong political representation that guarantees stability in the new economic order will one be able to speak about a transformation of political forces. Such a situation does not yet exist. This, however, may be only a question of time.

The Break in Generational Continuity

Former members of the Polish Youth Union (ZMP, 1948-1956), and people even older[25] are intermingled in Solidarity advisory circles with those who fought against this generation but who in various ways were themselves entangled with the political establishment for more than a dozen years.[26] Both these groups know the power apparatus from October 1956 and from the 1960s. Paradoxically, they appeal to ideology more often than the generation that matured during the Gierek period and within the apolitical structures of the Polish Students' Association (ZSP) or Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under these conditions, the recruitment to Walesa's Citizens' Committee of many leftists (perhaps as a

24. Association of Workers' Self-Management Activists, chairman — in Lech Walesa's Citizens' Committee.

25. For example, people affiliated with the Polish Socialist Party, as well as some liberal representatives of the establishment (a former member of the Council of State against martial law, the Polish ambassador to the UN).

26. For example, a few former Catholic deputies, Gierek's advisor (who resigned after a few years), a member of the Central Committee of the PUWP after 1980 (removed).

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conciliatory gesture to authorities) may turn out to be embarrassing for the ruling group, which wants to build a post-socialist, quasi-capitalist order. Unlike previous generations of leaders, this one is not responsible for "real socialism." The gambling temperament of the new power apparatus may be traced back to its initiating experience in the 1968 events. Its composition was then largely a manipulated instrument of the intergenerational contest in the power apparatus — a tug-of-war that was a confused mixture of anti-Semitism and de-Stalinization. Its reformist activity today may be an attempt to show that the main motive was de-Stalinization. Perhaps its members want to prove something to their former opponents, with whom this initiating conflict bound them more strongly than with the people of their own camp, who were from another generation. The present power apparatus is not afraid of competition and has no complexes. It wants to compete and win, without enjoying too much of an edge that would spoil the taste of victory.

This discontinuity between successive generations of the Polish intelligentsia is well illustrated by the complicated reaction to Jan Strzelecki's political career (Strzelecki was killed in what the authorities say was a random mugging in 1988). What is striking is the feeling of estrangement, in spite of the fact that Strzelecki was such a warm and generous person. He was never an active Stalinist, an opportunist or an uncritical believer. After the war, he was the leader of the young socialist movement, a member of the PUWP who managed to retain a certain independence until his expulsion in 1979, and a Solidarity advisor since August 1980. If there is estrangement in relation to him, then how much greater must be the gulf between the generation in their 40s today, and the so-called generation of revisionists and the still earlier generation of ZMP or Party members? Understanding this is important for analyzing present and future political developments in Poland (and in Eastern Europe as a whole) because Strzelecki's generation is overrepresented in the new center on the side of the opposition.

It was not opportunism (as some claim) that made Strzelecki stay in the Party so long. His decision to join resulted not only from the now trivial argument that "only from the center can one have influence" but from self-sacrifice. For him, participation in an organization that denied, as he knew, the values he cherished, was a "choice of brotherhood" from the "primitive mysticism of plebeian Marxism";[27] it was the sacrifice of himself and, more generally, the ideals of the intelligentsia in the name of the "interest of the masses." In the background of this decision

27. "The confession of Silony," *Kontynuacje*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

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was the vision of the already symbolic, pre-war *Annopol* haunting him and other socialists.[28]

Strzelecki's last and longer work, *A Lyrical Model of Socialism*, shows that, toward the end of his life, he rejected his basic argument that "one has to participate" and that only from the inside can one change things. The reason for this transformation was not only the appearance of Solidarity (and a much more realistic possibility of change "from outside"), but also the awareness that in Party thinking myth always swallows facts — ideological interpretative frameworks incessantly reproduce "supplementary reality," irrespective of knowledge of the facts. Thus it makes no sense to point out negative facts on the empirical level (and "from the inside," so that one would be listened to, which was supposed to justify staying in the Party) because it will not change the general situation and beliefs in the correctnsss of the "idea." At most it will give rise to the argument that "too little has been done to put this idea into practice."[29] Continuing Strzelecki's line of argument, one can fight a myth only with another myth, a new principle of interpretation. Only then will the helplessness that accompanies the collision of two unverifiable myths — Solidarity's myth of "moral right" and the Party's myth of the "avant-garde" — force both sides to come down to the level of articulation closer to real processes.

It was only after the abandonment by both sides (or rather by the factions entering the new center) of their myths that political negotiations became possible. Though Strzelecki seems to have accepted the Solidarity myth of moral right, he must have been put off by its fundamentalism and intolerance. The younger generation appears less inclined to accept any collective myth. This is especially evident in the anarchist "happenings" of the Orange Alternative movement, where even the crowd functions as a watered-down sum of individual rituals.[30] This accounts for the clear feeling of estrangement from Strzelecki's need for belonging. Equally anachronistic and strange (at least to some youth)[31] seems the neoconservative version of collectivism evident in the recommendation of Marcin Król that "one should choose selectively from the

28. This attitude is a complicated mixture of a *guilty conscience* (for being in a relatively privileged situation) and a sense of *superiority*. The latter is present in the assumption that the values sacrificed to the Party are not important "for the people" (who are chiefly concerned about their daily bread).

29. Resolution of the IXth Congress of the PUWP (July 1981). Materials issued by Ksiazka i Wiedza Publishers.

30. On the Orange Alternative, see *Across Frontiers*, vol. 4, nos. 2-3 (1988).

31. Discussion at the session on Stalinism organized in the Institute of Prophylaxis and Resocialization at Warsaw University by J. Kurczewski (Nov. 1988).

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tradition" (whether one believes it or not). In Król's opinion, in a polarized world the political behavior of individuals who assume that one can find support only in oneself (in one's own ethical and aesthetic principles) leads to ambiguity and isolation (since one is rejected by both sides). The young generation seems more inclined to reject both socialist (represented by Strzelecki) and Tory (tradition as a substitute for ideology) collectivism, with all of its antiliberalism. To young people today, collectivism without faith as a recipe for acting honorably in the world in which there are political and moral divisions does not seem attractive and intellectually safe. This rejection of collectivism and of symbolic politics combined with no sense of responsibility for real socialism considerably expands the range of political alternatives. This is why it is so important that the post-ZMP generation is now coming to power.

The New Generation of Protesting Workers

While the break in generational continuity in the intellectual community (both in the circles of power and in the opposition) is not confined to Poland, the appearance of a new generation of protesting workers with a clearly different way of articulating their grievances is a strictly Polish phenomenon. This is due to the specific nature of the Polish crisis, which brought onto the public scene considerably wider social groups than in other socialist countries.

This new, post-Solidarity mentality is a special orientation toward the world and oneself. The features of this mentality are: disbelief in "progress" (rejection of the fundamentalist myth so strong in 1980-1981, that "good must carry the day"); uncertainty as to one's identity on account of no longer being able to see the world in terms of categories of "good" and "evil" and attributing these features respectively to society and state (as the fundmentalists did); and action as an independent value, as a feeling of community built through common experience and not symbolic references.

Solidarity (as an organizational structure) is something of a supplement for the workers' lack of solidarity, which is more important as a strongly experienced value as in peer or prisoner groups. This accounts for why young workers so dramatically experience the "betrayal" by the older generation of opposition activists, who did not defend them sufficiently after the strikes.[32] The difficulties in defining their own identity

32. A dramatic example: the leader of the Wisla Shipyard strike (November 1988) suffered a nervous collapse and was in the hospital when Walesa arrived to end the strike. In its report of this event, Radio Free Europe mentioned only Walesa.

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are coupled with a typical "transferability" of symbols. For instance, one symbol (Smurfs from the children's fairy-tale) designates the constabulary and appeared on envelopes handed out during the strike in August 1988. Perhaps this is due to an awareness of a certain casualness in the roles played. Every one of the striking young workers, had he remained somewhat longer in the army, could have found himself on the other side of the gate, after having been drafted into the Reserve Force of the Civic Militia (ROMO). This explains the basketball games outside the shipyard gate (and thus beyond the barricade), the ease of verbal contacts (in spite of the brutality of law enforcement units and the workers themselves in direct clashes), and finally, in order to relieve the boredom of the sit-in strike, playing the game of ZOMO (Regular Force of the Civic Militia) and strikers, with a symbolic battle at the end in which workers assumed the role of constables.

Such things would have been impossible during the 1980 strikes, when workers exhibited their distinctness and their own symbols. The political language of this new generation is the language of children's TV and fairy-tales, which function as special myths meant to express the nature and dynamics of the conflict. What is typical is that these are fairy-tales in which no side is categorically good or evil and no one wins all the time. The conflict consists in a never-ending and totally absurd free-for-all (action for the sake of action). There are also attempts to express internal social differences so strongly felt in connection with the described division. This configuration of forces is expressed by means of a folk tale — which is not surprising, considering the young workers' low level of education and meager cultural experience (most of them came to the cities from the countryside after military service, but live apart from the cities in workers' hotels).[33] In this fairy-tale[34] a "wise brother" serves a lord and brings scraps from the lord's table to his sick mother (Poland). There is also a "stupid brother" (worker), to whom the "wise brother" tells fairy-tales in the field to relieve the former from boredom during hard work.

This new generation of striking workers seems much more alienated than its predecessors. Whereas in 1980 strikers felt like enterprise owners, in 1988 young workers emphasized that they had more space for themselves during sit-ins than in their cramped hotel rooms. Meager

33. About 80% of the young striking workers live in workers' hotels.

34. The fairy-tale about stupid Johnny in *Poza Ukladem*, (Gdańsk: Jan. 1989) — *Poza Ukladem* is a journal supporting the Working Group, issued jointly with the editorial board of the journal of young workers from the Gdańsk Shipyard (*Trzecia Brama*).

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skills and unfamiliarity with the city, and even with the immediate neighborhood (people living in workers' hotels are regarded as an undesirable element), make it impossible for young workers to participate in the so-called second economy and thus manage during the crisis.[35] Their only chance is to escape as individuals from the category of unskilled residents of workers' hotels: there is no collective solution. They are just starting out in life, so inflation hits them hardest. They will also be the first victims of eventual unemployment in times of crisis, while the waiting period for one's own apartment now exceeds 20 years. The market offers them no opportunities. This is why the political channel (including politics of the street) is so important for them, and the shutting off of this channel is one of the eventual concessions of Solidarity (in exchange for legalization). This explains the alliance of young workers with the Working Group. This also explains the ever sharper conflicts, which become especially visible during elections of plant committees.[36] For a number of other factors, then — the economic conservatism of young workers and their support for state paternalism; weak democratic restraints resulting from their disbelief in the practice or viability of bargaining as well as from frequent contacts with brutality and law-breaking on the part of lower-level state functionaries;[37] and finally, their proneness to "politics of the street" — the young workers are an unpredictable element.

Conclusion

The three processes described above — the emergence of the new center, the break in generational continuity, and the appearance of a new outlook among young workers — are splitting the divisions of the previous phase of the crisis (from 1980-1981 and martial law). The market-ownership reform is intensifying the differentiation of economic and political interests. Fragmentary material claims and the total rejection of the system have been replaced by a much more complicated matrix of demands.

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35. According to the studies of L. Beskid and Z. Sufin (Institude of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1986), nominal wages make up about 50% of average family income. The rest comes from supplementary income — such as from participation in the second economy.

36. A conflict appeared in many plants, e.g., in Ursus and the Gdańsk Shipyard. Regional authorities associated with Walesa pressured for the choice of old activists, many of whom no longer worked in the plant (politicians), whereas the young part of the crews wanted people from the plants (Autumn 1988).

37. Street clashes with the constabulary, brutality in arrests (according to studies of the Academy of Social Scieces entitled *Położenie klasy robotniczej* [Position of the Working class]), every other worker at one time in his life was arrested or in jail.

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What is the relation between these new developments and the transformation processes? Have the new owners (including those from the *nomenklatura*) established political channels open and influential enough to guarantee the reproduction of their newly acquired status? Not yet, it seems. At present, political positions are gravitating toward a peculiar borderline[38] between what society (and the economy) can no longer accept — the command system — and what the Party apparatus and the populist wing do not want to accept — permanent ownership changes in the state sector. The latter is strengthened by the workers' self-management movement, which fears the loss of its position.[39] The members of the new center are guided by their own political interest (stabilization, control, the widest possible support). Such a configuration of forces may push the reform movement toward worker self-management solutions as the least problematic. This would delay radical changes in the socialist system for a few years, but it would be consistent with Polish tradition.[40] The point is that the formula (and identity) of Solidarity does not fit the new configuration of social forces and the rapidly intensifying social conflict.

38. The expression of J. Orzel in *Podmioty przelomowej reformy* (Subjects of the Reform), manuscript, 1988.

39. This was the motivation for the attitude toward the law on the state treasury. See Resolution of the Workers' Self-Management Forum, Warsaw (Jan. 12, 1989).

40. See J. Jedlicki, *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebuja?* (What Kind of a Civilization Do Poles Need?), Warsaw (1988).

U.S. Postal Service. Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation. 1. Title of publication: Telos. A. Publication no. 10770. 2. Date of filing: August 30, 1989. Frequency of issue: quarterly. A. No. of issues published annually: 4. B. Annual subscription price: $60.00. 4. Complete mailing address of known office of publication: 431 East 12th Street, New York, N.Y. 10009. 5. Complete mailing of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers: same. 6. Full names and complete mailing addresses of publisher, editor and managing editor: Publisher, Paul Piccone, 431 E. 12th Street, N.Y. 10009. Editor, Paul Piccone, 431 E. 12th Street, New York, N.Y. 10009. Managing Editor, Kerry Milliron, 431 East 12th Street, New York, N.Y. 10009. 7. Owner: Paul Piccone, 431 East 12th Street, New York, N.Y. 10009. 8. Known Bondholders: none. 10. Extent and nature of circulation: first number in each category is average number of copies each issue during the preceding 12 months; second number is the actual number of copies of the single issue published nearest to filing date. A. Total no. copies: 3000, 3000. B. Paid circulation. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors, and counter sales: none, 1113. 2. Mail subscriptions: 1278, 1278. C. Total paid circulation: 2327, 2327. D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means; samples, complimentary, and other free copies: none, none. E. Total distribution (sum of C and D): 2327, 2327. F. Copies not distributed: none, none. Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: 673, 673. 2. Return from news agents: none, none. G. Total (sum of E, F1 and F2): 3000, 3000. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. (signed) Paul Piccone, publisher.

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Old and New Patterns of Corruption in Poland and the USSR

Jacek Tarkowski

One of the first signs that changes were coming in the Soviet Union was the anti-corruption drive undertaken by Andropov. He used this campaign as a weapon against the Brezhnev faction, accusing the late leader's family and followers of extravagant corruption.[1] More than a simple tactical maneuver, Andropov's campaign was seen as an important component of a general overhaul of the Soviet system. After the Chernenko interlude, when the anti-corruption campaign was abandoned, Gorbachev resumed this policy and turned the struggle against corruption into one of the major battle-cries of *perestroika*.[2] The study of corruption in communist countries is more than simply an inteliectual exercise since corruption is an integral, structural element of these systems. Consequently, one of the key tests of *perestroika* consists in its ability to deal with corruption.

It is still too early to judge how this problem is being solved in the Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev rose to power in 1985, his program took shape only about two years later; in many respects it is still being created. Some anti-corruption policies have already succeeded,[3] as

1. Zhores Medvedev, *Gorbachev* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

2. In Poland, the conspicuous corruption of the ruling elite contributed to the mass protests of August 1980. In 1980-1981 demands to confront "the corrupt bosses" were widely voiced, not only by *Solidarity*, but also by the official press and in Communist Party documents. See "Sprawozdanie tzw. Komisji Kubiaka," *Nowe Drogi*, (1983); *Protokoly tzw. Komisji Grabskiego* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1986).

3. See Dmitri Likhanov, "Organized Crime in Central Asia" in *Telos* 75 (Summer 1988), pp. 90-102.

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shown by the spectacular crackdowns on corrupt officials in Central Asia in 1987 and 1988. Yet economic reform proceeds slower than *glasnost*, and not enough evidence is in at this time.

Throughout the 1980s, Poland has witnessed a series of well-publicized upheavals, including an unprecedented economic crisis, the establishment of Solidarity, declaration of martial law, and a cycle of reforms initiated and then aborted. In many ways, therefore, Poland provides a particularly interesting case study in the fluctuating patterns of corruption in state socialist societies.[4] First, however, it is useful to review classic patterns of corruption in these societies and then see how they are affected by recent reforms.

Old Patterns of Corruption

Contrary to official claims, corruption in communist countries is neither a remnant of the pre-communist past nor a marginal pathology. Rather, it is structural. The reason for this is that communist economies are what Kornei has described as "economies of scarcity."[5] Centrally planned economies are not based on profit but primarily on the fulfillment of the central plan. Within such a system, rational economic behavior amounts to minimizing plan assignments while maximizing resources available for their fulfillment. This produces shortages. In such a context, everyone tries to hoard as much as possible, thus making the shortages even more severe. A communist manager's main problem is not output, as in capitalist firms, but input, i.e., the supply of raw materials, components, spare parts, energy, etc. Consequently, both political and economic systems become arenas of an all-out struggle for scarce resources. The most effective weapons here are connections, friendships and various forms of bribes.

Factories, local communities, schools, state or collective farms and housing co-ops regularly bribe those who dispose of scarce goods and services. These can be functionaries, factory managers or simply store

4. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Hungary, the problem of corruption is not a hot political issue, probably because of the slow pace of reform. Even in these countries, however, from time to time the press reports large-scale corruption (see L. Mazan, "Koniec krola Orawy," in *Polityka* 39 [September 26, 1987]), and discloses alarming figures on its extent. According to official statistics, in Czechoslovakia more than 40,000 people were sentenced for crimes such as stealing state property in 1986 alone. In other words, this kind of crime was committed every 12.5 minutes. (*Informacni Tydenik* — quoted in *Biuletyn Specjalny* 12427 (September 30, 1987).

5. For the best discussion of this, see Janos Kornai, *Anti-equilibrium: An Economic Systems Theory and the Tasks of Research* and *Economics of Shortage* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1971, 1980, respectively).

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superintendents. Instead of allotting goods according to the plan, these people dispose of them "on the side" in exchange for bribes. These transactions take more subtle forms than the simple delivery of cash. They include luxury goods, or simply access to scarce goods, which in an economy of scarcity are sometimes even more important than money.

Procuring additional resources can take less illegal forms such as the "collective bribe," e.g., a factory producing scarce commodities may divert part of its production directly to another factory, which then supplies other desired goods (e.g., vital components necessary for production) in exchange. Horizontal exchange is usually barter exchange (such as shirts for cement, or steel for canned meat). Normally, public opinion does not consider these activities corrupt.[6]

In addition to this type of horizontal exchanges, there are also vertical, patron-client relations. In hierarchical, centralized systems it is extremely important to have friendly persons strategically located at the higher rungs of the hierarchical ladder who can directly provide the desired goods, deliver information, secure connections to other influentials, or mediate between clients and upper levels. There are many reasons why patrons help clients. Sometimes, these are plain extortions of bribes.[7] In other cases it could be rooted in an old-boy network or family ties. [8]

Direct bribes are clearly instances of corruption. But what about horizontal exchanges and patronage? One's definition, of course, determines the answer. From a legalistic viewpoint, many of the previously described activities are not crimes. They can rather be seen as malfeasance against official duties.

Corruption proper is any activity motivated by interest, violating the binding rules of distribution, the application of which is within one's responsibility. Rules of distribution here refer not only to the letter of the law, but also to norms recognized as binding by society and/or to

6. "A bribe exists when both sides get personal profit," said one factory director accused of illegal dealings. "On our side it was only the factory which profited from these transactions." See M. Henzel, "Swad," in *Polityka* 27 (July 7, 1984).

7. The Soviet official accused of bribe-giving defended himself by arguing that "in order to develop my *oblast* (province), huge resources are needed. To get them you need many friends in Tashkent and Moscow. But you cannot visit friends without gifts. I paid bribes only for those who could help my *oblast*. I was giving them for the good of my community. Without bribes I wouldn't get even those resources already allocated to me." (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, quoted in *Biuletyn Soecjalny* 12551 (March 28, 1988).

8. J. Tarkowski, "Patrons and Clients in a Planned Economy," in S.N. Eisenstadt, R. Lemarchand, eds., *Political Clientelism and Development* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981); and "Patronage in a Centralized, Socialist System," *International Political Science Review* Vol.4, No. 4. (1983).

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the system's "official" norms and operational codes. Also "corrupt" are those activities regarded by society as illegitimate or seen by the power elite as contradictory to the logic of the system. This does not amount to an expansion of the concept of corruption, but takes into account certain systemic features which are legal and legitimate in other systems, but which in communist systems are branded as corrupt (or at least as questionable), thus putting them on the margins of legality.[9]

This brings us back to the "horizontal exchanges." Only in a strictly centralized system is paying a higher price for scarce resources considered illegal. The divergence of opinion about these exchanges is symptomatic of the crisis of the system brought about by its own logic. Economic managers, local leaders and other heads of institutions must resort to illegal and semilegal means to amass scarce but necessary resources and to fulfill the assigned goals. By doing so, however, they violate the basic principles of the centrally planned economy.[10] An even better example of corruption is "legalized corruption" — in particular, the privileges of the power elite: the various perks and allowances include such things as free flats and summer cottages, chauffeured cars, special shops, hospitals, health resorts, etc. In the economy of scarcity, access to scarce or publicly unavailable goods is an important privilege in itself. Their value, of course, is even higher when these goods and services are rendered free. The accounts of corruption and power abuses, particularly in the Central Asian republics, surpass the most improbable ideas of the authors of the detective stories describing crime and corruption in the Soviet Union.[11] The extensive use of the client-patron ties have been giving cover and protection not only to ordinary corruption but also for much graver crimes — torture, lawless imprisonment and murder.[12]

In what sense can we call these practices corruption? From the purely formal point of view, they are legal. They are granted on the basis of

9. Jacek Tarkowski, "Centralized System and Corruption," in *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 10, no. 1 (1988).

10. Such a situation fits Jowitt's unorthodox definition of corruption. Jowitt treats corruption as a loss of organizational integrity, with integrity understood as "an organization's practical ability to sustain specific competence by identifying socio-political tasks and enforcing strategies that subordinate particular members to general organizational interests." Consequently, corruption is "a situation in which organizational members confuse or equate their particular interests with the organization's general interests, and organization leaders fail in operationally establishing the difference between general and particular interests." (Kenneth Jowitt, "Soviet Neo-traditionalism: the Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime," in *Soviet Studies* [July 1983], p. 275, 293).

11. F. Neznansky, *The Fair at Sokolniki* (London: Corgie Books, 1987); E. Topol and F. Neznansky, *Red Square* (London: Corgie Books, 1985).

12. G. Ovcharenko, "Kobry nad zlotem," in *Biuletyn Specjalny* 12509 (January 28, 1988).

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regulations issued by state or Party institutions empowered to do so. They are corrupt, however, in that they lack legitimacy in the eyes of society. This does not mean that everyday life is immune from corruption. On the contrary, when faced with overall shortages, a weak or non-existent market, ineffective and corrupted redistributive institutions and a dominating bureaucracy, the person in the street resorts to the same defensive mechanisms and strategies as do large enterprises and members of the political establishment. Bribes and black market exchanges constitute an important part of the everyday life of Poles, Soviets, Romanians or Bulgarians.

What is more interesting, however, is the nexus between the private economic sector and the state bureaucracy. The private sector has always been underprivileged relative to the state sector. Private entrepreneurship has either been liquidated (Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia) or left in a residual form (Poland, Hungary and East Germany) as a remnant of capitalism, to disappear as society moves toward socialism. The private sector has been surrounded by a climate of suspicion, contempt and illegitimacy. During the Stalinist period, children of private businessmen were often barred from universities, and a private shopkeeper in the family could be a severe obstacle for other family members.

This attitude placed private businessmen at the mercy of an almost omnipotent bureaucracy, with power to grant licenses and assign raw materials, components, tools and skilled manpower. Running a private firm without paying hefty bribes to various officials has been virtually impossible. For example, in order to start a private firm in Poland it was necessary (till the end of 1988) to get the approval of sixteen various institutions ranging from the local departments of commerce, industry and sanitary inspection to the local fire brigade and secret police. Each of these institutions had virtual veto power. Any one of them could prevent the establishment of the firm. Once the company or enterprise is established, its dependence on the bureaucracy does not diminish. These institutional arrangements create the perfect hunting ground for a bureaucracy.

Corruption in the Era of Reform

How have systemic reforms affected the nature of corruption? While it is too early to provide an unequivocal assessment of recent reforms, economic progress has been modest. Consumer supplies have not improved; in some instances they have even deteriorated. For firms, the input side is still more important than the output side; selling any output

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in a market hungry for products is not a problem. For input, however, enterprises are still dependent on various distributive agencies, which set detailed tasks and establish priorities and privileges. Yet industrial enterprises have attained greater autonomy, and several market mechanisms have been introduced, particularly in Poland. Autonomy has given enterprises legal possibilities for horizontal exchange, and the scope of various bureaucratic agencies has been substantially reduced. Thus activities which used to be treated as violations of binding rules of distribution have been legalized and "depenalized." Perhaps most importantly for the long run, the stigmata of "parasite" and "remnant of capitalism" are gradually being removed.

Does this mean that corruption is declining? In general, as long as there is an economy of scarcity, corruption will continue to permeate these systems. Yet there are important changes. In search of scarce resources, the illegal and semilegal games are played as before, but today the objectives are somewhat different. Whereas in the classical command-distributive economy the main objective is allocation of specific goods and services (raw materials, construction materials, tools, machines, etc.) in the reformed economy enterprises struggle above all for favorable conditions and rules of operation. Because the state retains control of so much (such as basic prices, the flow of supplies, taxes and rates of profit) everyone tries to influence the appropriate agencies to get what they want most, be it subsidies, a special tax reduction, monopolistic privileges, specially reduced supply prices, hard currency allowances, or permission to raise the price of one's own products. The means are the same, but the ends are rather new.

Corruption of the Power Elite

The leaders who came to power in Poland in 1970 openly abandoned the slogans of communist humility. "*Enrichessez-vous!*" became the new slogan for the power elite. Conspicuous consumption grew prevalent throughout the political establishment, as the country was treated as an object of plunder. The 1980 strikes and mass protests put an end to these practices. Under public pressure, a broad anti-corruption campaign was launched. A number of corrupt officials were tried and sentenced, many more were dismissed from office. A special Party commission (the so-called Grabski Commission) investigated charges against the country's top leaders, including the First Secretary of the Party and the Premier.[13] The result was a visible change not only in the

13. *Protokoly tzw. Komisji Grabskiego*, *op.cit.*

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scope of embezzlement and power abuse, but in the norms of political conduct. The open plundering of public property (such as building private houses with state money, or exchanging valuable gifts paid from the funds of state institutions) is no longer tolerated, and public opinion keeps a watchful eye on officials.

In the Soviet Union the press nowdays reports sensational stories of deeds which surpass the most unimaginable doings of the mafia. Certain regions in Central Asia, were converted into absolutist principalities ruled by terror, extortion and bribery. In the most widely publicized case, one director turned his giant state farm literally into a sovereign principality, thanks to the support of the all-powerful lord of Uzbekistan, Rashidov. The farm's 30,000 inhabitants became virtual slaves. Minor offenders were interred in a "private" prison, while more serious breaches were punished by death.[14] Of course, such excesses could not have taken place without consent of powerful patrons in the provincial capitals, and in Moscow. The whole system was based on the hierarchy of patrons which run from the very top of the structure through provincial and regional levels down to local communities, factories and *kolkhozes*.[15] There is evidence that Soviet authorities are seeking to eradicate at least the most drastic cases of abuses of power. But these efforts meet resistance from the local mafias. [16]

For the local mafias, corruption and reform are in conflict. Less clear is the problem of legal privileges for the elites in the Soviet Union. Traditionally, Soviet elites have enjoyed extensive privileges.[17] Many of these privileges have been enjoyed not only by the political

14. See reports in *The Guardian* and *The Independent*, 1988.

15. According to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, "Bribes were given not only in one region of Uzbekistan, but in all the regions. From the regions they were remitted to oblasts, from the oblasts to Tashkent, and from there — to Moscow." Quoted in *Biuletyn Specjalny* 12551 (March 28, 1988).

16. According to Tatyana Zaslavskaya, "Many influential centers of organized crime have been annihilated. These clans consisted of demoralized functionaries of various trade organizations, tricksters and dodgers from the 'shadow economy,' and the corrupt part of the apparatus of power, including the organs of law enforcement . . . some of these mafias have been discovered and punished, but I think there are many others hiding in their lurking-places. They cannot afford to wait passively. For them, reconstruction means a loss of everything. They will stop at nothing." Cf. *Izvestia* (June 6, 1988). In the most drastic cases, members of investigative teams were tempted with million ruble bribes and threatened with assassinations and the kidnapping of their children. Cf. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, quoted in *Biuletyn Specjalny* 12551 (March 8, 1988).

17. These include free flats and dachas; special clinics, restaurants and food-shops; and even the special "Chaika lanes" on Moscow streets — special center lanes of main avenues, reserved for VIP cars, named after the Chaika cars used by top Soviet officials.

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elite, but by other elites as well, such as artists, scientists, army and police officers or top industrial managers. As most of these arrangements are perfectly legal, we can call them corrupt only if the Soviet population perceives them as illegitimate — and it seems clear they do. It is not yet clear how the reforms will affect these privileges. They do not seem to have been criticized as sharply as in Poland, perhaps because Gorbachev does not want to antagonize the elites who already have enough reasons to look at his reforms with suspicion.[18]

The Private Sector

The 1980s have seen much improvement in the situation of the private sector in Poland. Besides small repair and retail shops, there are now a growing number of small private factories, some of them producing sophisticated, high-tech products. Joint ventures with foreign capital and mixed-capital companies constitute another new element in the system. The equalization of sectors, meaning that the private sector obtains the same rights and privileges enjoyed by the state sector, has met stubborn resistance from the bureaucratic apparatus, which talks of "creeping capitalism" and "the selling out of socialism." Yet the debate is not about the existence of the private sector, which is now a widely accepted fact, but about the character and the scope of control over that sector.

As previously indicated, relations between the bureaucracy and private business are largely parasitic in nature. The underprivileged status of the private sector means a complete dependence on the good will of various bureaucratic agencies. Whether obtaining a license for an enterprise, allocation of scarce raw materials, or permission to expand production — everything requires elaborate formalities which can be simplified by greasing the appropriate palms. These practices are so widespread that many private entrepreneurs treat them as a routine part of their operation.[19] No part of the private sector is free

18. But this seems to be changing. The Soviet press prints letters from readers who criticize "the system of social parasitism, in which goods are distributed according to position, not according to work." In some republics, the special canteens for the "chosen ones" have reportedly been abolished. Recently, Abel Aganbegyan announced "the end of special hospitals and vacation centers accessible only to top party and government officials," though he added that no decision concerning special shops had yet been made. See *Sovietskaya Kultura*, quoted in *Biuletyn Specjalny* 12430 (October 5, 1987); and *Biuletyn Specjalny* 12517 (December 18, 1988).

19. As the owner of a middle-sized firm told me, "Wherever you go you meet extended hands, and you must stuff them all. Frankly, in comparison to the scale of my production, these are not terrifying sums, a few tens of thousands here and there. I treat it as part of my costs, which one way or other I eventually pass on to my customers."

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from extortions.[20]

Thus vast segments of the lower bureaucracy must try to hamper decentralization and guard against the expansion of market mechanisms or the introduction of equality across sectors. Any one of these steps would drastically diminish their possibilities of extortion. Paradoxically, some private entrepreneurs are also interested in keeping these limitations, or at least some of them, such as the complicated licensing procedures. An owner of a private firm characterized it in the following way: "Once you have jumped over this high wall, it protects you. I pay all the necessary bribes, and have practically a monopoly in the local market. Once they introduce the principle, "everything which is not forbidden is allowed,"[21] I lose this protective wall, I lose my monopoly, and I have to compete with God-only-knows how many guys who will freely enter my turf." Besides parasitic relations of extortions and bribes, there is also a symbiotic relation of mutual benefits and co-operation.

In the 1950s and 1960s, any kind of friendly relations between party-state functionaries and private businessmen were highly unlikely. Gradually, however, a number of informal ties arose. These usually assumed a patron-client character, where a member of the establishment used influence, authority and connections to protect and/or support friendly businessmen in exchange for cash payments or a mutual exchange of gifts and favors.[22] In some cases these ties assumed a close personal character, with public officials becoming regular, albeit silent partners in private business. Another strong tie between power and private capital was the flow of people from the political and economic establishment into the private sector. Thanks to early retirement, police officers, Party apparatchiks and officials in the state administration may leave their careers in the prime of their lives and go on to establish industrial enterprises, shops, brokerage agencies, etc. They do not, of course, break their former connections or friendships; in fact, they usually count on the support and protection of former colleagues. These

20. A press report gives an account of the people who run retail shops in Warsaw: "An owner of a drugstore must regularly drink with a district constable and bribe various supervisors. Another shop which sells foreign goods is almost never left alone by inspectors and auditors. One would never believe how many reasons can be found for control, and how many inspectors supplement their miserable salaries with extortion." See Z. Krzyzanowska, "Wyznania ajenta," in *Tryouna Ludu* (March 28, 1988).

21. This slogan refers to simplified procedures for establishing new firms. Existing, complicated procedures are replaced by simple notification of the local administration of the establishment of an enterprise. The principle became law in Poland at the beginning 1989.

22. P. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964).

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types of symbiotic relations developed in Poland on a wide scale in the 1970s. Today, they are ripe for expansion.

But now there are new possibilities. As the private sector has changed its character, from small scale family workshops to sophisticated industrial and trading firms, a new symbiotic relation has arisen: the joint company, bringing together people and capital from state enterprises, private companies, and voluntary organizations. For example, some youth organizations recently set up a number of commercial firms in which a majority of the shares belong to the association as a whole, but some shares are owned by the youth group functionaries themselves.[23] Leasing state enterprises to private persons is also becoming possible.

Another popular practice is to hire functionaries of important political institutions. For example, a giant (by Polish standards) computer firm, Agrokomputer, established by the Peasant Youth Union, employed on a part-time basis cadre workers of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party. These companies also link with the establishment by integrating various officials into their board of trustees such as judges, public prosecutors, and other top officials. These people may not use their influence for illegal dealings on behalf of these firms, but the practice of including such officials on governing boards creates an ambiguous situation.[24] In other cases, open corruption is quite evident.[25]

Thus the common sense view that bureaucrats are stalwart opponents of reforms is no longer so obvious.[25] Paradoxically, those members of

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23. Recently, the "Towimor" factory, along with two other state firms, established a thermostat production company. Of the 33 shares in the company, 13 belong to private persons, including all four directors of "Towimor." See A. Szmak, "Punkty odniesienia," in *Przeglad Tygodniowy* (February 16, 1989).

24. In 1988, public opinion was aroused by the revelation that one of the country's Vice-Premiers (since retired) was a member of the board of trustees of the giant corporation Elpol, a virtual monopoly in Polish electronics. Although Elpol is a state firm, and the Vice-Premier did not receive remuneration for his board membership, his very presence evoked suspicion that he would use his position on behalf of the corporation. See J. Chlopecki, "Znieslawienie vicepremiera," in *Prawo i zycie* (July 9, 1988).

25. One party official told me he was offered membership on the board of trustees of one company with a gratuity of 100,000 zlotys per hour, at a time when the average monthly salary amounted to 45,000. This official refused the offer, but noted that "some of my friends don't have as many scruples as I do. I know people who sit on several such boards. Don't ask me how much money they get."

26. As Aleksander Paszynski, one of the leading Polish advocates of the private sector, observed: "Today there are many economic managers, and even state and party apparatchiks, interested in establishing companies. They aspire to places on various boards of trustees, and are more and more daring in thinking about their shares in such companies. . . . Some of today's chairmen of boards of trustees belong to the most narrow circles of power." See A. Paszynski, "Drogi i bezoroza reformy," in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (December 11, 1988).

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the political establishment involved in these corrupt, or at least morally dubious arrangements, may become a powerful pro-reformist force. They seek to develop an economic system in which their companies could prosper. This kind of alliance of money and power seems to have a bright future in Poland. In a strange way, corruption may aid reform.[27] The situation in the Soviet Union is entirely different. Until recently, there were no legal private enterprises. But if, in spite of various obstacles, the Soviet private sector grows, one can expect corruption will follow the Polish pattern.

Conclusion

Generally, reforms in Poland and in the Soviet Union diminish certain types of corruption. The most visible changes can be seen in "legalized corruption" and illegal abuse of power by the power elite. The leaders of both countries are determined to eradicate at least the most extreme cases of power abuse. Further, privileges are decreasing as the population's negative attitude must be taken into account. By abolishing privileges, the leaders risk the wrath of certain segments of the elite, but they can hope to gain popular support in return.

If scarcity is a principal cause of corruption, we cannot expect any drastic reduction of graft before economic reforms bring a more satisfactory supply of goods and services. Indeed, prospects for corruption have much to do with the prospects of reform, for those bureaucrats who gain from corruption and extortion will do their best to fight the reform. At the same time, there are important new trends in Poland connected with the rapidly expanding private sector and the transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock companies. A growing number of higher and middle level functionaries of the state admnistration, party apparatus, police and other members of a broadly defined "establishment" now have vested interests in freedom of enterprise and market relations. The ideological stigma which weighed heavily against the private sector has been officially removed, symbolized last October by the appointment of a private businessman, one of the richest individuals in Poland, to the post of Minister of Industry. The person employed simultaneously in the political apparatus and the joint-stock company is becoming a familiar figure in the socio-economic landscape of Poland.

27. This opinion is shared by some Soviet authors. In an interview for the First Channel of Polish Television, Soviet historian Natan Eidelman stated that the only way to neutralize the resistance of the apparatchiks is to make the reforms economically advantageous for them.

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Finally, there are psychological and cultural factors affecting corruption, e,g., the permissive attitudes towards illegality that are a product of the communist system itself. Even if the system is changed, there will remain a "corrupt mentality" — values, attitudes and behavioral patterns developed and consolidated during long years of centralized rule. Disregard for law, amoral familism, suspicion toward official institutions, nepotism, favoritism and patron-client relations — the belief that all of these are natural elements of human relations will certainly outlive the conditions which brought them into being.

Some cultures, of course, have more favorable attitudes toward corruption than others. According to some authors, the endemic corruption in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Soviet Central Asia and the Caucuses is due to the specific features of the traditional, pre-Soviet cultures of these societies. Some Soviet scholars see corruption in Central Asia as proof of the conquest of Soviet institutions by traditional clans and kins, which have adapted these institutions to their needs, and exploited them as they used to do for centuries.

The study of corruption cannot overlook this aspect of the problem. It is quite possible, for example, that Czech or German culture, with their stress on discipline, law, obedience, hard work and frugality, could restrain corrupt practices to a higher degree than the Romanian, Georgian or Polish culture. In the end, cultural factors may reinforce or weaken the impact of systemic conditions of corruption, and provide a "local flavor" to its various forms. However, they cannot change the point that the main sources of corruption must be sought in the system itself.

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Self-government and Ownership in Poland

Miron Wolnicki

Imagination is a precious commodity in politics. In 1981 only those who had a lot of it could have predicted the present situation in Poland: Solidarity's sweeping electoral victory, the end of the Communist Party's monopoly of power, Jaruzelski's running for the presidency amidst praises of his personal courage from Adam Michnik — the most famous Polish political prisoner. Even more imagination may be needed to foresee what will result from the unprecedented concordat between the opposition and the Communist Party, and who is going to manage and own the dilapidated capital stock of state enterprises.

The present economic crisis is the most important political factor in Poland. Notorious market shortages and failed government attempts to marketize the economy since 1986 played a decisive role in the union's comeback and its spectacular victory in semi-free elections. Even if Jaruzelski's second stage of the reform (market equilibrium prices, no subsidies, convertibility of the zloty) had succeeded, the new generation of workers Staniszkis discusses[1] would still have gone on strike in Spring 1988. It was the workers' dislike of government-sponsored market reforms that revitalized Solidarity's ideals and brought its fading regional structures above ground. Economic crisis, rather than Jaruzelski's respect for pluralism, proved to be most crucial for the development of the Polish version of "real socialism." It broke the political monopoly of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) and turned its leaders into politicians. Caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of political and economic reforms, the Party has chosen the first as apparently easier

1. Jadwiga Staniszkis, "The Obsolescence of Solidarity," in this issue of *Telos*.

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to carry out. The price the union has paid for legalization is not small. If Solidarity is going to underwrite market-type economic reforms, it will have to reconcile macroeconomic probity with the traditional functions of the trade union.[2] Thus independent labor leaders will have to tell workers that strikes are bad; that a market solution to the crisis will require free, but higher prices; that reforms will mean closing inefficient plants — which in turn means unemployment. This is not likely to make Walesa's union center very popular and may create an unusual collusion of interests between the opposition-Left and the Party anti-reformist faction, or even precipitate the emergence of a Polish Robespierre.[3]

In the coming months, visionary proposals of independent economists and union leaders concerning workers' self-management, ownership reforms, and marketization will be tackled within a disordered system. This time Solidarity is about to undertake a task which appears no less challenging than its 1980 call for legalization: continue the operational consensus with the Party reformist faction without alienating radical young workers and, most importantly, shape future economic reforms. The latter, however, are virtually impossible without participating in the government and paying the political costs of marketization.

The question here is the following: What systemic modifications are likely to emerge in Poland? What can be expected from the expansion of self-government and industrial democracy, both on the micro- and macroeconomic levels? Will Solidarity's legislative power, situation permitting, mean a transformation of the economy into a classic market economy or Yugoslav-type self-management, or something else?

The strength of the independent workers' movement and the popularity of the ideal of worker participation renders Poland more likely to imitate the Yugoslav model. At the same time, however, there is no steadfast support for self-management, either among Solidarity's new center or the Party's reformist faction. Therefore, the outlook for the country's economy may be very different from the Yugoslav or any other systemic solution implemented so far Eastern Europe.

Self-Government in Poland

Workers' self-government has appeared in Poland three times. After WWII, workers' councils undertook the rebuilding and operation of war-ravaged factories. They were especially visible in the Silesia-Dabrowa

2. Miron Wolnicki, "Instead of Revolution: Prospects for Power Sharing," *Commonweal* (May 19, 1989).

3. David Ost, "The Transformation of Solidarity and the Future of Central Europe," in *Telos* 79 (Spring 1989), pp. 69-94.

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Region where the tradition of self-government dated from 1918. Self-governing bodies were permitted primarily in private enterprise and, in some cases, were used by the Polish Workers Party (before it forced the Polish Socialist Party to consolidate in the PUWP in 1948) to control those firms. After the nationalization of industry in 1946, the communists found self-government too competitive with the monopoly of state control over production and decided to abolish them. During the next two years, the workers' councils were increasingly restricted, and they continued to 1949 only as tokens, limited to advising government-appointed managers. Before eventually disappearing, they were forced to cede their position as the legitimate employee representatives to the factory Party cells.

Self-government re-emerged after the June 1956 Poznan "bread and butter" revolt. The new workers' councils were supported by the PUWP reformist faction, which regarded employee participation as a cure for excessive centralization. According to Oskar Lange, who engineered the introduction of "manipulative decentralization" and planning reforms, the councils would insure greater enterprise autonomy from the ministries and the government.[4] The breakdown of Gomulka's political liberalization in 1957 and the subsequent economic recentralization brought an end to this experiment. The new planning system and a parametric economic steering mechanism strengthened management's role. The workers' councils were replaced by a subordinate, consultative body called "The Conference of Workers' Self-Government" (known as KSR (*Konferencja Samorzadu Robotniczego*) which consisted of token, hand picked, acquiescent workers. Although lacking any economic discretion, the KSR retained a limited redistributive role (the rubber-stamping of fringe benefits, such as company housing, subsidized vacations, and coupons for scarce commodities.

In the following years there was no real interest in supporting self-governing bodies, either among the Party *nomenklatura* or the employees of large enterprises. Party economists did not consider the participatory model viable, there was no desire in the *nomenklatura* to share

4. After October 1956, along with Party secretary Gomulka, Lange publicly advocated decentralization . Lange supported "manipulative decentralization" as opposed to "administrative decentralization." The latter limits the lower echelons' options by providing guidelines for decision-making. It stresses detailed information, while de-emphasizing the appropriate incentive structure. According to Lange, "manipulative decentralization" does not limit feasible choices but manipulates lower echelon decisions by altering the consequences resulting from any given act. Lange's views on decentralization can be found in his "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," in B.E. Lippincott, ed., *On the Economic Theory of Socialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).

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power in the enterprise, and the branch Ministries were not too interested in adding to the tribulations of managers besieged by taut planning and scarce material resources. For their part, workers believed that support of the emasculated KSR structures would only strengthen the Party's role in the enterprise.

The repression of the December 1970 Gdansk strikes were critical for the formation of a broad-based opposition of workers and intellectuals. The Workers' Defense Council (KOR) translated the strategy of tiny free union cells into specific tactics, created a nationwide opposition network, brought together disconnected workers to generalize their grievances, formulated remedies and coordinated their activities. KOR's leftist communitarian ideals developed into the apolitical concept of "self-governing republic" and the later injunction to stay away from administrative functions. Jacek Kuron was particularly insistent that unions should refrain from playing any administrative role and thus be compromised by accepting coresponsibility with the communist government. As for self-government, Kuron believed then that it would be nonsense for the union to represent both employers and employees. For workers in 1980, self-government was a practical rather than an ideological issue. It assumed that workers could run factories better than their bosses, and allowed them to circumvent the paralyzed central economic apparatus.

The battle for self-management was the focal point of the first session of the Solidarity congress, which convened in Gdansk on September 5, 1981. The union delegates attacked the government's "worker self-management" bill in the Polish Parliament as a charade and demanded a national referendum to decide between it and Solidarity's version; should the government fail to hold the referendum, Solidarity would hold its own. On September 8, without reaching consensus on the bill, the congress voted to send a letter of greeting and support to workers and free trade unionists throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The delegates then adjourned the first session for two weeks of consultations in their home districts. On September 22, four days before the congress reconvened, a poorly attended meeting of Solidarity's presidium voted three-to-one (with Rulewski as the only dissenting vote) to accept a "worker self management" compromise and cancel the call for a referendum. Three days later, on September 25, parliament approved the compromise, which allowed some worker input into the selection of managers, but reserved exclusive Party control at key security enterprises. The congress which met the next day opened with angry attacks on the union leadership for failure to observe the democratic process in accepting the bill. After fierce discussions and appeals by Walesa, the

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congress voted a mild reprimand of the leadership and then, with certain reservations, agreed to honor the leadership's compromise. The 1981 law restored self-government, but permitted only limited worker input into decisions regarding production, employment, wages, and the selection of managers. Nevertheless, there was at least hope of controlling output (as demanded by Solidarity on November 9, 1981) and of eliminating the Party organizations from the enterprise. (In the November 27 meeting, the Politburo noted that there had been efforts to eliminate Communist Party cells from factories in 21 of Poland's 49 provinces). The government intended to use elections to neutralize Solidarity in the enterprise. For both sides, the 1981 law was too little, and too late.

The Big Privatization Debate

The present debate on self-government is really a discussion about its merits and shortcomings. Brus has developed a theoretical model of optimal institutions in a market socialist economy with increased worker participation.[5] One of Brus' most interesting contributions concerns worker participation in management — an area unexplored by the Lange model. According to Brus, such participation is essential to any effort at decentralization. Worker participation will result in lengthening the enterprise's time horizon and, hence, diminish traditional resistance to technological change that comes from the one-dimensional focus by "one-man managers" on meeting the enterprise's planned production targets. "An enterprise," Brus writes, "must be able to work for its long term interest, and the best way of ensuring this is to develop collective decision-making, collective incentive and collective responsibility."[6]

5. Wlodzimierz Brus, *The Market in a Socialist Economy* (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1972); *The Economics and Politics of Socialism* (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1973). See also Brus, "Economics and Politics: The Fatal Link," in Abraham Brumberg ed., *Poland: Genesis of a Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1983); and "Ziele, Methoden und Politische Determinanten der Wirtschaftspolitik Polens 1970-1976," in *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 49 (1978).

6. Brus' arguments for self-management are similar to Vanek's. Both locate their models in state-owned enterprises managed by workers, whose objective is to maximize their income. Vanek uses five characteristics to identify such a system: 1) The firm will be managed in participatory fashion by the people working in it. 2) Income sharing will prevail and is to be equitable, that is, "equal for labor of equal intensity and quality, and governed by a democratically agreed upon income-distribution schedule assigning to each job its relative claim on total net income." 3) Although the workers may enjoy the fruits of the operation, they do not own, and must therefore pay for the use of productive resources. 4) The economy must be a market economy. Economic planning may be used through indirect mechanisms. 5) There is freedom of choice in employment. See Brus, "Economics and Politics. . .," *op. cit.*, p. 41. See also Jaraslav Vanek, *The Participatory Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 1.

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Because of the Yugoslav experience, support for self-government today is far less enthusiastic than twenty years ago. Opponents of this model focus on two aspects of Yugoslav-type firms: their low capital and motivational efficiency and their limited ability to deal with a crisis. In the first case, Polish economists have been strongly influenced by Hayek, Mises, Bergson and Ward.[7] One of the most frequent objections is that worker-managed enterprises cannot generate employee motivation comparable to classic private enterprises. Thus a firm entertaining the possibility of long term expansion must demand wage sacrifices from the employees in the short run. Theoretically, the firm may offer stock instead of wages increments, though in the long run income on capital must be redeemable in some way. Workers would have to work harder for the common good and continue employment until their sacrifices pay off. What would happen to employee stock ownership when some workers decide to leave the firm? Should their shares be bought back by other employees or can ownership by non-employees be permitted?

The fundamental nature of the relation between workers and owners of capital can be altered by the mobility of profits. If workers' rewards depend on business profits, workers may internalize capitalistic ideals and accept risk-taking. Attempts to improve the model by allowing the transfer of profits to non-employees raises problems concerning saving behavior, the scope of worker property rights, entrepreneurial propensity, new enterprise formation, etc.[8]

7. In their critiques of the Lange microeconomic model, Hayek and Bergson concentrate on the impossibility of the complex pricing system and the managers' motivation. The same goes for the average worker's motivation. Lange's system provides for no direct bonus for workers — only a general "social dividend" shared by all. He makes no provision for worker participation in enterprise decision-making or choice of job. See Abram Bergson, "Market Socialism Revisited," *Journal of Political Economy*, 75 (October 1967), pp. 663-75; Friederick Hayek, ed., *Collectivist Economic Planning*, 6th ed. (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1963). Cf. also Benjamin Ward, *The Socialist Economy* (New York: Random House, 1967), Ch. 2. Similar arguments were advanced by Slawomir Kozlowski, who juxtaposes "classical" and "self-managed" enterprise. See his "Czy Samorzad Uratuje Polska Gospodarke?" *Kontakt*, nos. 7-8 (Paris: 1986), p. 15.

8. A considerable body of literature by Libenstein and Horwat supporting the motivation of worker-managed enterprises to maximize profits and the rise of X-efficiency (macroeconomic efficiency) as opposed to lower allocative efficiency is not very persuasive. For all practical purposes, for those in Poland entertaining the possibility of self-government today, the crisis of Yugoslav self-managed firms in the 1980s speaks more eloquently than Libenstein's arguments. The concept of X-efficiency developed by Libenstein was used by many economists to analyze efficiency of Yugoslav enterprises. X-efficiency defined those aspects of organization in production external to allocational efficiency, such as style of management, worker participation, motivation, organizational structure, etc. Libenstein's point is that participation is very important for overall efficiency. Djilas thinks that self-management is completely artificial — part of the ruling

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The inherent shortcomings of group ownership has led many Polish economists to advocate a break-up of the monopoly of state ownership by selling factory stock to workers and reprivatizing the economy.[9] Krawczyk and others propose uncompensated redistribution of assets to workers, since ultimately society owns the assets collectively.[10] Secondly, they point out that any form of collective ownership has proven less efficient than privately operated capital.

Most liberal economists have understood the reality of Soviet-type economies. As used in Poland, the term "workers' self-management" refers to institutional arrangements. Participation is not merely "mental and emotional involvement of persons in work situations" or "a sharing process among managers or employees," as Western management science presents it. Rather, it refers to the degree of institutional power-sharing between workers councils and the enterprise's administering organization (Ministry or Peoples' Councils). Therefore, all debates concerning self-government authority must be regarded as a zero-sum game. The shifting of proprietary rights is equivalent to the reallocation

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structure. See Thomas J. Bray, "A Conversation with Milovan Djilas," *The Wall Street Journal* (October 20,1982), p. 33. Branko Horvat has claimed that classical microtheory is inadequate to judge worker managed firms, see: "On the Theory of the Labor Managed Firm, in Branko Horvat *et al.*, eds., *Self-Governing Socialism* (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1975). There is a body of literature concerning the positive impact of participatory and self-managed firms on capital efficiency published in Yugoslavia. See John Hampton Moor, *Growth with Self-Management: Yugoslav Industrialization, 1952-1975* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), Darek C. Jones and Jan Svejnar, eds., *Participatory and Self-Managed Firms* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982). On the macroeconomic front, since implementation of the 1965 reforms, the real output stagnated and real average earnings fell at an average rate of 4.75% between 1980 and 1985. See OECD, *Yugoslavia: Economic Surveys 1986/1987* (Paris: OECD, 1987). Between 1970-1984 consumer prices grew in Yugoslavia 15 times, while in most EEC countries prices increased only 3 times. See *Economic Survey of Europe, UN Economic Commission for Europe*, various editions.

9. As Krawczyk put it: ". . . as proven beyond doubt by the Yugoslav crisis, self-government solutions suffer from the alienation of capital ownership and use. Capital without an owner is only another accounting method of real assets, and not a living economic category." See Rafal Krawczyk, "Skrypt do Kapitalu," *Przeglad Tygodniowy*, no. 49 (October 11, 1988), p. 7; and "Uwlaszczyc," *Przeglad Tygodniowy*, no. 35 (September 11, 1988). Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Prawa Wlasnosci w Socjalizmie i ich Ekonomiczne, Spoleczne i Logiczne Implikacje" (unpublished paper); and "Wlasnosc-Racjonalnosc-Dynamika-Struktura. Proba Istnienia Realnego Socjalizmu," in *Przyjaciol Nauk* (1985), no. 2. See also Tomasz Sarkozy, "Problems of Social Ownership and Proprietary Organization," *Acta Oeconomica* (1983), no. 3-4. Tomasz Gruszecki, "Gospodarki Socjalistycznej Klopoty z Wlasnoscia," paper delivered at the "Socialist Property" conference in Radzyn-Poznan (May 15-17, 1985). Janusz Korwin-Mikke, "Pochwala Akcjonariatu," *Przeglad Tygodniowy*, no. 38, 338 (September 25, 1988).

10. Zdzislaw Fedorowicz, "Obiektywne Uwarunkowania Czy Chciejstwo?" *Zycie Gospodarcze*, no. 10 (1988).

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of power away from the administering organizations and toward the workers councils which, hereafter, are likely to be dominated by Solidarity and be entirely beyond the reach of Party organizations.

The second type of criticism of the Yugoslav model focuses on the viability of the worker-managed firm to help the economy out of the crisis. An inflationary gap is likely to create immediate incentives for private enterprises. One-man management is likely to be more efficient than a *status quo* oriented collective worker-management. Why then use group ownership, some liberal economists ask, when only an owner-manager can effectively deal with the dynamics of the market?[11]

Free marketeers (the majority of the union's economists) know all too well that social ownership of the means of production is an ideological fiction which makes no sense either as a legal or as an economic category. The poor performance of Yugoslav economy in remedying market shortages has reaffirmed their conviction that self-government cannot assure automatic market reforms and thus remedy shortages.[12]

According to Hausner, Yugoslavia enjoyed an adequate growth from 1965 to 1973 because the worker-managed firms operated according to market forces. He, however, ignores the proprietary dilemmas of the Yugoslav system and sees the causes of decline in the leadership's political conservatism. Likewise, along with Party conservatives, Mieszczankowski and Fedorowicz advocate that ownership pluralism (subordinated self-government and state ownership) is most appropriate for Poland.[13]

Between Theory and Tactics: The Union Proposals

As the country's largest social movement, Solidarity has been under pressure from the membership to propose an acceptable model of industrial democracy since 1981. During the first 16 months of the union's legal existence there were many spontaneous reform proposals based on a mixture of market and worker ownership. The union's advisor and

11. Maciej Swiecicki,"Przeglad Tygodniowy," *Socjalizm a Wlasnosc*, no. 27, 327 (July 3, 1988) and Janusz Korwin-Mikke, "Pochwala Akcjonariatu," *Przeglad Tygodniowy*, no. 38, 338 (September 25, 1988).

12. "The Yugoslav experience proved," two Polish authors write, "that self-government cannot be treated as an effective remedy for economic crises without fundamental change in ownership. Without clearly defined proprietorship, an effective economic and financial system, and the separation of economics and politics, self-government reforms are meaningless. Since 1973, Yugoslav self-government has failed because it was disenfranchised. It simply never became self-government as such." See Teresa Wojcik, Jozef Borkowski, "Czego Dowodza Doswiadczenia Jugoslawii ?" *Zycie Gospodarcze* (April 4, 1989), no. 23.

13. Jerzy Hausner, "Samorzad Ekonomiczny," *Zycie Gospodarcze*, no. 5 (January 29, 1989).

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economic libertarian, Stefan Kurowski, suggested leaving regulation to the market, which would follow the reprivatization of the economy and the expansion of all self-governing bodies. Ryszard Bugaj, a student of Brus, favored a similar expansion of self-government but under a pragmatic marriage of flexible and decentralized planning with market mechanisms. Jerzy Milewski, the coordinator of Solidarity's Network (*Siec*) and the author of its statutes, suggested sweeping reform based on a network of cooperating independent factory councils.

Ideologically, the Network proposals were close to French syndicalism and to the industrial democracy advocated in England by Tony Benn. According to Network statutes, "Social ownership of the means of production" should mean "ownership by society, not by the state," ". . . factories should become social enterprises." "Self-government administers the enterprises' property, lays down the general lines for its activity and development, and decides how profits should be distributed by the Network" (Article 10, section 5). "The managing director carries out the resolutions of the workers' self-government" (Article 36).[14]

By May, 1981, the largest enterprises — the Lenin and Warski Shipyards, and the Wujek mine near Katowice — were all represented in this spontaneous movement. Network spread rapidly, elaborating both its own regional structures and alternative proposals for the new Workers' Self-Government Bill the government introduced in September, 1981 and subsequently suspended after martial law was declared. "Our next step after (factory) self-government," Network's founders wrote, "is to go on to local self-government, and finally, a self-governing state . . ."[15]

Though Solidarity did not fully endorse the Network program, it did agree with its goal of sharing power within the enterprise, rather than merely consulting, as proposed by the government. For unionists, the ideal of enterprises owned and operated by workers was obviously appealing. What was less clear, however, was the political feasibility of a transition to a "state of producer cooperatives." As Ash has pointed out, self-government was not a top priority to many delegates to the first congress.[16] At best, it was part of the "Self-governing Republic" many delegates believed should be an ultimate goal of the workers movement. To some, self-government meant primarily worker's control; to others, it

14. *Solidarnosc*, Special edition (September 5, 1981), pp. 18. The draft of the statutes was presented at the Network conference in early June.

15. Charles Hudson, "An Interview with the Solidarity Activist Jerzy Milewski," London (August 19, 1982). *RFE Background Report*, no. 211 (24 July 1981).

16. Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p.190.

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meant strong, independent, competent non-Party management. It is impossible to know what would have resulted from this mixture of plan, self-government, market, and private, social and state ownership.

The debate concerning self-government within Solidarity intensified after the government's attempt to marketize the economy in 1986. By that time, Walesa's wing had clearly moved toward neo-liberal solutions. Since Walesa's center now strongly believed that marketization-*cum*-privatization was the best and quickest solution for the crisis, the so-called second stage of the reform came as a surprise and a relief. On the one hand, it meant the economy was going in the right direction and higher prices would stimulate production of consumer goods; on the other, Rakowski's price increases freed the union from advocating price hikes and created windfall support for the union among young workers. When the government eventually accepted that reforms were impossible without privatization and extending self-government, Walesa's center welcomed it, not in order to revive the myth of a "self-governing republic," but because of the chance it presented to break up the monopoly of state ownership and replace it with a realistic marketization program.

What are the chances for marketization? In macroeconomic terms, Poland today can be compared to the Third World economies of the 1970s — a large external debt, an inflationary gap, declining prices of export staples, and political instability. Within such an economy, marketization is necessarily going to be costly in the short-term. First, it requires a radical upward price adjustment and the acceptance of an even higher "inflation tax" (under the round table agreement, indexation is to cover 80% of inflation). The likely scenario is that younger workers most vulnerable to real wage erosion and disappointed with the lack of Solidarity's support of full wage compensation for price increases may be the easy catch for a radical Left. Secondly, profitization of the economy means the liquidation of hundreds of subsidized enterprises and, consequently, unemployment. Before an expanding private sector may provide new jobs to replace those lost in the state sector, transitional insecurity and the loss of fringe benefits is certain. Thirdly, some of the internalized values of socialist egalitarianism may not apply in the market economy. The Solidarity-dominated legislative branch is likely to focus on the liquidation of the *nomenklatura* system and accelerate the escape of the former elite to the private sector. Walesa's support of privatization is already arousing criticism among workers, who regard it as a "golden parachute" for the security police and the Party apparatus.

It will not be easy for the union to combine support of marketization with the labor union's traditional welfare functions. Today, however,

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there are very few options left. Even if this entails some loss of membership, it is a calculated risk. This situation implies tactical constraints on the union and the qualification of the union's support for self-government. While the marketization-*cum*-privatization, to which Walesa's center is committed, risks the loss of some support in the short run, self-government at least postpones taking an immediate position on privatization. Such tactics, understandable at the time when legalization required mobilization, may not work now when the union has to consider potential costs and benefits of a market economy.

While hitherto union support has come from a wide spectrum of wage workers in the state sector, students, and farmers, this is likely to change with privatization. The proposed ownership reforms will necessitate the restructuring of Solidarity's social base. Post-socialist, depoliticized entrepreneurs, recruiting both from former Solidarity activists and *nomenklatura* fallout, are likely to create new elites and the demand for a new social-democratic Party. In the long run, Solidarity's program will have to cater to this group if it does not want to lose important allies. Without them, marketization will remain a myth.

No less important is whether the privatization scenario means creation of a labor market to absorb workers laid off from closed inefficient enterprises, or an output sufficiently large to close the inflationary gap.[17] Until the answers to these questions are found, self-government will remain only the second best option, lacking the enthusiasm necessary to build it into a viable, effective system of worker participation.

Privatization or Self-Government: A Bitter Choice

Martial law gave rise to speculation that Poland was on the way to becoming a state characterized by a partially militarized "decentralization-*cum*-marketization," and that the system would evolve toward that prevailing in Spain under Franco. Instead, the government decided first to recentralize (1981-1985)[18] and then to institute gradual price increases in an already inflationary economy (1986-1987).[19] The late Francoist model

17. Stanislaw Gomulka, "The Polish Crises: Will it Spread and What Will be the Outcome?" in Jan Drewnowski, ed., *Crises in the East-European Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

18. During this period factories were run by or with military curators and virtually no workers' participation. A 1985 poll in 334 industrial enterprises showed that 25% had rubber stamp "worker councils" and only 15% of the polled "worker councils" were consulted concerning management decisions. In the same year, 78% of interindustry cooperation was defined by the respective ministries. See "Samorzad Robotniczy w Przedsiebiorstwach Przemyslowych," *CEBOS* (Warsaw, 1985).

19. In October 1987, the government eliminated 8 branch ministries and shifted

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did not work. In 1986, Winiecki predicted that, "As there are no resources to support an increase in consumption to mitigate political repression, failure is certain. Thus a new shock is all but inevitable."[20] The Spring 1988 strikes confirmed such predictions.

A sense of urgency to find a formula for viable economic reforms led the government to relax the equity laws and to consider self-government. In 1986, the debate over privatization and self-government resurfaced in the official press. Party liberals were probably attempting to defuse mounting social pressure to reinstate an independent union. After all, self-government did not pose any direct threat to a system where 45% of all prices were still controlled by the government.[21]

The decline of the councils can be attributed to increasing government restrictions on the creation of new ones and on their legal prerogatives under the 1981 law. Thus councils have been forbidden in the mining industry (1984), state security and military enterprises (1982), the railway system (PKP), the airlines (LOT), radio and television (PRiTV), and research and development. Executive orders have been used to limit the right of workers councils to appoint and dismiss enterprise directors (granted previously under art. 38 of the September 1981 Law), or to decide on the disposition of enterprise income (1984). Moreover, the Ministry of Industry restored so-called employment verification, empowering enterprise directors to dismiss employees without first granting a "grace period" and without consulting the councils.

If, before 1986, the Party saw the restoration of self-government as a way of neutralizing Solidarity's influence on the enterprise level, the return of the union to factories three years later changed the Party's

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some of the responsibilities to local governments. According to new instructions, the provincial governors and city mayors were put in charge of 1800 enterprises formerly under the discretion of branch ministries. In addition, the administrative reform authorized governors and city mayors to set up new local enterprises designed to serve specific regional interests. Management and control is expected to be placed under the discretion of locally elected governments. In an unusually low turn-out by East European standards (57% in the last local elections), the People's Councils were practically boycotted. See *Rzeczypospolita* (March 24, 1988); *Trybuna Ludu* (February 25, 1987).

20. Jan Winiecki, "Soviet-Type Economies: Considerations for the Future," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 4 (October 1986), pp. 543-61.

21. Apparently, government support for self-government is decreasing. By December 13, 1981, workers' councils were established in some 4800 firms (80% of industrial firms). Martial Law suspended existing workers' councils and empowered branch ministries to determine where self-governing activities could be restored.The first workers' council was recreated in March 1982, to be followed by 1622 new councils by the end of the year. In 1983, the number of councils tripled to reach the peak of 6403 in 1985 (in 1988 this number decreased to 6279).

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policy of support to self-government reforms. It became obvious that a legalized Solidarity would dominate such bodies and proprietary relations would become less important. Today, the *nomenklatura* managers and the official union (OPZZ) are the only remaining vestiges of the Party's power in the enterprise (though even this may not last long after the new enterprise law is introduced by parliament).

An embarrassing solution for the Communist Party, privatization, may look more acceptable than self-government controlled by Solidarity group ownership. In mid-1988, Rakowski's government removed most of the administrative hurdles to setting up private enterprises and permitted the issue and sale of stock of state companies to workers. But how feasible is privatization of the socialized sector? Consider the following. In 1985 the gross value of the real assets in the "socialized sector" (state owned assets) amounted to 28.3 billion zlotys, and its net value to 18.7 billion zlotys. In the same year, all savings in banks and other savings institutions amounted to 1.3 billion zlotys (i.e., 4.6% and 7% of the gross and net real assets respectively).[22] Consequently, workers using their savings could at best become a dispersed minority of the industrial stock confronting a collective state owner of more than 90%. This level of workers' shareholding is insufficient to exert any meaningful control over the enterprise. One possible solution may be to sell the company shares to the employees below market value or simply hand it over to them.[23] Here wage-for-equity substitution or other types of employee ownership plans may be considered. An apparent advantage of such a system would be a reduction of permanent "market overhang" of forced savings in an economy suffering from consumer goods shortages.

Another important problem concerns the marketability of shares and bonds offered by state enterprises. To remain competitive, the dividend rate would have to reach at least 10%, considering return on other forms of workers' saving. Since in 1985 the total net assets reached 18.7 billion zlotys, the annual dividend would earn workers about 1.9 billion zlotys. This would mean more than doubling their income, since in the same year wages paid out to industrial workers amounted to 1.2 billion zlotys. Under the present system, "workers' dividends" or "profit-sharing" in the state sector did not exceed 45% of the total wage fund — less than .5% of the value of the real assets. Thus, to avoid hyperinflation, payments of dividends would have to be either suspended or such income

22. *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Warsaw: GUS, 1986).

23. Jacek Osiatynski, Mieczyslaw Fedorowicz, and Wladyslaw Pankow, "Samorzad w Gospodarce Polskiej 1981-1985," *Polish Sociological Society* (Warsaw: 1986).

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turned into new equity, which would be a realistic assumption provided the company's market value grew year by year.

Considering the problems with rapid privatization, there is going to be a likely reconsideration of self-government. It will come back to state enterprises in many variations of ownership and participation. Such socialization through group ownership and stock offering is likely for large enterprises. It may go along with the simultaneous expansion of the private sector.[24] Expatriate Poles, joint ventures with the EEC, marginal efficiency firms coping with market unification and local capital will probably take up to one- fourth the country's economy. But this will take more than half a decade to happen. In the meantime self-government, though different from the Brus-Vanek model, has a chance to develop. There are four possible shapes this participatory model can take:

Full Self-Management. Directly or indirectly through workers' councils, workers make all decisions concerning the operation of the enterprise. State ministries which provided the initial capital do not exert any influence on the organization. In this classic form of democracy, there is collective decision-making and the enterprise is autonomous.

Dominant Self-Management. Here formal decision-making power rests with the enterprise's employees. The workers' council is elected by all employees and is the basic policy-making unit, roughly comparable to the board of directors of a US corporation. In a small enterprise, workers elect not only the members of the workers' council but also a management board, which in large enterprises is elected indirectly by the workers' council. A management board executes decisions and exercises only the authority given to it by the council. The initial quasi-technological discretion is determined by the ministries, who provide fixed and variable capital. At the same time, however, the ministries retain decision-making power concerning the establishment of new firms independent of those already in operation, and of mergers, takeovers, and bankruptcy. All other decisions concerning investment, the joining of (or withdrawal from) industrial associations, inter-firm contracts, and joint ventures are at the discretion of the workers' council.

Partnership Self-Management. Here the ministries and the workers' councils operate in separate spheres. The management board is chosen by the

24. All small enterprises (less than 500 employees) in Hungary can create "enterprise councils," in which no less than half the members are directly elected by the employees. Bauer has shown that the existence of "enterprise councils" had little effect on management decisions. See Thomas Bauer, "The Second Economic Reform and Ownership Relations: Some Considerations for the Future Development of the New Economic Mechanism," *East European Economics*, nos. 3-4 (1984), pp. 33-87.

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workers' councils through open competition, but subsequently approved by the ministries. Both the ministries and the workers' councils are represented on the managerial board, which serves as the main executive body. The ministries make decisions about investment, mergers, the joining of industrial associations, business expansion, and the production of basic, centrally controlled goods. The workers' councils, in turn, plan production, hire personnel, and determine the firms' inner structures and operating procedures. The workers' councils and the ministries both retain veto power on all issues. There are legal procedures to solve conflicts and to assure internal peace. For example, the ministries influence the managerial board by deciding on annual wage raises, while the workers' councils, in turn, evaluate the management board once a year and check the financial reports. This model comes closest to the internal structure of contemporary Yugoslav firms.

Subordinated Self-Management. In this option, the management board is selected by a branch ministry (centrally subordinated enterprises) or the local Peoples' Councils (territorial enterprises). The workers' councils serve merely as subordinate bodies consulted before decisions are made by management. Overall wage policy issues may be submitted to the workers' councils, although management is not obliged to follow the suggestions it receives.

Considering the population's economic resources and the condition of the social agreement, the likely scenario for ownership modification in Poland is the combination of *dominant self-management* in the socialized sector, based on mixed employee-state ownership and privatization of 20-25% of the economy. Showing once again his knack for persuasive synthesis, Walesa has said that: "For half of Polish companies, nothing needs to be done. Just change the organization and you can make money instantly. One fourth needs only some capital, and one fourth have to be disbanded." He is probably right. Poland is thus likely to accept a reformed Yugoslav model for large enterprises, which represent about half the national economy. The problem, however, is that there does not seem to be much enthusiasm for implementing this solution or doing the necessary legislative footwork. There is also no significant demand for self-government both on the part of government or Solidarity.

Conclusions

Both the opposition and the government agree that state-ownership is inefficient and must be changed. However, for tactical or political reasons, neither side goes as far as to advocate general denationalization.

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In the politicized debates of Polish economists there is a lot of talk about marketization and privatization. The union's neo-liberal economists support far-reaching reprivatization and profit-maximization, while at the same time calling for workers' autonomy. Therefore, there is much idealistic admiration for codetermination and for the West German Social-Democratic model, or for neo-liberalism *à la* Thatcher. Both models, however, need developed markets, a well-functioning banking system, commercial laws, and experienced management, which will take time to develop. That is why in Poland, in the short run, self-governing enterprises and socialization via stock ownership are probably the most plausible solution for much of the economy. Unfortunately, the development of a participatory model for the economy has been considerably de-emphasized in the government's priority list. While still supported "*in principle*," *self-government as a dominant form of ownership and* worker management is rapidly giving way to plans and hopes for massive privatization. The government bureaucracy did its job in curtailing the 1981 law and emasculating existing workers' councils. Today, members of the opposition are ready to exchange the illusion of self-government and ownership for the illusion of entrepreneurial freedom in a system where all fiscal and monetary tools are likely to remain a government monopoly. Consequently, little is said about the obvious, i.e., that in spite of all its shortcomings, the self-government model based on workers' stock ownership is probably by far the most feasible solution for most of the economy.

There are no quick fixes for the Polish economy. In the short run, all economic options will result in a deterioration of the Polish workers' standards of living. Solidarity advisers have proposed an international assistance program to provide more than $10 billion over the next three years. Under the plan, Poland would borrow the maximum from the International Monetary Fund and draw adjustment and project loans from the World Bank. Additional money would come from West Germany and Japan. The plan calls for credit and investment insurance, food and more access to West European markets.

Today it is impossible to predict whether the Polish union-Party compromise is a plausible solution for all of Eastern Europe. The uniqueness of the Polish situation casts doubt on how this untested concordat can affect Prague, Budapest, or Bucharest. Yet the demand for industrial democracy will be central to all mass movements for democratic reform in the Soviet bloc. The demand for worker participation is just as important as the demand for general political democratization.

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Perestroika *at a Snail's Pace**

Lucio Leante

The disappointment of Soviet reformers with the "slow pace" of *perestroika* has recently come to light. As Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachev's chief economic advisor, has summed it up: "The hole from which the Soviet economy must emerge has proven to be much deeper than it initially seemed." Leonid Abalkin, the director of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and advisor to Gorbachev, estimated last February that the effects of *perestroika* will be felt "only around the middle" of the next decade. Gorbachev himself announced at the Central Committee plenum in March 1989 that price reforms may be possible "in two or three years," thereby postponing the key element for radical economic reforms.

After this period of bold proposals and speeches, as Gorbachev has characterized them, reality has turned out to be more resistant to change than expected. Gorbachev has decided not to force the situation but rather to proceed with *perestroika*, as Bukharin said, "at a snail's pace." This is not the result of any reluctance to reform, nor of hostile conservative ideological resistance forcing the reformers to compromise, but of very serious problems with the Soviet economy.

If Gorbachev has ignored some of his more radical advisers and decided to postpone price reforms, it is because a sudden increase in prices would impoverish a large part of the population. The hostile response would not threaten the Soviet regime, but Gorbachev's political course. Such a crisis would encourage either "conservatives" or radicals to demand an end to the crisis with an iron fist and the restoration of the

* Translated from Italian by Florindo Volpacchio.

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administrative methods Gorbachev's reforms seek to change. The same is true for the reforms of enterprises, agriculture, and cooperatives. Actually, Gorbachev's reforms threaten not only bureaucrats and the elite, but also much of the population, which has managed to fit within the cracks of the stagnant system. This state of affairs provides the *status quo* with a perverse coherence and an assured stability difficult to replace.

Gorbachev's reforms are clearly limited by the desire to conserve the system's fundamental framework (centralized planning, no market, collectivist self-management of agriculture, one party system, etc.), but this alone does not explain what is happening in the USSR. The displacement of centralized planning by the market, for example, is unrealistic, but not because it is ruled out by Gorbachev's program. A large market can only come about as a result of a long and probably painful historical phase — not from the snap of a finger of an "enlightened despot." Even the introduction of a marginal market is opposed not only by the Party apparatus or the ministries (who can easily block any reform), but also by the inertia of a society which, after seventy years of futile struggle against a stubbornly hostile state, has come to accept the paternalism of a lax, egalitarian, welfare system. Society has forfeited its fundamental autonomy in favor of underground activities essential for survival, thus creating an informal economic stability whose dismantling is violently opposed by large social groups.

Consequently, what has forced Gorbachev to compromise are the fundamental political features of the Soviet system, e.g., the policy of "full employment" and the system of "administrative prices." Reforms conflict with these foundations of the Soviet political system, and to question them triggers a reaction not only from bureaucrats and Party ideologues, but also from a large strata of the population for whom job security, the low cost of basic necessities, and the lack of accountability compensate for stagnant production, shortages, and the low quality of life. Thus radical economic reforms deteriorate to the level of "small reforms" able to reduce waste and inefficiency, but deferring fundamental objectives such as the systematic introduction of the economic rationality of the marketplace (alongside planning) raising the question of whether a socialist system can function without "administrative methods."

The Soviet Economy in the Hole

1988 economic statistics indicate that there has been a slow-down since 1987, especially in agriculture, where there has been a decrease in grain (195 million metric tons compared to 215 million in 1987), which means future increases in grain imports (an additional 36 million metric

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tons). There have been minor increases in real income (3.5%) and median income (217 rubles a month — about $322), while there has been a significant increase in consumer prices in state stores (8.7%), and even more in the black market — the only place where one can find otherwise unavailable quality goods. According to official statistics, 40 million citizens (in a population of 280 million) live on less than 80 rubles a month (mostly pensioners), which is "the poverty threshold." Median income is actually much higher, since there is a conspicuous parallel underground economy generating some 100-150 billion rubles (a quarter of the national income, which was about 625 billion in 1988). Notwithstanding the recent introduction of a state system of quality control (*gospriomka*), the quality of Soviet goods is still "far below Western standards."

According to official statistics, the introduction of technology and modernization in general, which was the main objective of the Jan. 1 1988 law concerning reforms of enterprises, "has remained stifled." Even the small increases in labor productivity are a result of decreases in employment (-1% in 1988). Imports have been increasing more than exports, cutting in half the favorable 1988 balance of payments from 8 to 4 billion rubles. In 1988 the budget deficit also increased to 100 billion rubles, as a result of huge worthless public works projects, questionable plants, and the subsidizing of enterprises to keep prices of basic commodities low. From 1985 to 1988, there have been losses of 49 billion rubles as a result of the campaign against alcoholism, 37 billion rubles because of the fall of international oil prices, and 12 billion because of the Chernobyl disaster.

The amount of waste is immense, and it is generated by the internal logic of the Soviet system, which can best be defined as an economy of waste. This system has created a series of vicious circles and a "stagnant stability," which make it difficult for Gorbachev's reforms to bring the Soviet economy out of its "hole." The system of centralized planning is based on political rather than economic considerations — considerations based on strong national and local interests. Thus, it manages to combine the shortcomings of both centralization and localism.

The main problem of centralization has been the subordination of the entire Soviet economy to the unlimited growth of military power pursued solely as a remedy for a disintegrating domestic legitimation caused by poor economic performance. This has resulted in more than just unchecked growth in military spending and a waste of resources (17% of the GNP, according to Western estimates). Coupled with the "obsession with secrecy" it has also separated the military economy from its civilian counterpart, thus creating two economies with differing technological

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standards. Consequently, the production of a missile is extremely costly since it cannot rely on a technologically advanced civilian economy.

Here Gorbachev's policies are radically innovative: they project cuts in military spending of 14.2% and military production of 19.5%, along with a unilateral reduction of conventional forces in Europe and in the Far East. Nevertheless, given the difficulties in reconverting war industries to civilian production, and the persistence of inertia, it is difficult to produce quick concrete results. The system of centralized planning has developed similar enormous waste with its "strategies" toward peripheral interests. Thus, it has instituted a division of labor among the various Soviet regions and a totally irrational "extensive" allocation of resources, which results in an immense waste of resources. When they have had the authority to do so, local bosses have built within their domains entire networks of low and intermediate enterprises producing goods not integrated on the micro- or the macro-economic level.

The irrationality is heightened by the division of the economic ministries, whether central or based on the various republics, into jurisdictional sectors, which creates paradoxes such as the famous one where a Kazakhistan railroad-track factory buys wood supplies from a Russian factory instead of from a nearby factory, which in turn supplies the same wood to a Russian railroad-track factory near the one sending these wood supplies to Kazakhistan. Here Gorbachev's reforms cannot have a major impact. The first phase of the reforms has integrated the jurisdictions of various ministries managing similar economic areas into one superministry. But the recent decision to dismember the *Gosagroprom*, the superministry of agroindustry, is evidently a sign of the failure of this ministerial "reorganization." The corresponding decision to decentralize various economic jurisdictions of the central ministries to those of the republics would likely favor economic integration at the federal level, but would only intensify distortions locally. It is the planning system itself and the ministerial public management of the economy that produces most of this irrationality. Although *Pravda* once asked why not do away with "this obsession with planning," for a socialist society there is no realistic alternative to planning and bureaucratic management.

In the USSR, land and capital are provided to enterprises practically free of charge. In fact, land is not even counted among the resources, and state investments in enterprises are practically unlimited since the State covers all losses. The law concerning the reform of public enterprises (which has introduced obligatory solvency) stipulates that land be accounted for in financial statements and that banks decide which enterprises to finance. In 1987, there were officially 24,000 firms operating at

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a loss. The system is such that, according to Leonid Abalkin, there are no unsubsidized enterprises. These subsidies are growing. For agroindustry enterprises alone, they amounted to almost 87 billion rubles in 1988.

The reform of public enterprises, which requires that they be self-financing (almost half the firms, 76,000, already are) has reduced in 1988 the number of firms officially in the red (in the agricultural sector last year it was reduced from 6,500 to 2,100), but that was due mostly to price increases of 8.7%. But the decline of the grain yield per hectare from 18.5 quintals (about 4079 lbs.) to 17 quintals (about 3747 lbs.) in 1988 is enough to disclaim improvements in efficiency.

In 1988 the productivity of industrial labor grew 4.7%, but this is explained, according to Soviet authorities, by the 1% reduction in employment and not by an increase in efficiency. The ideological bind of "socialist full employment" perpetuates enterprises which produce unsaleable goods (e.g., the entire shoe sector) and maintains non-productive workers while inhibiting the introduction of labor-saving technology. The bind of maintaining full employment is so rigid that a pipe factory in Moscow's suburbs, after going into debt to purchase modern machinery, was not allowed to lay off 2000 unnecessary employees. It now uses almost all of them as gardeners.

Gorbachev's reform of public enterprises requires them to pursue profit and self-finance. Since, however, it does not allow them a free hand with wages and prices, problems remain. The same law establishes that yearly and multi-year plans no longer be expressed in terms of physical quantities of goods but in monetary terms, provided that excess production can be sold "on the market." Enterprises need to be motivated to produce more. Enterprises have tended to produce the least possible amount, fearing that any production increase could result in being assigned higher and possibly impossible objectives in successive years. The requirement of financial solvency should reduce the enterprises' tendency to accumulate unnecessary amounts of supplies and machinery. But, given the persistent bind of maintaining full employment and administered prices, the same law does not encourage enterprises to introduce technological innovations. With the low cost of manpower, enterprises continue to fear improving productivity by introducing innovative technology. Even within the context of obligatory solvency, enterprises find it convenient to continue traditional production methods employing a larger number of people and little new technology.

So far, efforts to create a "market" for enterprises in which they would exchange goods at "market prices" have not borne results. This has not been due simply to the ministries' conservative reluctance to

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reform. Ministries have absorbed practically all that enterprises have produced, without allowing a surplus "market." But this is a result of pressure from the enterprises themselves. The law assures an unlimited supply of goods (at low prices) only to enterprises which produce "strategic" goods, i.e., those requested by the ministries, and this has driven the enterprises themselves to ask the ministries to absorb their entire production. Enterprises fear a market for manufactured goods at "market prices," since in this market they would have to pay for manufactured goods at prices undoubtedly higher than those guaranteed by the state (by *Gosnab*), without being able to pass on these higher costs to consumers, since these prices are still set by political authorities.

Finally, the reform's third major objective, to generate a natural selection among enterprises in order to eliminate inefficient ones, cannot be realized for the simple reason that, if all the structurally non-performing enterprises were eliminated, there would be an unacceptable widespread unemployment. Full employment and administered prices are two features of the Soviet system difficult to eliminate because they constitute the system's very basis of consensus and stability. Gorbachev's reforms would lead to a modification in policies concerning prices and employment by removing both from political controls. But this would almost certainly result in the end of *perestroika.*

The Vicious Circle of Collectivism

Waste and irrationality in Soviet agriculture are proverbial. At the March 1989 Plenum, Gorbachev described its inefficiency and cited Ukrainian agriculture, where in the last 20 years the means of production have increased 320%, fertilizers have tripled, wages have increased 170%, while production has grown only 39%. In that same session, Gorbachev also confirmed that waste in harvesting, transportation, storage and production of grain cereal alone amounted to 30-40 million metric tons — the same amount of grain presently imported.

It is well-known that in the production of potatoes (an essential product in the USSR) waste was as high as total production. There are *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* which do not produce anything but simply purchase at low prices from state stores goods they should have produced, and resell them to the state at higher prices, as if they had produced them. *Kolkhozes* which raise livestock do more or less the same with fodder: they resell the fodder provided cheaply by the state to other farms that need to produce livestock, and feed their own livestock bread bought at bakeries, which costs much less — thanks to a policy which has kept the price of bread unchanged since 1955. This business is particularly widespread in

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the production of butter, meat, and milk, but the same happens in the production of other commodities (and not only in agriculture). This situation is entirely a result of administered prices and renders Soviet statistics on production wholly unreliable.

According to official statistics, 3% of the land granted by the state to individuals for private cultivation amounts to about 25% of total agricultural production: 30% of milk, meat, and vegetables, 40% of eggs and fruit, and 60% of potatoes. These numbers indicate the extent to which the bureaucratic mechanism drives *kolkhoz* peasants to neglect state production and dedicate themselves almost entirely to their private plots. *Kolkhoz* products are also purchased by peasants with their own plots who then resell these purchases as part of their own produce on the free market at higher prices.

Official estimates identify 2,100 agricultural enterprises in the red (6,500 in 1987) after more than half of them became self-financing. 70% of the 49,000 collective farms (*kolkhozes* managed as cooperatives) and state farms (*sovkhozes* managed by the state) would be lost without the 87 billion rubles the state spends subsidizing food enterprises. If there were price reforms, the entire agricultural collectivist edifice would collapse, and with it a whole series of parasitical relations which presently support millions of *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz* workers. For this reason, various radical economists do not think a reform of *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* is possible. Instead, they would like to see them simply eliminated as in China, where the land was then redistributed among the peasants.

These proposals have been opposed not only by "conservatives" such as Igor Ligachev, for ideological reasons, but also by Gorbachev on the basis of pragmatic and realistic considerations. Furthermore, Soviet collective farms differ from Chinese communes in their enormous size and the employment of a relatively low number of people: 245 employees on the average manage *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* of about 4500 hectares. Their dissolution would amount to giving up economies of scale and plunging into a long period of productive and organizational chaos. This would result in a steep rise in food prices, and a high rate of inflation with severe social repercussions — mostly in cities. Furthermore, the Chinese communes were still made up of ex-owners, ex-tenant farmers, and sharecroppers, for whom the elimination of communes meant simply a return to the ancestral farm. In the USSR, these social classes were physically, socially, and culturally destroyed during the forced collectivization of the land. Their place was taken by agricultural workers lacking either entrepreneurial experience or any real ties to the land. This places the USSR in a difficult position: who should be given what land?

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At the March 16, 1988 Plenum of the Central Committee, the decision was made that *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* currently in the red have two years to improve their performance or be eliminated. While land ownership will be kept by the state, lease contracts can be extended indefinitely and inherited. Any improvement and growth in agricultural capital accrued during the terms of the lease will be the peasants' own property. This restores a quasi-property right to individuals, since under the new law the right to lease land will be "conferred to a single farmer." The problems with this reform lead to the second vicious circle.

The main obstacle to private farm management is the peasants' reluctance to leave the "security" of a state system for the risks connected with private initiatives. Some Soviet journalists have observed that only a small minority of peasants (1.1%) are actually willing to leap into a private initiative. This is understandable: the Soviet state is a firm enemy of private initiative — especially the peasants'. The bloody campaign against peasants as a class has left an indelible mark. And, when all is said and done, leased farms would be islands in the ocean of the state. Will the state banks grant credit? Where are the supplies, seeds, equipment, and machinery supposed to be purchased? Will the state have enough for the leased farms, given that state farms have priority? Will independent farmers have to buy them on the open market at speculative prices?

Gorbachev himself has indicated another reason for the peasants' resistance to private initiative. On January 13, 1989, during a meeting on the problems of agroindustry, he pointed out that the less motivated farmers found the old system comfortable, for they could "rely on a secure wage without working hard and, this says it all, with the opportunity of stealing something for themselves from the collective capital." There is also an underhanded way to apply the reform. After Gorbachev announced the land-leasing plan at the July 1988 plenum, many *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* quickly leased the land, but they merely transformed their legal relation to the state, leaving operations unaltered. Many collective farms have entered into leasing contracts with the state, but continue to produce according to what *Gosplan* stipulates. They then sell to the state their entire production, since there is no surplus above the state orders.

The introduction of economic rationality in the countryside thus requires a quick elimination of the collective and state farms, but the present price structure for agricultural products rules this out. This means that as long as the actual price structure persists, the better part of Soviet agriculture will continue to be collectivist and, thanks to state subsidies, it will continue to provide the majority of the population's food badly. Leased farms will remain marginal, serving only a minimal part of the

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population able to pay market prices for food products. Something similar to this is already happening with cooperatives.

The Vicious Cirle of Gorbachev's Cooperatives

On May 1, 1987, a law which reduced the tax rates on individual enterprises and cooperatives took effect, triggering the development of some 77,000 Soviet cooperatives, involving more than a million persons by January 1, 1989. Their prospects, however, remain limited. Although reduced, tax rates remain sufficiently high (an income of 6,000 rubles a year is subject to 60% taxation) to discourage most individual operations in the Soviet underground economy from coming into the open and operating as cooperatives. Moreover, last February 24, after a long debate on whether to once again raise the tax rates on cooperatives, the central authority granted the 15 federated republics the power to impose supplementary taxes (but also to grant tax exemptions to producers of particularly scarce products). The main issue was whether cooperatives could buy from state stores at subsidized prices when they can then resell their products or their services at free market prices. This seemed unfair, so the government decided that cooperatives buying supplies from the state are required to sell their goods at state prices. The cooperatives complain that Soviet banks do not allow them free access to deposits and that, because there is no checking system, they often cannot pay workers or creditors.

In the USSR there is a "natural" distrust of cooperatives from state institutions, where simple low-level functionaries constantly create obstacles for them, and from a widespread "social envy" among the public. An example of petty state obstacles is the absurd prohibition in restaurant cooperatives against serving or selling alcohol, explainable only by the widespread fear that the state sector will be deserted by clients in favor of more attractive cooperative activities. *Pravda* has published letters from readers worried about what a bad social example cooperative workers provide for the youth, who will not be content with "the poor state stipend" of 150 rubles a month when they know that a cooperative worker earns at least seven times as much. Nevertheless, cooperative workers are less protected by the police from the extortion rackets which tend to target them as "millionaires." Generally, cooperative workers have a bad reputation due to the fact that some of them in the past have been engaged in illegal activities within the underground economy and now use cooperatives to launder their "dirty" property.

On February 24 1989, a decree not only excluded outright cooperative activities in areas deemed properly belonging to the state (arms,

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medicine, drugs, etc.), but also prohibited cooperatives from selling their goods and services in exchange for other valuables. Some cooperative activities (such as publishing and health) require state contracts. To be sure, there have been paradoxical excesses of doctors' cooperatives where in the morning they carry out their work sloppily, since wages in medicine are very low; but in the afternoon, working in the same hospital divisions with state equipment, they do cooperative business at free market prices, and suddenly become more careful in their diagnoses and treatments, giving rise to invectives, ironies, and sometimes the indignant resentment of their morning patients.

At this time, cooperatives account for about 1.1% of the USSR's GNP. Among these, service cooperatives have the highest "mortality." Equally unstable are the few cooperatives producing consumer goods; but these mostly involve quasi-artisan activities, which in no way compete with state production. The enormous difference in prices between their goods frequently is not compensated by an adequate difference in product quality, so that these cooperatives have to turn to a market totally different from the one supplied by the state. Their market usually consists of foreigners and the Soviet rich, for whom eating out at a cooperative restaurant or purchasing a cooperative-produced shirt is a "status symbol." Most of the Soviet population must be satisfied with what they find in state stores which, although they sell poor quality goods when available, do guarantee prices accessible to middle income Soviets.

Here also, what structurally limits the expansion of the cooperative sector in the USSR are prices and wages. No matter how one looks at it, the system of administrative prices is the fundamental bind of the Soviet economy, along with the stability achieved over time between prices on one side and wages on the other.

The Vicious Circle of Price Reform

The system of administered prices responds to various demands, first of all to the need to maintain low wages and pensions in a manner consistent with state growth, while guaranteeing full employment and a minimal subsistence to low income strata. This assures political stability and a minimal consensus. The price paid for this is an irrational allocation of resources, the inability of wages to provide incentives for productivity and labor mobility, a general lack of motivation among workers, and irrationality within the system.

According to Soviet economists, prices for food, residential services, energy, minerals, and raw agricultural materials are excessively low, while prices are "unjustifiably high" for manufactured goods. The price

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of bread has not changed since 1955; meat, milk and butter since 1962. Without state subsidies to offset the low cost of beef, at least half of the peasants would get rid of their livestock. Under the present pricing system, it is preferable to drill new oil and methane-producing wells rather than develop energy-saving technology. Since the value of land is never considered, the construction of hydroelectric plants continues, even in fertile flatlands, without consideration of the millions of acres it floods.

With the level of prices fixed by the centralized plan, the actual cost of doing business is often difficult to determine. Prices are no indication of the relative scarcity of goods and distort the system of supply, leading to the production of goods not in demand or the failure to produce (at least of sufficient quality) what is needed. In fact, fixed prices drive enterprises to reduce gradually the quality of what they produce when they cannot raise prices to offset expenses. What this amounts to is a disguised inflation. It also makes it more difficult to identify profitable enterprises from those operating at a loss. This is another aspect of Soviet inflation not evident in official prices. While official prices have gone up the last three years at an average of more than 7%, real inflation manifests itself in the lowering of product quality and the transferral of quality goods to the black market where prices are free to rise to market levels. For example, poor quality Soviet shoes produced by Soviet factories lie unsold in state stores, while better quality shoes produced by more modern establishments are only available on the black market; if they can be found at all in state stores, it is only "under the counter," at prices much higher than those prescribed by the state.

Administered prices are partly responsible for the on-going shortages by provoking the hoarding of low priced goods available on the official market, which then reappear on the black market at prices 10-15 times higher. Many products in the USSR are not really hard to find, constant scarcity exists only on the shelves of state stores which are raided to supply the black market. The obstacles to spending in the Soviet market, coupled with the presence of undesirable low quality goods and services, has forced families to save. With money growing much more rapidly than available goods, prices on the black market are rising, which in turn is accelerating the disappearance of goods from the official market. Thus, to obtain an idea of the amount of money in circulation, well-to-do families in the USSR are responsible for almost 300 billion rubles in bank deposits (about half of the annual national income of 625 billion rubles in 1988). Added to this are inestimable savings kept "in the mattress." At the same time, the growing public debt has generated an official deficit of 100 billion rubles which increases the demand for money.

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This enormous amount of money favors two types of hoarding generated by the very system of administrative prices. Besides speculative hoarding, which shifts products of relatively high quality from the official market to the black market, there is also personal hoarding generated by the expectation of future shortages and the fear of having to turn to the black market for necessities. Understandably, consumers are very distrustful of the Soviet system of production and distribution. All this demonstrates the perverse effects of the Soviet price system and the inevitability of price reform. Gorbachev's economists hoped that the high cost of scarce goods could be driven down without price reform by increasing the supply of products in state stores. Most of them forgot, however, that the state stores require price reform to fill the state stores. This is the vicious circle of price reform. The plan to eliminate shortages with marginal increases of production, efficiency, and with technological improvements and qualitative goods is inadequate. These marginal increases only feed the black market and the underground economy.

The decision to reform the pricing mechanism was announced at the Central Committee plenum of June 1987. Beginning in 1991, there would be a periodic revision of prices accompanied by an adequate "compensation" for those with low incomes. Price reform was deemed necessary for systematically introducing rationality and incentives into the Soviet anti-economy, and for separating profitable enterprises from those operating at a loss. But price reform is unlikely to work in the immediate future. Serious price reform, which means an increase in all prices, all wages, and all the stipends without driving the approximately 40 million pensioners (with an average income of 80 rubles an month) and the 16 million low income families (with an average income of 60 rubles a month) to hunger and desperation, needs to be accompanied by a significant redistribution of wealth. This can only be accomplished by means of fiscal policies; but in the USSR this is impossible because officially there are few high-income earners. Statistically, only 16% of the population is in a high income bracket earning 200 rubles or more a month (whereas a family needs more than that to live decently in the USSR). Real high-income earners in the USSR are underground. Thus the real millionaires are unidentifiable and consequently not taxable.

There is another reason why price reform is impossible. An increase in consumer prices without a corresponding increase in quality will only give consumers more reasons to shun state-produced goods and try to acquire illegal or semi-legal Western equivalents, as is now happening in unmeasurable proportions.

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The economic situation in the USSR has been allowed to deteriorate for too long, and it will take a long time to pull the country out of this "hole." Given the difference between state prices, which have stood still for decades, and black market prices, which are ordinarily ten to fifteen times higher (a difference corresponding to the respective quality of state-produced goods and the level demanded by the population), an "economic miracle" would have to occur before state stores can provide goods acceptable to consumers in both price and quality.

The same vicious circle exists with Gorbachev's other grand monetary objective, the convertability of the ruble. At the June 1987 plenum, it was announced that the ruble's purchasing power was to be raised and made convertible within the Comecon. Gorbachev's reformers plan to use the convertibility of the ruble to anchor the USSR in the international economy and end Soviet isolation and self-sufficiency. This foreign catalyst is the only hope for introducing a mechanism of competition to stimulate technological and scientific innovation and reduce Soviet production costs. But the convertibility of the ruble presupposes so many preliminary changes that, like price reform, it will have to take place "at a snail's pace." According to Soviet economists, before convertibility is possible, it must first of all be "domestically convertible." There are as many ruble rates as there are economic sectors in the economy. The existence of "special stores" for state officials, for example, makes the ruble of a minister more valuable than that of a pensioner, and the ruble in Moscow (where numerous products that cannot be found elsewhere are legally available) is more valuable than the ruble in the province. In order for the ruble to become convertible it is necessary that prices become real indices of relations between goods and the factors of production. In this way, money will once again reflect the goods' real value. For this reason, the convertibility of the ruble is closely linked to price reforms. But price reforms are possible only if the supply side of the Soviet system can fill stores with desirable goods. Even if all this were possible without price increases or competition, convertibility would still not be possible (according to Soviet plan) before the mid-1990s.

All this appears to encourage the postponement of reforms. There are other factors, however, which accelerate their implementation. How will the Western international economy perform in the mid-1990s? For now, the Western economy will continue moving at a faster pace, and by the mid-1990s the relative gap between the USSR and the West will remain, while the convertibility of the ruble will be further postponed. More significant than foreign exchange is the USSR's integration

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into the international division of labor. This requires a total revolution of its system of production; closing obsolete factories, abandoning the policy of "full socialist employment," and eliminating the system of administered prices. This cannot be done now. Can it be done later?

In the short run, what can be achieved is a partial convertibility of the ruble within Comecon, in relations among enterprises, in currency auctions for Soviet enterprises and in "free zones" instituted to attract foreign investments. But *perestroika* will run up against and continue to lag behind Western technology, and the ruble is unlikely to ever become fully convertible. The distance that has developed between the West and the socialist countries is too great, while there are not many obstacles to the further development of the international capitalist economy. In the last ten years, the West has largely extricated itself from dependency on oil, it has taken full advantage of the information and technological revolution, and has been able to move capital around the globe at lightning speed; while the East has spent its time studying the necessary preconditions for price reforms and the convertibility of the ruble.

By deciding to take *perestroika* "at a snails's pace," Gorbachev must constantly defend his experiment against resistance and opposition from below by those who see his minor reforms as intrusions into their lives rather than improvements in the quality of life. Accelerating the pace of reform would neither improve the situation nor generate an alternative to the system; it would simply provoke an eventual restoration of state management by conservatives or by Gorbachev, with a reintroduction of repressive measures. The snail's pace may disappoint supporters because it is a sign that the USSR may never pull itself out of the hole into which the October Revolution and its achievement, Stalinism, have plunged it. But it may also be an indication of Gorbachev's personal realism — that *perestroika* is irreversible, and that the Soviet dream of dominating economy, society, and the world by force is over.

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Professionalism, Culture and the Predicament of Literary Studies

Hugh Grady

According to Lynne V. Cheney, chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the state of the humanities in the US is one of healthy participation and growth in the public sphere, and decline, decadence and politicization in the academy: "At the same time that public interest in the humanities has grown, study of these disciplines has declined among formally enrolled students."[1] And while the vocational mindset of contemporary students is part of the problem, the professorate in charge of academic humanities cannot escape blame for two troubling aspects: overspecialization and politicization. On the latter problem, Cheney is quite explicit: "Viewing humanities texts as though they were primarily political documents is the most noticeable trend in the academic study of the humanities today" (pp.11-12).

The NEH report is a mixed bag, combining a surprisingly accurate analysis of the current crisis of the humanities with political opportunism and nostalgic longing for a past that never really was. The report consists of three separate strands: (1) a self-serving NEH pat on the back for a supposed revival of interest in the humanities in the public sphere (which is more a result of the new bureaucratic professional layer created by government funding and not true 19th-century-style public self-activity); (2) a Matthew Arnoldesque argument that the humanities capture the values of Western civilization and deserve a central place in school curricula, especially at the college level; and (3) an attack on the

1. *Humanities in America: A Report to the President, the Congress, and the American People* (Washington: National Endowment for the Humanities, September 1988), p. 4.

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academic profession for its overspecialization and politicization.

Of these, the last proposition is of greatest interest: the analysis of overspecialization, while hardly new, is the most accurate aspect of the report; and the second proposition of Argument Three, on the politicization of the profession, is a milestone of sorts: there simply have been no previous occasions for attacking the profession as a whole (as opposed to occasional Red professors) for being politicized. On the other hand, praise for the dissemination of culture in America is almost as old as despair over its public's low cultural standards. Generalists have attacked specialists since the formation of research universities in the late 19th century, and the fight for placing humanities at the center of the curriculum is recognizably Arnoldian, now a century old.

The following will provide a framework for these brief remarks on the new NEH broadside. By looking at the history of Shakespeare studies at the crucial point of their professionalization in the late 19th century, it becomes clear that many of the supposedly current charges against contemporary literary studies (which here stand for the humanities as a whole) are actually quite old. This clarifies some of the paradoxes in the NEH report. The field of Shakespeare studies makes a perfect test case because Shakespeare is as much a central figure today as in the past, and new approaches to the Shakespearean texts are now at the forefront of much of the "politicized" criticism denounced by Cheney. The case of Victorian Shakespeare scholarship and the 20th-century reaction to it illustrate how the literate society celebrated by the NEH was undermined by professionalism through the ordinary dynamics of bureaucratic corporate capitalism.

First, Cheney's coupling of politicization and professional specialization as the twin enemies of the humanities' cultural mission is opportunistic — a specious guilt by association erected so that, in a stroke, she can associate the academic Left with the overspecialization and irrelevance of the educational bureaucracy. In fact, the humanities tradition has long since been relegated to bureaucratized institutions of education in a process that has transformed the public sphere into an empty container ready for the one-dimensional cultural productions of modern mass media — an occasional public forum or Masterpiece Theatre production notwithstanding. There is thus a special irony in this attack on professionalized literary studies: the cultural impoverishment has been the outcome of the very free market forces which are otherwise supposed to solve all social problems.

Yet, some fragments of the report are embarrassingly accurate. The

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NEH report rightly identifies some of the dynamics of professionalism as contradicting the humanities' educational and cultural mission and rightly questions the value of endemic academic overspecialization.

A further irony here is that the "political" forces being attacked find themselves isolated from any substantial mass sectors of the population and depend for legitimacy on ideologies of professionalism rooted in positivist notions of power/knowledge. The historically conservative but oppositional "cultural" position, which the late Raymond Williams defined years ago as a possible "space" for a genuinely emancipatory critique of capitalism, has been largely abandoned by the Left to Cheney and co. by default — even though the position of most radical deconstructors, Marxists, new historicists, and feminists is in many crucial ways similar to that of the older cultural tradition. For the newer cultural critics, as for their ideologically conservative Modernist forebears like Eliot, art and literature (even where those very labels are criticized) constitute a locus for meaning and libidinal investment that social life, particularly in the work-world, cannot provide. The reconstruction of aesthetic texts as constituted by a play of desire through endless chains of signifiers in deconstruction, or as the occasion for New Historicist symbolic political critiques which the modernized political arena has otherwise successfully delegitimated, reconceptualizes the older forms of dissent by modernist conservatives and Surrealist radicals.

Conservatives, on the other hand, have created a middle-class populist and nostalgic attack on professionalized culture in a call to return to the good old days of a literate 19th-century society which produced and consumed culture in voluntary, anti-professional associations. But they invoke the cultural tradition for their own purposes, without recognizing the conservative critique of capitalism which has been, as Williams has shown, an essential component of that tradition since Coleridge. And they want the college curriculum to return to the same mythical past, with a right-wing political agenda concealed beneath the old Arnoldian ideology of "timeless truths" and "great works" of the Western tradition, now mobilized in an attack on women and minorities studies.

In this context it is instructive to return briefly to those good old days and examine the dynamics by which the literate society of high bourgeois Victorian culture was willingly transformed into a passive, consumerist, and culturally debased public arena. This story is one small strand in the complex fabric of modernization brought about as

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capitalism underwent a metamorphosis from an entrepreneurial to its current corporate-bureaucratic form. But it is peculiarly revealing of professionalism's entwinement with a corrosive positivism which the Frankfurt School diagnosed as a fundamental component of the disaster-laden history of the 20th century.

The beginning of the 19th-century witnessed that stage of modernization in which the industrial system had become established and was producing its sweeping series of changes, without yet having entered its bureaucratic, corporate phase. Shakespeare criticism was written for the "cultivated" public and disseminated in new editions of the works, public lectures, books, and — above all — in magazines and newspapers. Shakespeare's plays were prominent in the repertory of both English and American theaters, and were assumed to be the intellectual property of people with cultural pretensions. But Shakespeare was not a staple in the higher education curriculum which was still dominated by classical studies.[2] At that time there was no highly bureaucratized system of education. Instead, Shakespeare was discussed in that "public sphere" which Eagleton has described as the originating point of English literary criticism.[3] Of course, Shakespeare was prominent in the paradigm-shift from neo-classicism to romanticism, and there was nothing "antiquarian" about the passionate championing of Shakespeare as the prototype of a literary genius and the great exemplar of organic form so prominent in the writing of romantics like Coleridge. Even before the age of romanticism, Shakespeare had become what he was so often called in both England and America: a secular Bible, a repository of thought, words, and forms held to be the common property of a culture — and claimed by both Left and Right in the politicized literary world of the 18th and 19th centuries.

As Williams has established, the romantic moment was also an age when art was invented; and Shakespeare, in the romantic deconstruction of the older classical duality between art and nature, became perhaps the major example of a poet whose organic forms demonstrated the idealistic and monistic unity of art and nature over and against a debased industrialized society which had never contaminated him. As Coleridge wrote, "Nature, the prime genial artist, inexhaustible in diverse powers, is inexhaustible in forms. Each exterior is the physiognomy of the being

2. Gerald Graff, *Professing Literature: An Institutional History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 19-35.

3. Terry Eagleton, *The Function of Criticism: From 'The Spectator' to Post-Structuralism* (London: Verso, 1984), pp. 9-67.

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within, its true image reflected and thrown out from the concave mirror. And even such is the appropriate excellence of her chosen poet, of our own Shakespeare, himself a nature humanized, a genial understanding directing self-consciously a power and an implicit wisdom deeper than consciousness."[4]

This romantic moment of Shakespeare criticism, now understood to be rooted in the 18th-century Enlightenment and given a peculiar German twist which Coleridge channelled back into England, has in the 20th century been canonized as a classic moment of critical giants on whose shoulders we miniature moderns, disillusioned of the worst romantic excesses, now stand. After Coleridge and Hazlitt, so the traditional story goes, were some minor curiosities — and A. C. Bradley.[5] After Bradley comes Eliot and the Academy.

Implicit in this received account of critical history — Eastman's account is perhaps the *locus classicus* — is an identification with an older, pre-professional "cultural" tradition, and an embarrassed silence concerning the academic present. This traditional account tends to repress any trace of the very forms which contained and produced contemporary literary criticism: the rise of professionalism out of Victorian society in the bureaucratic phase of modernization. It was a change basic enough to transform literary studies and to remain largely invisible to those caught in its sweep. By looking closely at a symptomatic moment of this process — the rise of positivist methodologies in the ranks of Victorian literary amateurs, one can begin to grasp the paradoxes and historical reversals of the postmodern present.

The origins of literary professionalism, in fact, present their own irony: literary professionalism owed much of its methodology to techniques developed by passionate amateurs. Out of the remarkable voluntary activities of a group of energetic, largely non-academic gentlemen-scholars, came the techniques and much of the initial work establishing "modern" notions of Shakespeare's life and texts. Here it is useful to focus on a group of individuals (F. G. Fleay, F. J. Furnivall, J. M. Robertson, and E. E. Stoll) who went against the grain of the larger "cultural" tradition and attempted to "modernize" Shakespeare studies

4. *Shakespearean Criticism*, extracted in *English Romantic Writers*, ed. David Perkins (New York: Harcourt, 1967), p. 500.

5. See, for example, Arthur M. Eastman, *A Short History of Shakespearean Criticism* (New York: Random, 1968). For the period in question, Eastman treats Gervinus, Lowell, Dowden, Swinburne, Pater, Shaw, Tolstoy, Bradley (the only one to receive a chapter to himself), Bridges, Stoll, and Schucking.

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in ways which, significantly, are now forgotten, having become the objects of a striking social amnesia. But, in the process, they revealed corrosive potentialities within the positivism which professionalism adopted. They are now re-appearing in quite different forms within postmodern criticism.

From the viewpoint of these modernizers, the still celebrated Bradley was an anachronism — a romantic who had not learned the lessons of professional literary criticism, an enemy from the "other side" to be attacked and marginalized. Here is how the American E. E. Stoll takes on Bradley on Falstaff: "In Shakespeare criticism, as in most things Anglo-Saxon but sport, there has been little professionalism. The best as well as the worst of our scientists and artists have done their work without learning how to do it, and our critics, like our soldiers, have won their Waterloos on cricket fields. For two hundred and fifty years Englishmen and Americans have been writing about the character of Falstaff, and hardly three or four of these have been students of the stage. Since 1777 they have followed in the steps of Maurice Morgann, a country gentlemen of philosophic bent and literary taste who seems to have known little of the acted drama and to have loved it less."[6]

Stoll himself ignores the importance of amateurs to his own undertaking. But the beginnings of the application of instrumental reason to literature — the hallmark of scientistic professionalism — can be traced to the earliest attempts to edit Shakespeare in the 18th century, an activity connected with the rise of the entrepreneurial "man of letters" of whom Samuel Johnson can be seen as the most successful prototype. As Magali Larson has argued, however, this is the typical pattern in the development of professions.[7]

In Shakespeare studies, many of the key discoveries were the work of passionate amateurs like Edmund Malone, the great 18th-century editor who was the first to establish a reliable chronology of Shakespeare's

6. "Falstaff," *Modern Philology* 12, no. 4 (Oct 1914): 65. An interesting and revealing ideological slippage, by the way, is at work in Stoll's characterization of Morgann — who is in any case a stalking horse for Bradley (who had rescued Morgann from obscurity). In fact, Morgann was not a leisured gentleman, but a professional and highly active civil servant in 18th-century colonial affairs; he advocated a conciliatory approach to the American colonies and the abolition of slavery in the West Indies — see Daniel A. Fineman, *Biographical Introduction to Shakespearean Criticism by Maurice Morgann*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 3-36. But Stoll wants to invoke the stereotype of the dilettante gentleman-farmer as a foil to his own status as a professional of the new science of English studies now ensconced in the universities.

7. *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 9.

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plays. Malone was a lawyer who was able to devote himself to his Shakespearean vocation after coming into sufficient money to abandon his legal practice. Similarly in America, the earliest Shakespeare scholars were a group of Philadelphia lawyers who organized the Philadelphia Shakespeare Society in 1852 and inspired H. H. Furness' celebrated *Variorum Shakespeares*.[8] Well-known names like Malone and Furness, however, only constitute the tip of the iceberg of "private" Shakespeare scholarship in both Britain and the US throughout the 19th century. The strength and passion of Shakespeare studies in high bourgeois 19th-century culture can be adduced from a fascinating 1889 book written by one L. M. Griffiths, identified on the volume's title page as "Honorary Secretary of the Clifton Shakespeare Society." Griffiths displays a virtual missionary zeal in promulgating the study of Shakespeare as one of the highest activities conceivable for the middle and leisured classes: "It is most desirable that persons busy with a daily occupation should have some outside intellectual diversion in which they can engage in a methodical manner. For this purpose nothing can be better than a Shakespeare-Society with its endless ramifications of beauty, enjoyment, and interest. To people of leisure such a society offers boundless facilities for a zest and satisfaction in life which it would be difficult to obtain in any other way . . . . The literary criticism of which a society of ordinarily well-informed men and women is capable may not add anything to the knowledge of experts, but, at least, it will be a delight and an illumination to many to whom the wealth of Elizabethan drama has not yet afforded much beyond the riches of Shakespeare himself, or to whom, perhaps, his work is known only by a superficial acquaintance with the more frequently acted plays or, possibly, by a perfect familiarity with most of the well-quoted passages."[9] Griffiths supplies detailed instructions for the organization of such groups of ladies and gentlemen and offers the curious the benefits of the long experience of the Clifton group. A membership of 25 — 18 "gentlemen" and 7 "ladies" — is said to be ideal, since on alternate meetings the society reads the plays aloud with assigned parts. A system of substitute or "associate" members is advocated as a solution to occasional inevitable absenteeism from the regulars, and the amount of dues — a guinea for the regulars, half that for the associates — is

8. Alfred Van Rensselaer Westfall, *American Shakespearean Criticism: 1607-1865* (New York: Wilson, 1939), p. 4.

9. L. M. Griffiths, *Evenings with Shakespeare: A Handbook to the Study of his Works* (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1889), pp. 2-3.

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suggested. On weeks following the readings, meetings are devoted to criticism of the play just read, with reports from the members on a set of topics to be researched for each play.[10]

In a chapter somewhat misleadingly titled "Some Minor Matters," Griffiths sounds that note of moral earnestness unmistakably associated with the high bourgeois culture of the Victorian age: "In some societies entertainments of a nature lighter than that of the ordinary meetings are sometimes held. Even a society so serious as the New Shakspere Society had, as long as it could afford it, an annual musical entertainment. These diversions, probably, in all cases contain an element of danger. Introduced often, they would doubtless tend to the demoralisation of the more regular work" (p. 53). On the other hand meetings which are "cold, formal, and dry" are to be avoided (p. 54); tea is normally served first (p. 26). And some concession to levity may safely be made on occasion: "An annual dinner might be permitted. Possibly a reading in winter, to which the public would be admitted, or one or two private open-air readings in the summer, might be desirable introductions. But trivialities, such as regular musical evenings, members citing their favourite passages or setting and working out Shakspere-puzzles, and the like, should be all sternly discountenanced." (p. 54)

It is impossible to avoid being amused at the tone and the nearly parodic quality of this undertaking, but an effort should also be made to appreciate the rather extraordinary qualities of the enterprise described in Griffiths' book. This serious and systematic study of Shakespeare's texts is undertaken independently of any academic institution and entirely on a voluntary basis as a means of self-cultivation and of contributing to a high-minded sense of cultural mission. It is participatory and — discounting for the moment the "pre-selection" which the British class-system imposed in advance on who the members would be — egalitarian in its operation. For example, Griffiths emphasizes

10. Listed in alphabetical order: aesthetic criticism; anachronisms; animals; arts and sciences; Biblical and religious allusions; classical and mythical allusions; coins, weights, and measures; demonology and witchcraft; dress and social customs; early dramatic representations; fine art; geography; grammar; historical references; law and heraldry; meat and drinks; medicine and surgery; meter and authorship; music and ballads; oaths and exclamations; personal histories; plants; play-craft; puns and jests; rare words and phrases; satire and irony; similes and metaphors; sources and history; sports and pastimes; trade and commerce; tradition and folk-lore; and "various readings" (Griffiths, pp. 37-38). The author does note of his topics that "this plan has, I think unfortunately, fallen much into disuse," but he recommends that "half-a dozen short, departmental reports" grace every critical session, particularly to encourage participation from "the most busy, the most nervous, or the most recent critics" (p. 38).

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the need for each member to come to his or her own judgment and to avoid reliance on the opinions of supposed authorities (pp. vii, pp. 38-39). By contemporary standards, of course, the critical suppositions that guided the members were naive. Griffiths believed that Shakespeare's characters were "flesh-and-blood beings whose analogues may be met with in every-day life. They are to be paralleled amongst our own friends and acquaintances . . . ." But, of course, such a supposition meant that the social skills of everyday life were excellent hermeneutic training and that every reader was therefore equipped with the wherewithal to contribute to the discussion.

Societies like the Clifton one described by Griffiths were widespread in the late 19th century in England and in America.[11] The most prestigious was undoubtedly the New Shakspere Society, alluded to by Griffiths, which had been founded in London in 1874 through the efforts of Frederick James Furnivall, a remarkably diverse and energetic Victorian gentleman, in many ways with the same relation to 19th-century literary scholarship as Josiah Wedgewood and Arkwright earlier had had to commercial manufacture. Like them, he was a systemizer and organizer who worked with already existing technology but reorganized (and "modernized" it) by dividing it into simple procedures to be performed along a proto-assembly line, step by step.[12] Furnivall specialized, not like

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11. The United States boasted "hundreds" of Shakespeare societies, led by branches in Philadelphia (founded in 1852) and New York. The still well known *Variorum Shakespeares* of H. H. Furness came out of the work of the Philadelphia Shakespeare Society, founded by a group of lawyers. On this and related topics, see Van Rensselaer Westfall, *op. cit.*, pp. 4ff. and Frances N. Teague, "A 19th-Century Shakespeare Reading Club," *Shakespeare Newsletter* (May 1977):20. More information on the American societies is available in the letters of the American Shakespearean Joseph Crosby (1821-1891), a selection of which has been published in John Velz and Frances Teague, eds., *One Touch of Shakespeare: Letters of Joseph Crosby to Joseph Parker Norris, 1875-1878* (Washington, DC: Folger, 1986).

England seems to have lagged behind America somewhat in forming societies, since Griffiths alludes to the need of the "old country" to emulate the new in this regard. Griffiths' own ambition was that "there should be a Shakspere-Society , not only in every town, but in every set of people that can get together at least a dozen men and women with any literary desires" (p. 2), but it is uncertain to what extent his ambition succeeded. The New Shakspere Society claimed nine affiliated branches after one year of existence and a total of 450 members after two years — see "The Founder's Prospectus Revised," Postscript, *Transactions of the New Shakspere Society*, Ser.I, Vol. 2 (1874), separately paginated. But Griffiths complained of the overly "specialist" bias of the New Shakspere Society and advocated separate but cooperating organizations such as his own, with a "more popular basis" than the New Shakspere (pp. 355-57).

12. The influence of contemporary industrialization on 19th-century Shakespeare scholarship is a theme of Aron Y. Stavisky, *Shakespeare and the Victorians: Roots of Modern Criticism* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), pp. 23-49. Stavisky is

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modern scholars with their concentrations in literary "periods," but in organizing research programs for other specialists to pursue. During the course of his career, for example, he organized, among other things, the London Working Men's College (1852), the Early English Text Society (1864), the Chaucer Society (1868), the New Shakspere Society (1873), the Wiclif [sic] Society (1881), the Browning Society (also 1881), and the Shelley Society (1886),[13] all of which performed still valued scholarly, often textual work through a systematic plan. He also was instrumental in beginning the Oxford English Dictionary project, of which he became editor in 1861, but which he ultimately passed on to James Murray after very slow progress. He was ever the organizer rather than the practitioner. Remarkably enough, Furnivall accomplished all this on his own time without remuneration.[14] He was, in a word, a modernizer who, like a 19th-century industrialist, applied administrative-technical reason to create a new field of endeavor: an important segment of modern literary scholarship. But Furnivall worked in the context of a now vanished social milieu in which specialization and professionalization were novel and not yet fully established, and his work in the Christian Socialist movement belies any one-dimensional notion of him as a literary industrialist. It may come as a surprise to modern readers how vigorous voluntary institutions were in bringing about modernization — a process, which was to doom such institutions.

Furnivall himself desired to take Shakespeare criticism in a "German" direction, explicitly championing the Right Hegelian "philosophical criticism" of Gervinus and Ulrici.[15] The method entailed was basically the following: to establish a reliable chronology for the composition of the separate plays and poems, and to describe a kind of idealized spiritual *Bildung* in which *Geist* and individual genius slowly unveiled themselves, with a climax in the period of the major tragedies — all taken with a heavy dose of earnest moralization and conservative politics. But the

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particularly interested in demonstrating a continuity from 18th century Enlightenment criticism to Victorian scientistic scholars like Furnivall and Fleay to certain strains of 20th-century criticism, as against what he sees is the mistaken conflation of the Victorians with romanticism.

13. *The Dictionary of National Biography*, Supplement (Jan. 1901-Dec. 1911), ed. Sidney Lee (London: Oxford University Press, 1912).

14. He had inherited a considerable sum from his father who, Sidney Lee tells us, had made a fortune keeping a private "lunatic asylum" in his house, but the younger Furnivall lost much of the inheritance when a bank holding substantial parts of his fortune failed.

15. Gervinus in particular was well known among Anglophone Shakespeareans until World War I brought about what is apparently a permanent social amnesia concerning these monumental German critical works.

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Society did not ever really pursue this endeavour.

Instead, the Society became embroiled in the elaboration of a "scientific" method to establish the needed, reliable chronology: versification analysis. The idea was to produce statistical tables describing the characteristics of the verse of each Shakespearean play — how many lines, for example, contained extra syllables; how many were end-stopped, as opposed to run over; how many contained rhyme or employed meters other than iambic pentameter; and so on. Such tables could then quantify what had long been intuited, that Shakespeare's verse style changed and developed over the years in the direction of less regularity and more experimentation. Having established a chronology with the aid of the dates of plays whose years of publication and performance were already established from Elizabethan sources, it would be possible to estimate the date and chronological relation of plays like *Timon of Athens*, on which no performance or publication information existed at all.

As anyone who remembers "scansion" exercises from school might suspect, however, the results of such analyses produced no consensus. Even so mechanical an exercise as counting syllables in a line depended on such far from certain matters as Elizabethan pronunciation and stage practice; "scientific" results eluded the practitioners, and instead, polemics proliferated.[16]

Disputes reached nearly hysterical levels when the verse analysts announced themselves ready to use their techniques in order, not merely to establish the chronology of the composition of Shakespeare's works, but to settle the undeveloped suspicions of editors since the 18th century that certain portions of the received Shakespearean texts contained parts by other authors. If widely varying verse styles co-existed in the same play, it was argued, such variation was the tell-tale effect of multiple authorship, and the characteristic verse practices constituted "signatures" through which an identification of the various authors could be ascertained. The Shakespearean text became "disintegrated," the portions assigned, depending on practices of the critic in question, to the hands of a panoply of Shakespearean contemporaries. Analogous textual critical techniques were at work on the continent at approximately the same time on those other central works of the Western tradition, the Judeo-Christian Bible and the two Homeric epics, with similar, but much longer lasting results. In the late 19th-century Age of

16. For a readable account of the most notorious of these polemical exchanges, see Oscar Maurer, "Swinburne vs. Furnivall," *University of Texas Studies in English* (1952), pp. 86-96 and Stavisky, pp. 77-107.

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Positivism, not only was God dead; so were central Western authors such as Moses, Homer, and Shakespeare.

Of these three, only Shakespeare's works managed to pass into the Age of Modernism as the unified work of a single author, a fact which is not incidental to the far grater emphasis given to Shakespeare in the contemporary curricula of both America and England. What allowed this apparent exception to a widespread trend were not only the specific differences of the modes of composition involved (both the Biblical and the Homeric texts existed first as oral "literature"), but also a concerted counter-attack on the disintegrationists by literary humanists like the poet Swinburne and a group of "unifying" bibliographers who managed to co-opt the rhetoric of scientificity for their own purposes.

All contemporary editions of Shakespeare's works are indebted to the "scientific bibliography" of A. W. Pollard, W. W. Greg, R. B. McKerrow, and J. Dover Wilson, who "saved" the Shakespearean text in the early decades of the 20th century by inventing a new series of analytic techniques for getting at the nature of the manuscripts used in setting into type the received Shakespearean texts.[17] Their results vindicated the traditionalists' defense of the integrity of the Shakespearean texts — or at least were widely perceived as doing so. When Modernist critical procedures were invented by critics like G. Wilson Knight and William Empson, they assumed the organic unity of the texts and situated themselves on the side on an international anti-positivist Modernist assault. But it was not until the late 40s that this anti-positivism, in the form of American New Criticism, reached US literary academia.

It would be convenient if there were a clear transmission from the culturally radical positivist disintegrators to their culturally conservative positivist cousins in the early English departments of the newly professionalized universities of the turn of the century. However, there is disjuncture. The new academicians were too cautious to tamper with the integrity of so potent a cultural icon as Shakespeare. Instead, they became embroiled in their own controversies over how to constitute an adequate knowledge/power for English studies. In academia, with its pedagogical and socially formative mission, professors were confronted from the beginning with a felt need to temper their professional, value-free positivism with value-laden pedagogical accounts (as, e.g, from Arnold and

17. An excellent single source for information on this group is Frank P. Wilson, *Shakespeare and the New Bibliography*, ed. Helen Gardner (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970). For a more recent and theoretically sophisticated account, see Margreta de Grazia, "The Essential Shakespeare and the Material Book," *Textual Practice* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 69-87

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his cultural analogues). Academic positivist criticism was thus never as culturally corrosive as disintegration; at the same time, the Arnoldian cultural tradition in academia was constantly diluted by positivist tendencies. The result has been a standoff difficult to comprehend.

Just a few years ago, it did not make sense to speak within the profession of literary studies of its own history. Today, thanks to Richard Ohman, the GRIP project, and now Gerald Graff, it is possible to define the enormous but elusive impact of professionalization on how we read and understand such seminal cultural artifacts as Shakespeare's works. Thus, Graff points out that many contemporary radical critics give too much credit to the ideological pretensions of "cultural" heroes like Arnold, I. A. Richards, or T. S. Eliot by taking at face value their claims for the centrality of "culture" in modern society.[18] Professional English studies have often been a much more mundane, more tedious business, often, as the traditionalists feared in their own exaggerated way, corrosive to the pretensions of traditional culture to embody the "lost center" of a Western civilization ensnared in the unprecedented complexities of modern capitalism. The major weakness of Graff's work is in what it does not attempt: a mediation to the larger dynamics of corporate capitalist society of the phenomenon of the professionalization of literary studies, necessary in the present context to understand the urgency of the early 20th century anti-modernizing modernists. The dialectic between modernization and culture is a key to understanding what happens to Shakespeare studies.

By the early 19th-century, a triumphant romantic criticism had produced a Shakespeare who stood with art and nature defiantly in opposition to the mechanized reality of nascent industrial society. But the older Coleridge — and a host of Victorian disciples, most notably Matthew Arnold — understood the difficulty of finding a social agent for the vision that Shakespeare symbolized. Cultural traditionalists like Coleridge and Arnold despaired at the wreckage of the surviving amenities and values of traditional society in the wake of modernization. Coleridge wanted a "clerisy," a secular caste whose occupation it would be to preserve and expand the insights of art, literature, and culture in an increasingly commercial civilization.[19] Matthew Arnold, as is well documented, saw that the recently instituted national public educational apparatus could, with the right curriculum, undertake many of the tasks

18. *Professing Literature*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-15.

19. On this point and in much of the general argument I am indebted to Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950* (1958; rpt. New York: Harper, 1966).

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that Coleridge thought required the existence of a clerisy. To simplify a story which has by now been told many times, English literature and Shakespeare entered the educational system in the 19th century as part of the effort to preserve a sense of cultural unity in the face of the fragmentation and differentiations brought on by modernization.

Paradoxically, however, English was created to embody Arnold's cultural "center," thereby to provide an alternative to the failed religious tradition, in an institution embodying the very fragmenting and corrosive forces that Arnold thought English should conjure away. At the same time that English was being introduced into the curriculum, the nature of Western educational institutions became transformed.

As Cheney's report recognizes, the seminal development in the process was undoubtedly the revolution in higher education in the late 19th century that transformed the "old college" into the modern research-oriented University. The key date here is 1876, when the Johns Hopkins University was established in Baltimore on the model of German higher education and soon imitated by Harvard, Yale, and Chicago.[20] The story in Britain had different rhythms but a similar outcome. From the viewpoint of the history of Shakespeare studies, the key change was in the nature of the college English teacher.

Previously, the core of "humanistic" education in early 19th century US colleges had been the classics, with an emphasis on grammar and a slow march through set texts — the detail work was held to be the kind of "strenuous mental exercise" that built character and developed the intellectual faculties, much as physical exercise developed the body.[21] The study of English literature took place largely around the edges of the main curriculum — in extra-curricular literary societies, in courses in rhetoric. English literature as such was part of the curriculum in high schools, "practical" (non-collegiate) schools, and finishing schools before it entered the sacred groves of "higher" learning proper. English literature and modern languages were thought to be particularly appropriate for girls as subjects less mentally "strenuous" than Latin, Greek, and mathematics — hence suitable for ladies-in-training. Many who taught English in the early colleges were in fact clergymen without any particular literary training. Such a teacher, wrote an early observer of American education, "was a doctor of divinity who spoke and wrote the mother tongue grammatically, had a general 'society knowledge' of the literature, and had not

20. *Professing Literature*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
21. *Ibid.*, pp.19-39.

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specialized in this or any other academic subject."[22]

The rise of the modern university, of course, was to change all — or at least a good deal of — that. In a word, from the viewpoint of the new university, what early teachers of college English lacked was "professionalism," and the formation of modern academic criticism is intimately entwined with the rise of this new social phenomenon.

In a way, professors at the new research universities were more fortunate than many of their fellow professionals, with much less of a burden of legitimizing their services than, say, the various competing sects of the medical profession. The institutions which provided their salaries and without which the profession would have been non-existent, the colleges and universities, could point to a centuries-old history and set of traditions which, of course, leant an aura of prestige and status to what was in many ways a new social role. And in addition to the prestige of its past history, the new university benefitted from the general wave of professionalization. The university was itself a key link in the overall social strategy of the entire professional movement. As Larson argues, credentialing is a key component in the social viability of any profession. After some experiments with licensing and examination by professional associations, more and more of the professions adopted a system of professional schools linked to liberal arts colleges and universities.[23] The trend of requiring the professional trainees to have completed a regular liberal arts program before beginning their professional training proper, with roots in 18th-century notions of gentility, also began in the 19th century, though it was hardly universal. Thus, universities could count on a good deal of outside support in their expansion, and the result in America was a significant increase in enrollments in the 1890s, with steady expansion thereafter up until the 1960s .

Within the expanding universities, the newly constituted or redefined English curricula also benefitted from "outside" social trends, particularly the erosion of support for classics as the center of undergraduate curriculum. Graff argues that the collapse of classics in the fourth quarter of the 19th-century resulted from the increasingly revealed gap between the educational ideals of the old colleges and the changing society they served. The classics were associated with the training of an old republican elite of patrician ambitions which, however, became more and more removed from the American power centers as industrialization progressed.[24] The

22. Quoted in Graff, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
23. Larson, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-55.
24. Graff, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

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new universities forged links with broader social strata and undertook, in addition to training future ruling strata (now often of different social and cultural backgrounds than the older "bluebloods"), a mission of upward social mobility for portions of the middle classes. Out of these trends a consensus developed against the classics, but much of the educational ideology of "general culture" and the liberal arts which had been associated with classics migrated to the new English departments.

Thus, university English programs were presented, virtually simultaneously with their births, an educational role of considerable importance, including a heavy dose of "liberal arts" ideology. But other institutional conditions led to other ideological influences. With the hegemony in American higher education of the (Americanized) "German model" through Johns Hopkins and its imitators, a new and powerful determinant of the new English programs became clear: that there would have to be expanded training in the vernacular language supplying something of the disciplinary "strenuous training" of the old classics courses had become clear; that English literature would come to new prominence in promoting the "culture" of the upwardly mobile student populations also seemed certain. But the new research model of Hopkins and its followers brought about one more highly significant characteristic for the future of all literary criticism: the discipline would have to "professionalize" and meet requirements of disciplinary coherence and standardization. How was a professional discipline to be constituted out of the motley assortment of classical rhetoric, Enlightenment and romantic theorizing, "general knowledge," and literary gossip and history that had formed the English curriculum, such as it was, in the older colleges and schools? In the atmosphere of positivism and the scientific method prevailing in the new-model universities, this inevitably meant the injection of a certain scientism into the new discipline.

One early solution was that German import, philology, which had been developed by the German romantics as the application of the methods of studying and teaching the classics, first to German, then to English languages and literatures.[25] Harvard's Francis James Child, the celebrated ballad collector, was an early champion of American philological studies, and he helped Harvard develop a program of modern languages with emphasis on mastery of the medieval versions — Anglo-Saxon and Middle English, Old French, and Old High German.

25. See Arthur N. Applebee, *Tradition and Reform in the Teaching of English: A History* (Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1974), pp. 25-29 and Graff, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-97, for accounts of philology in late 19th century American colleges and universities.

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Through the philological model, the "strenuous" quality of the classics was imported wholesale to English. As Graff put it, "The philologists had solved the problem that had perennially thwarted the claim of English literature to be a classroom subject: that you could not examine in it."[26] In an MLA session in 1892, one Frederick A. Marsh noted (with a touch of sarcasm) that "the early professors had no recondite learning applicable to English, and did not know what to do with classes in it, they can now make English as hard as Greek."[27]

But the same generalist ideology that had taken on and defeated disintegration found a place within the new profession — albeit an embattled one. Generalist misgivings helped bring about the eclipse of philology as a mainstay of university English curricula. The most common objection was that the specialized and austere nature of philological study made it unsuitable for general education. Much more appropriate for the "95%" of students who could not be counted on to display much of an interest in their professors' specialized pursuits were readings in English (and later American) literature.[28] But the great weakness of the late 19th-century generalists in the new professional context was their lack of a suitable methodology, an organized knowledge/power, which could take the place of philology in the curriculum.[29] By the nineties, disillusionment with philology was widespread. But what took its place was not the "aesthetic" criticism dreamed of by the generalists. Instead, literature programs turned to that method that accompanied verse tests in the first meetings of the New Shakspere in 1874: positivist historical criticism, which prevailed at the universities until the New Critical revolution of the forties and fifties, with which it eventually found an accommodation.

Recent Left academic criticism has, unfortunately, failed to grasp the dynamic of professionalization at work in academia and has zeroed in, instead, squarely on the "cultural" tradition. This has been particularly true of the otherwise bracing efforts of a new generation of cultural critics in Britain. I want briefly to comment on two of the more interesting products of the movement, Graham Holderness' *Shakespeare's History* and Francis Mulhern's *The Moment of 'Scrutiny'*. Ironically, both writers draw on the rich analysis of "culture" which Raymond Williams bequeathed to the British Left some 30 years ago, but each writer ultimately fails to keep in play both sides of Williams' double-edged analysis.

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26. Graff, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
27. Quoted in Graff, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-80.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

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Williams' classic *Culture and Society* (1958) was a personal, yet text-based and rigorous, attempt at a mediation between British Socialism and the iconoclastic, eccentric and elitist but socially critical New Criticism of F. R. Leavis, which Williams was absorbing at Cambridge. By triangulating three distinguishable "points of view," Williams attempted to take Leavis without his elitism and idealism, "30's Marxism" without its doctrinaire systematizing and reductionism, and working-class culture, in its clearly subordinated position to an official culture which necessarily contained much that the working class could not do without. From this new position, Williams narrated a materialist account of the shifting meaning of a series of what he called "key words" — *industry*, *democracy*, *class*, *art*, and, most important of all, *culture*. Like Leavis, Williams saw that the line of English criticism from Burke and Coleridge to his contemporaries Eliot, I. A. Richards, Orwell, and Leavis himself, had centered around developing a notion of "culture" that, however conservatively inflected, was oppositional to "the bourgeois idea of society,"[30] i.e., "an idea of society as a neutral area within which each individual is free to pursue his own development and his own advantage as a natural right."[31] Rooted as it was in a common language and in daily give and take between the social classes, "culture" could not be rigidly divided into "bourgeois" and "proletarian" branches, as many contemporary Marxists assumed. Thus Williams separated himself from the group he called "the Marxists" and instead followed his own theoretical program of great originality and insight.

Nearly 20 years later, when he came to write the volume on literary theory for the Oxford paperback series "Marxist Introductions" of which he was one of the editors, Williams presented himself as an engaged Marxist. It was not Williams who had changed, however, but contemporary perceptions of what it meant to be a "Marxist." New generations of Leftists had rejected the orthodox pretensions of unitary Marxism-Leninism and had begun to cast around for alternative radical traditions. Williams looked to a redefined Marxism, supple enough to contain his earlier work (and he saw affinities with Gramsci and others that encouraged his perception).

Showing the influence of Williams, both Holderness and Mulhern focus attention on a Cambridge line that begins with Matthew Arnold, goes to the Newbolt Report, and climaxes with the *Scrutiny* polemics of F. R. Leavis and associates.[32] But the role played by "culture" is reduced

30. Williams, *Culture and Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

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essentially to simple repression as an ideology disseminated through the educational apparatus, inculcating values of nationalism, social hierarchy, and political quietism in bringing about a stable bourgeois hegemony in 20th-century England.[32] While of course this analysis gets at an important part of the truth, it erases much that was central to Williams' painstaking working out of the paradoxical oppositional role that culture also played.

A reading of the Matthew Arnold-Newbolt-Leavis-Tillyard tradition in the spirit of Raymond Williams and Gramsci would bring out, however, the relative autonomy of that tradition and its social agents from the major coercive aspects of capitalist domination and emphasize the double-edged potential of intellectuals and culture in the formation of hegemony and counter-hegemonies. Gramsci's ruminations on the role of traditional humanistic culture and training are also worth consideration. While Gramsci was critical of the isolation of traditional humanist culture from the material realities of social production,[33] he by no means thought that humanism was simply a class-based affectation, even though it had been reserved for the children of the upper classes. Instead, he argued, a "general, humanistic, formative culture" allowed these classes to "lead" more specialized intellectuals and would be needed as the basis of national education in an egalitarian society of self-management. That is, for Gramsci, traditional culture, deprived of its hermetic separation from the technical and scientific, was to play a decisive role in the formation of potentially autonomous, power-sharing agents in a post-revolutionary society — and in the struggle leading up to such an outcome.

Mulhern is better on grasping the interplay between the forces of society and culture in the formation of English studies after WWI,[34] but even so his emphasis constantly stresses the philistine and "clubby" aspects of traditional culture while maintaining a symptomatic silence on the immensely negative potential of instrumental-administrative reason.[35] If such an analysis amounts to substituting the

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32. Graham Holderness, *Shakespeare's History* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 150-53 and Francis Mulhern, *The Moment of 'Scrutiny'* (London: New Left, 1979).

33. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, eds. and trs. Quintin Hoare and G. N. Smith (New York: International, 1971), p. 9.

34. Mulhern, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-41.

35. Note,e.g., the treatment of scientism and professionalism in I. A. Richards, Mulhern, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-28. The impression conveyed is that traditional culture was the main component of bourgeois hegemony in the Britain of the early 20th century, while administrative-technical reason was, on the whole, a welcome corrective to the flabby thinking of the traditionalists.

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dynamics of university life for those of society as a whole and underestimating the critical and progressive function played by "culture" within the larger society (because it creates a "space" from which a critical stance can be developed), then the dangers of a purely negative critique of culture developing its own form of philistinism should be clear.

Nor are such tendencies restricted to Britain. Similar blindspots can be found in current treatments of the American New Critics who should be situated with the *Scrutiny* group in the same European-wide reaction against positivism that Mulhern defined as the larger intellectual context for the British grouping. What Mulhern wrote of Leavis could, with minor changes, be applied to the writings of the American New Critics John Crow Ransom, Allen Tate, Cleanth Brooks, and their colleagues and followers: "In its strict circumscription of positivist reason, *Scrutiny* echoed a theme that was stated in countless variations, from Freud's scientifically-inspired exploration of the unconscious to Bergson's irrationalist celebration of intuition and the *elan vital*. The Leavisian epistemological themes of 'recognition' and 'inwardness,' of cultural knowledge as 'recreation,' as the identity of knower and known, belong to that tradition of *Verstehen* (sympathetic understanding) whose representatives include Dilthey, Rickert and Croce — and, in another very different variant, Max Weber."[36]

New Criticism's peculiar doctrines of the objectification of the text, which became so prominent in Wimsatt's late New Critical formulations (but which can be found in embryo in earlier writings), call for qualifications of these continental affiliations and speak of a strong Anglo-American empirical strain that differentiates New Criticism from, for example, German hermeneutic theory. But the anti-positivism which New Criticism shares with these doctrines is certainly among its strongest, most thematized characteristics. Allen Tate in particular could be militant and caustic in this regard. On one occasion he predicted that the positivist approach to literature, by undermining the access to "the only complete, and thus the most responsible, versions of our experience" contained in "high forms of literature," unwittingly deprive students of their critical faculties and help usher in a nightmarish American consumerist version of Nazi censorship. In such a society, he continued, ". . . we were to be conditioned for the realization of a *bourgeois* paradise of gadgets and of consumption, not of the fruits of the earth, but of commodities." And while Tate believed that the Nazi success in Germany and the American engagement in the war had worked

36. Mulhern, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

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to discredit the possibly catastrophic outcome he feared, he knows that a consumerist " 'democracy' of appetites, drives, and stimulus- and-response has already affected us."[37]

These themes suggest an affiliation of New Criticism with a strain of anti-positivism which has never been linked with the New Critics previously but which is an especially important connection to grasp in the present era of the debunking and denunciation of the entire New Critical enterprise. There is a limited but striking convergence of interests and ideas between the American New Critics and the Frankfurt School and their anti-scientistic "cousins" Lukács, Goldmann, and Gramsci, among others. It is in fact probably these affinities which account for the relatively modest impact that Frankfurt School themes have had in Anglo-American literary studies, as opposed to a much greater influence in communications and sociology. Many of the Frankfurt School aesthetic themes seemed too close to the ideas of the New Critical father-figures being repressed to be taken in their own, ultimately very different context.

One way into the convergence is a look at the brief relation which Adorno had with the flagship New Critical journal *Kenyon Review* in the late 1940s. *Kenyon Review* was edited by the courtly leading New Critic, John Crow Ransom, who had been first a poet and professor, then an Agrarian champion of returning to the values of "organic society" in the American South during the Depression, and, from the 40s on, an advocate and architect of turning American academic English departments into New Critical strongholds to preserve those values and visions which social life could no longer contain in the face of capitalist modernization.

Adorno had participated during the war years in a Los Angeles forum on art and religion in modern life, where he, perhaps despairing of being able to bridge the considerable gap between his own philosophical assumptions and those of his audience, contributed to the discussion with a series of numbered theses. The talk somehow came to Ransom's attention, and he was impressed enough to print it in his journal and write a response to it. Adorno subsequently contributed a review to *Kenyon Review*, but, of course, he left America in 1949 to return to Germany and the collaboration never developed further. Nevertheless, the brief passing of these two ships revealed fascinating similarities in approaches to art theory between the two men, whose political affiliations and interests were otherwise so opposite.

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37. Allen Tate, "The Present Function of Criticism," *Collected Essays* (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1959), pp. 5-6. See also the essays in the same collection, "The Man of Letters in the Modern World" and "Miss Emily and the Bibliographers."

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In his essay, Adorno insisted against a pervasive tendency at the conference and in some contemporary art theory, on a firm separation between religion and art as distinct, historically separated practices; furthermore, he argued, art's historically constituted autonomy had been a distinct liberation threatened now from a number of directions. In trying to define his peculiar notion of art's autonomy and to ward off the accusation of "attempting to revise good old aestheticism, the idea of *l'art pour l'art* which has now been pronounced dead so many times" ("Nothing of this sort is my aim," he insisted), Adorno gave one of his clearest and most accessible explanations of the notion of the art-work as a monad:[38] the idea that it is in the form of art that its relation to the social is expressed and mediated (in implicit contrast to Communist themes of social realism and their accompanying denunciation of Modernism, and in explicit opposition to various attempts to assimilate art to religious vision). While Adorno cautiously described himself as a music theorist, Ransom was able to recognize that Adorno was for "collectivism in politics," but, he goes on to (correctly) assure his readers, "not . . . fanatically." Clearly Ransom found Adorno's intervention extremely stimulating — he reprinted the essay of reply in the collection *Beating the Bushes* — and he found much with which to agree. The separation between art and religion, which he had stressed in his own way, for his own distinct reasons, seemed to him very happily formulated in Adorno's theses: "His social ideal has no room in it for religion yet provides a special asylum for art. But art is curiously close to religion in his very original and engaging description of it, as a concrete monad representing the universal concretion itself; that is to say, as a construction from which the experient receives cosmic or ontological vision. . . . It is not attached to the practical life which falls under the overall survey of the political economy. It is free, and Mr. Adorno awards to it an *imperium in imperio*. That is a handsome concession which many collectivists have not made."[39]

Adorno would certainly not own every jot and tittle of this paraphrase, especially the categories of "cosmic or ontological"; and Ransom assumed a hostility to religion which is not quite accurate either. But both theorists had found in art a possible counter to the levelling and sterilizing processes of capitalist modernization, and both believed fiercely in

38. T. W. Adorno, "Theses Upon Art and Religion Today," *Kenyon Review* 7 (Autumn 1945), pp. 676-82.

39. John Crowe Ransom, "Art and the Human Economy" (1945); rpt. in his *Beating the Bushes: Selected Essays 1941-1970* (New York: New Directions, 1972) p. 129.

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the need to preserve art's autonomy, not in order to escape from social reality, but in order to preserve the alternatives to it contained within art.

In addition, for both the Frankfurt School and for the original New Critics, art constituted a kind of knowledge — richer, fuller, value-laden, and multiply perspected — that served as an essential critical foil to the abstracting and value-free conceptualizations of positivism in all its forms. Significantly, the very term "positivism" was a bugbear for both groupings, and for similar reasons: it epitomized for both groups the scientistic homogenization of life and theory that was anathema to each, caught up as they were in their different ways in the anti-positivist crusades of international Modernism. Strikingly too, both were outraged by the consumerist superficialities of post-war American culture. How unlike the received idea of New Criticism are the pages of Ransom's *Kenyon Review* in the late 40s before they were turned into a set of procedures for grinding out abstract readings of texts, isolated from any social significance,

Of course, the dialogue between Ransom and Adorno became a curiosity, a lone signpost of a road not taken in American criticism. Rather than developing the potential for cultural and social criticism it clearly contained, academic New Criticism, as both *Scrutiny* and Ransom himself saw clearly, became reduced to its own techniques, becoming a professional discipline with writings addressed only to other professionals — writings which remained unread and whose real social purposes could only be understood in terms of credentialing in a scramble for jobs, tenure, and fame. The result, in Said's perceptive observation, has been a complete denial of the "materiality" of the literary text, its existence as "a cultural object sought after, fought over, possessed, rejected, achieved in time."[40] Instead, as Said wrote, both the literary and the critical texts exist in a fantastic abstracted timelessness "working alone within itself." And this is a condition which has continued well into the post-New Critical period.

At the present juncture, generational, aesthetic, and political currents are converging to produce rapid change in English studies. In one more ironic reversal, the very forces that deprived New Criticism of its critical content and reduced it to a series of sterile image-pattern studies in the 50s and 60s have helped bring about the current critical insurgency, as deconstruction, the new historicism, and feminism all

40. Edward W. Said, "Roads Taken and Not Taken in Contemporary Criticism," *Contemporary Literature* 17 (1976), p. 339.

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strive to produce "the Postmodern Shakespeare." The compulsion to publish, the large number of active scholars in the academic bureaucracies that are modern English departments, and the consumerist appetite for novelty have combined with other forms to produce the new Shakespeare who has been implicitly denounced by the NEH. Not accidentally, however, the new radical critics born within professionalized academia are relatively unconscious of the dominating force of their own professional practices, directing their fire instead (witness Holderness and Mulhern) against the older cultural tradition which, with all its elitism and illusions, had been the principal counter to positivism and which had provided one of the few viable critiques of modernized societies in mid-20th-century America and Britain. Now outside even this perch within society, the Left today finds itself speaking out of the privileged spaces of professionalist criticism (and largely ignoring its embarrassing predicament) while the Right calls for populist revival and a return to humanist culture.

It will take all the ingenuity of the newer criticism — and a rare level of political acumen and skill — to work through such an *aporia*. Of course, it was only because of their complicity with the procedures of professionalism that the newer critical methods have been able to reach a position from which to command attention and to transform the social reproduction of so central a cultural icon as Shakespeare. Whether from this position, after a long march through the institutions, the newer criticisms can begin to recognize and criticize their own empowering professional supports, or like the older New Critics become engulfed and absorbed by those processes, is at this moment very much in question.

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Notes and Commentary:

*The Crisis of Communism**

Milovan Djilas

It is difficult enough to predict routine, everyday events, not to mention the political and social shape of the future. Furthermore, I am not personally inclined to predictions. But recent upheavals within the system in which I have worked virtually my whole life compel me to express my views, however briefly and superficially, because there may not be enough time left for me to pursue a deeper analysis or to undertake the research that would be required for a more adequate account.

Today we are witnessing one of the great turning-points in history. One-third of humanity — from Belgrade to Beijing — is caught up in developments whose form and duration are still unclear. Yet all my experience tells me these will radically change the communist world, which in turn will have a great impact on the rest of the world. Thus no one can remain disinterested. As the saying goes, *de te fabula naratur* (this story is about you). No matter how strong and stable, humanity will not thereby become happy or satisfied. But the world will no doubt be different and, one may hope, better.

The crisis of communism is intensifying in most communist states, but in different ways in each of them. Even where it has not yet appeared, there are faint rumblings beneath the surface, stirrings in the ideological prisons of these police states. All of this follows directly from the nature of the system imposed by Party oligarchies, which by means of an absolute ideal justify a monopoly of power: the absolute control of society and the state. Despite the fact communist states differ from each other and even internally (insofar as some of them, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are multinational), they are all related in that not one of them can be an exception or escape the fate of the monopolistic link between power, property and ideology.

This is a crisis of power. More precisely, it is a crisis of the monopoly of power by communist parties. It is significant, even crucial, that the crisis

*This speech was written for delivery in Munich in September 1988. Since Djilas was unable to make the trip, it was read by Karl Ludwig Bayer, the editor of *Neue Epoche*. Translated from Serbo-Croatian by Michael and Deborah Milenkovitch.

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emerged in the Soviet Union and is spreading throughout the system it established. The Soviet Union is the model — a mighty military empire that until recently has been spreading on a global scale: in the first instance, by subjugation and domination of revolutionary movements; in the second, by the support of weak and dependent totalitarian states.

Consider the ideology and nature of the system established by communist parties after they seized power. Inspired by theories or, more precisely, by utopias about a classless society presumably free of conflicts, communists established an absolute rule which oversees all societal activity. Government organs become instruments of the party. In communist societies the individual becomes atomized; almost a faceless fact of society. A "new class" of rulers developed and became entrenched upon this foundation — a class of managers of a specific kind of collective with hierarchical ownership not only of the economy but of society itself. Of course, this project was realized more in some states than in others, depending on internal relations of power and international circumstances. But it was always the predominent tendency.

In relatively backward, non-industrialized nations, whose survival was endangered from without (such as Russia and China, and even Yugoslavia), communist ideology and even the communist system were attractive to power-hungry revolutionaries and pauperized peasants. The Party bureaucracy justified itself historically, if only temporarily, by successes in industrial transformation, even though these successes were accompanied by unforgettable terror and economic madness. Such a system can survive only so long as there are strata to whom industrialization appears to be the way to an ideal future. But with forced industrialization, faith and ideology tend to weaken and become ossified as industrial society becomes stratified. It cannot be otherwise. Industrial society requires rationality and some sense of the worth of life — not the rationing and scarcity a privileged bureaucracy imposed in the name of an unseen and unconfirmed, but already compromised, ideal future.

In order to get a clear picture, these utopian systems can be compared with feudalism. Like all historical analogies, such a comparison is necessarily abstract and schematic. Moreover, in communist systems the laws and the government apparatus depend on the political power of the Party instead of a monarch and the nobility. Nevertheless, the analogy holds for ideology as well as for economic relations. Under feudalism, not only did the Church not determine the government, but the government decreed the faith: *cuius regio eius religio*. Property rights were legally imprecise or not defined at all. Also, there was a lot of "collective" property owned by the Church and/or various religious orders (e.g., the Templars). The labor force was not free, while markets and commodity production were only beginning to develop. In all these respects, feudalism was not unlike the situation in states with a monopoly of communist power. Just as the modern constitutional state arose out of the dissolution of feudalism, so today it arises from the class of total lawlessness

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and totalitarian anarchy. Instead of absolute monarchy, we see the appearance of enlightened autocrats.

This comparison is not meant to degrade feudalism, especially that medieval European feudalism which was the source of the spiritual and political developments that have most directly influenced and continue to influence human life. Moreover, despite all their evils and follies, I do not absolutely reject communism and communists. What I am interested in is to obtain a more critical perspective. Let us leave the rest to history and the historians. Here I want only to specify, also in comparison with feudalism, what kind of social order we are dealing with, what kind of crises confront it and where they lead.

First, there are the authentic systems which emerged from revolutions (Russia, China, Yugoslavia, etc.). But we must also consider those states in which the system was forced upon them by Soviet military power, because even in these states — despite national differences and lack of authenticity — the system is essentially the same. In all, the crisis started when these states began to evolve modern, post-industrial, pluralistic and commodity-oriented types of society — independent of their will and at the expense of ideology. To draw another historical analogy, perhaps no less an oversimplification, the situation is more akin to Europe on the eve of 1848 than to the French Revolution. Some may see in this process a movement toward capitalism, which is not wholly without foundation if under that rubric we understand a developed Western society. Nevertheless, such a view suffers from dogmatic traps and chasms no less than the comparison of Marx' and Engels' Germany and England (the US, being still primarily agrarian, was beyond their analysis) with contemporary Germany and England.

In brief, communist societies, although differing from state to state, are moving steadily toward the weakening and ultimate abandonment of monopolistic party power, toward political pluralism and various forms of ownership, and thus toward stratified society. This process has been taking place for some time, and has penetrated the Party even more intensely than society because ideology has gradually been revealed to be a fantasy and a deceit — a transparent excuse for the privileges of the oligarchy. Within communism there have always been various currents, even democratic ones, which even Stalinist total terror could not eliminate. But the totalitarian currents always succeeded in reestablishing ideological unity. This cycle has finally come to an end. Communists are no longer able to rid themselves of their own "heresies" and "foreign" oppositions, even if the party oligarchies were to apply outright totalitarian methods instead of those predominantly authoritarian and autocratic forms that now obtain. The question is: how long will this process last and what shape will it take?

Clearly, solutions for each individual crisis will differ according to relations of power and the political and programmatic conditions in individual states. It is unlikely that any communist system will voluntarily accept political pluralism and free and equal forms of ownership. This is not because it would be

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contrary to communist theory, for some theoretical justification can always be found, but because it would mean the destruction of the very nature of communist power. Perhaps a current will emerge (I am convinced it already exists somewhere) which, nurtured by patriotic and other idealistic motives, will aim at accepting these principles. But this could not and will not originate with authentic Leninist, Marxist-Leninist communists. True, communism has adapted itself to changing realities, but it has always done so in order to survive, strengthen and preserve its totalitarian essence. The current changes and "reforms" are different, because the crisis is different — it is systemic and without a communist solution. The essence of communism is not changing; it is disintegrating. There is no exit from the current crisis except into a new essence: a new system.

It is necessary to specifically focus on two mutually related illusions, which still find fertile soil not only in the communist East but in Western countries as well. It is believed that a gradual strengthening of private ownership — so-called small economy and personal labor — and the importation of foreign capital will enable the gradual transformation of so-called social or "socialist" ownership, the communists' monopolistic power. After all, despite themselves, even communist authorities have become more accomodating and unorthodox in this regard. I do not deny that private ownership grows out of "socialist" ownership — out of its inefficiency and waste — nor that it provides a good example and makes daily life easier. But the Party reformers of the bureaucratic economy and even less the Party leaders could never conceive of private ownership as anything other than a supplement to social or "socialist" property. A similar conclusion holds with respect to the possibilities offered by the participation of foreign capital. Despite the fact that in some communist states it is possible to temporarily improve the system, there is no consolidation or normalization, nor can there be, without the abolition of the monopolistic power structure and thus also the abolition of Party-state ownership.

Some communist states will probably undergo such transformations, even in the near future. As a general phenomenon, however, it will take a long time. This is especially true for the Soviet Union, due to the close ties between the Bolshevik Party and the imperial structure. But one thing is already clear: with the exception of Albania and Romania, where the total monopoly of ideology is still maintained by force, the disintegration of communist ideology is irreversible and the growth of new ideas irrepressible. That is not sufficient, but it is still crucial, because any liberalization begins as an idea within an idea.

I have not dwelt on the impact of external circumstances (first and foremost, the West) on these changes in the communist world. This does not mean that such circumstances have not had a direct and often decisive impact. For example, the West has succeeded in stopping Soviet expansionism and thereby in intensifying the crisis of communism. But the present crisis in communist countries stems primarily from the nature of communism itself. This appears to be the most significant factor. "Rotten capitalism" has turned

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out to be incomparably more successful than "real socialism" (this was recently acknowledged in *Kommunist*, the leading Soviet Party journal) and continues to have a devastating effect on the system communists support. This leads to one conclusion: nations under communist rule today cannot take up new challenges, nor can they maintain their distinctive and spiritual position among developed nations. The only remedy is democratic rule.

*A New Form of Dictatorship: An Interview with Milovan Djilas**

Bayer: Alexander Dubcek received an honorary doctorate from the University of Bologna in November, 1988. Most Italian newspapers consider Dubcek, the leading figure of the "Prague Spring" of 1968, a precursor to Gorbachev. In contrast, *La Stampa*, takes the view that *perestroika* is not bringing about liberalization but a destabilization. In this sense, Gorbachev's reform politics have already reached their limit.

Djilas: Like Dubcek, Gorbachev is a *product* of the crisis. Nevertheless, Dubcek can somehow be considered a precursor to Gorbachev. Yet Gorbachev's appearance was totally independent of Dubcek and would have come about even if Dubcek had never existed. The Soviets take into account what occurs in other countries — in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary — but they follow their own course. I think they are indeed striving for liberalization — it is no trick, no maneuver, no swindle. But this liberalization has its limits: first, this system will not allow the rise of a market economy (if this is understood to mean the rise of free and diverse forms of property); second, no pluralistic system, no multiple party system, can develop.

There have always been many different tendencies within communism. Stalin liquidated all currents except his own — he physically annihilated and repressed them through his tyranny. At present, different currents are reappearing. These new currents are different, however, from those that existed in Lenin's time. Then, these currents searched along various paths for the authentic and most efficient communism. Today there are strong tendencies seeking a revision of fundamental communist doctrines. But there are still hardliners who practice strong-arm politics. They argue for totalitarian domination. Driving these forces back is the most important task in this struggle.

* Originally conducted by Karl Ludwig Bayer and published in *Neue Epoche*, no. 111 (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 22-29. Translated from German by David Pan

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On the one hand, we are seeing the disintegration of communist ideology and the communist system; on the other, one can conclude (e.g., from the events in Yugoslavia) that the disintegration of ideology, even of the Party, does not necessarily mean a disintegration of state power. Gorbachev has realized that the Party can no longer be a mobilizing factor. For this reason, he is shifting the emphasis to the state apparatus. In the process, he must compromise with the Party bureaucracy and, consequently, must act cautiously.

Bayer: Does this mean that the power structure has a longer life-span and more stability than the ideology?

Djilas: The power structure is certainly more stable than the ideology. Up to now we have always proceeded from the fact of a Party-controlled state. We always thought that the state is only as strong as the Party. But now the Party is weakening. Yet, despite ideological disintegration, corruption, and the disintegration of its monopoly on domination, the power of the state remains.

Bayer: But all power requires legitimation. How does a regime justify itself after its ideology has lost its credibility? Is a state and nationalist consciousness taking the place of no longer marketable Marxist promises?

Djilas: Undoubtedly every system or regime requires an intellectual justification. Today the return to Russian history, tradition, and national consciousness also serves in a sense as a legitimation of domination. The "national" partially takes the place of the "Marxist." Marxism in its communist variant has become a banal ideology without creative energy. It has become downright ridiculous. Thus, in schools, jokes are regularly made about it. Among schoolchildren in Yugoslavia, a common saying goes: "You're as boring as Marxism." There is spiritual emptiness. Many people turn back to religion, to national values, to democratic ideas.

Bayer: Can this new nationalism support state power as a justification of domination, or is it rather a destabilizing force — a motivation for national uprisings?

Djilas: Both are possible. Gradually, everyone is becoming a nationalist. In Romania and Albania, totalitarian communism is identical with a form of totalitarian nationalism. There, nationalism supports domination. Yet there are also counter-instances. Here in Yugoslavia, e.g., in Slovenia, liberalism and pluralism under the rubric of nationalism are on the rise. Something similar is taking place in Poland where a pluralism has arisen with an intense nationalist tone and anti-Russian overtones. The Catholic Church and Solidarity are independent forces; and some pluralist tendencies even exist in the dominant party. Developments in Hungary are roughly similar. Nationalism can only be stabilizing when the leadership identifies itself with it. When nationalism is directed against the leadership, it is destabilizing.

Bayer: With respect to the Soviet Union, Ernst Topitsch has spoken of a "military patriotism" which the leadership is using to support itself.

Djilas: The Soviet Union cannot become totalitarian on the basis of nationalism. "Military patriotism" has always existed — even in Russia under the Czars. Such a large country cannot be controlled without a military. But a

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military dictatorship is out of the question. A multi-national state cannot have a nationalist totalitarian dictatorship because it would set off rebellions among all other peoples. Presently, the Russians would not be able to quell such rebellions. They would be able to intervene, but they would be incapable of suppressing large national movements because all of their potential opponents would support these movements.

Bayer: Within NATO there has been discussion concerning an appropriate response to recent developments in the Soviet Union. Americans have criticized West Europeans for providing the Soviets with credit and technology, thereby releasing the Soviets from the necessity of having to decide between "guns *or* butter." As the Americans see it, if Helmut Kohl goes to Moscow with three billion marks in his trunk, then, the Soviets will find themselves in the comfortable situation of being able to afford both "guns *and* butter."

Djilas: The three billion marks which Kohl promised to the Russians is just a drop in the bucket. Other Western nations are also offering credit — in a competitive struggle for Soviet markets. But the Soviet system is so disorganized that such aid has little impact. If one were to place at the Soviet's disposal the most advanced Western technology, it would become obsolete before the Soviets could use it. But among Russians both the feeling of being a great and powerful state as well as the fear of disintegration — and the fear of the outside world — are still very strong. If they have to choose between "guns *or* butter," they will always choose guns. I am no one's adviser, but in my opinion the West's political position in response to Gorbachev's reforms should be positive — though not blind. Openness to the Soviet Union should increase at the same pace that the Soviet Union transforms itself internally so as to pose less of an external threat.

Bayer: But is this really possible? In your book, *Conversations with Stalin*, you described how the Soviet dictator sought to dominate all of Europe.

Djilas: He wanted to control Germany, and all of Europe. But today it is different because the West is much stronger, though clearly not so strong as to be able to dictate terms to the Soviet Union. Moreover, such would not even be wise, since it could strengthen chauvinistic and totalitarian tendencies. It would also be a mistake to offer the Soviet Union unreserved cooperation, which some capitalists are ready to do. Expectations of profits should not be the deciding factor. Western governments must retain control. At the moment, Gorbachev does not pose a danger to the West. But this could change.

Bayer: When the French Revolution reached the end of its program to improve the world, it changed under Napoleon into a military imperialism. Could that also happen with the Russian Revolution?

Djilas: That comparison is very schematic. Open Soviet expansionism more or less ended after Stalin. What came after — in countries like Angola or Afghanistan — was rather the expansion of a large state. Different from the early colonial imperialism of Western nations, this expansion of power only resulted in large economic losses.

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Bayer: Is it then conceivable, considering the ideological disintegration, that Moscow might one day be prepared to jettison some of its ballast? In the last century, Russia eventually sold Alaska to the United States. Do you think it possible that something similar might happen again, that Moscow might give up some of the marginal Western provinces of its enormous empire in return for economic concessions?

Djilas: In terms of its structure, the Soviet empire is different from earlier Western colonial empires. British and French colonies were not part of the motherland. The systems of domination that existed in the colonies were very different from those in the European states. Moscow's expansion proceeded in such a way that all the annexed territories became in effect parts of the Soviet Union. In Russian consciousness, the detachment of any one of these territories would mean a disintegration of the state. The only possibility seems to be a stronger regard for the aspirations to national independence on the part of the separate peoples within the Soviet empire. Gorbachev's reforms cannot be realized without granting more extended political rights to individual republics. Admittedly, communists are not true nationalists, but nationalists for the sake of domination. National communist parties will attempt to solidify their positions in their own countries to the same degree that ideology loses its significance. Developments in Eastern Europe may signal the establishment of a sort of loose commonwealth.

Bayer: Then what will remain of communism?

Djilas: Very little. Of course, the disintegration of ideology proceeds not abruptly but gradually. The Soviet Politburo does not simply sit down one day — as Solzhenitsyn might have imagined it — and decide to abandon ideology. But already most functionaries no longer believe socialist property makes any sense. For example, the only chance seen in Yugoslavia is to turn away from a planned economy. It is the only hope of controlling the economic situation and of preventing the elimination of leading functionaries. It has gone so far that Stipe Suvar, the federal Party chairman, jokingly remarked at a conference with foreign journalists, that we are on the path of a "peaceful transition from socialism to capitalism" — a reversal of the social-democratic model.

Bayer: Could it be that the Party is introducing with its opening to the West a temporary reform similar to Lenin's New Economic Policy that will be reversed later?

Djilas: No. Industrial development is too far advanced; the move toward a complex, differentiated society has become unavoidable. For the future, however, allowing a private "small sector economy" will not be decisive, but much more the fate of the large, so-called socialist sector of the economy. This question is still open.

Bayer: The nations of the European Common Market are moving closer together and forming a powerful economic bloc. Will this bloc attract the East?

Djilas: I believe the Soviet Union itself will move closer to Europe, while other

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East European countries — some more, others less or not at all — will gradually make overtures to the West. This could lead to eventual separation from the Soviet Union, though none of these countries will completely detach itself from Moscow.

Bayer: But Yugoslavia long ago detached itself from Moscow. Could it not embark on a foreign policy course toward the Common Market?

Djilas: These tendencies are certainly becoming stronger in official circles. I am convinced Yugoslavia will not be able to solve its crisis if it does not in some way attempt to become part of the process of European integration. The government has now decided on serious economic measures. However, everything is still unfinished and full of contradictions. The changes necessary cannot be undertaken by the present bureaucracy. True, even Suvar has become an advocate of a market economy, and it has been decided that foreign capital should enter the country. Even the transfer of profits out of the country is supposed to be possible. Despite all this, however, foreign capital will not enter the country in meaningful quantities because capitalists are not willing to be bullied by the local bureaucracy. The absurdities remain! For example, according to laws currently being drafted, a foreign entrepreneur is allowed to own a factory, but a Yugoslav national is not.

Bayer: Since the publication of your book, *The New Class*, you have continually pointed out that functionaries cannot simply give up the authority to administer the means of production without undermining their own domination as they understand it.

Djilas: You have already formulated my answer. The central question right now is whether the Party or the state apparatus dependant on it is prepared to divorce itself from the economy. This is unlikely in the near future. However, in Yugoslavia there is a growing tendency to allow the state apparatus to function independently of the Party, because the Party is split into eight separate factions which actually function as a coalition and reach a collective opinion on general questions concerning the Yugoslav state as a whole. Since a unified Yugoslav Party no longer exists, but only a coalition of national communist parties, there is a chance for the state to become independent of the Party. In my opinion, the Party-state in Yugoslavia is in the process of disappearing, although this process varies from republic to republic. Slovenia is the most liberal; Bosnia, in the midst of confusion. In Macedonia and Montenegro there are still rigid regimes, while in Serbia liberal tendencies prevail in both the economy and the intellectual sphere.

Bayer: Despite all the differences between Yugoslavia and the Western democracies, do you think a rapprochement with the Common Market can be reached?

Djilas: The present government is actually making the attempt, but the system itself is blocking these efforts. There are few in Yugoslavia opposed to these efforts. Even official circles favor cooperation between Central and

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Western Europe with the proviso that they be able to retain their own system. This means they are not in a position to cross a certain line.

Bayer: Do young people, who have grown up in communist countries, dream of the golden West or is there still a lingering belief in an ideal, but as yet unrealized, form of socialism?

Djilas: There are mixed dreams, but the former tendency prevails — the young people lean more to the West. The concern is less with direct ties to the West than simply with freer structures, with the abandonment of hitherto existing dogmas. Many people look to a freer society, which is linked to their conception of Western life.

Bayer: In October 1988, an authoritarian regime in Chile asked its people if they desired a continuation of the existing system. If a similar referendum were held in Yugoslavia, what would be the result?

Djilas: That would depend on the phrasing of the referendum. If the question were whether Yugoslavia should continue as a unified country, then a large majority of the people would be in favor of it — probably 99% of the Serbians. If the question were phrased: "Are you in favor of democratic reforms?" the result would also be 80% to 90% positive. Other than that, I think the opposition would do better than it did in Chile.

Bayer: If there are secret majorities in favor of the Common Market and democracy, then a partnership between Yugoslavia and West Germany is no longer a distant utopia.

Djilas: Even my father knew everything depends on the Germans. At the start of the Spanish Civil War, he asked: "Are the Germans involved?" When I told him this was not yet the case, he replied: "Then it is not yet a real war."

Bayer: Let us rather speak of peace. How stable is it?

Djilas: Very stable. The Soviet Union is today weaker than the West and would be left without allies were it to start a war. Also, people in the West can only be mobilized to defend themselves. No one is in a position to attack anyone else. We are now witnessing the total absence of war; the most dramatic moment in the history of mankind. From Belgrade to Beijing: everything is in disarray. New opportunities are opening up within communist countries as well as for cooperation with the West.

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The SPD: Between Europe and Modell Deutschland*

Mario Telò

To what extent has German social-democracy internalized the need to unify Western Europe? The Münster Congress held at the end of August 1988 did not directly confront this issue, although Hans Jochen Vogel's, Horst Ehmke's and Willy Brandt's speeches all reiterated a Europeist perspective long since supported by the party. Of course, there were other important issues to discuss, and there will be a convention specifically dedicated to the European program later, at a time closer to the June 1989 European elections. But the decisions taken at this Congress concerning questions of economic and social policy, as well as the fundamental outlook that has gradually developed in the three congresses that followed the party's shift to the opposition (since the end of 1981), have relevant implications for the Europeist perspective. Thus it is appropriate to ask how and with what general strategy the party is committed to the Europeist option — a party which, because of its history as well as its organizational solidity and authority, remains the most important of the Socialist International.

Notwithstanding the fact that it is 125 years old, the SPD is seen by today's polls, as well as by the recent twists of the Liberal-Christian-Democratic coalition, as a credible candidate for the direction of West Germany — a country essential to the future of the Common Market and to the destiny of Europe. Along with the other main parties of the European Left, including the combative British Labour Party, the SPD has long since abandoned its initial opposition to the economic and political integration of Western Europe, and has given a Europeist twist to its most important foreign policy documents. As can be seen from the June 1986 Irsee Draft (*Irseer Entwurf*),[1] one of the main innovations of

* Originally published in *Mondoperaio*, vol. 41, n. 11 (November 1988), pp. 56-61.

1. The "Irsee Draft" concerning the SPD program was approved June 1986 by the party's leadership and, in August of the same year, by the Nuremberg Congress. A new committee headed by Oskar Lafontaine is to elaborate the definitive text at the beginning of 1989. The following quotations are from that document.

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the party's new fundamental program, presently being drafted, consists in the clear stand in favor of a Europeist choice: undoutedly, this will be central, along with the clear ecological option, in the new Bremen Program which, probably after 1989, will replace the famous programmatic text approved in Bad Godesberg 30 years ago. Thus the SPD is neither going back to the past nor does it have anything in common with minority leftist positions which, in various countries, are still resolutely opposed to European integration. Furthermore, it has also turned the Europeist dimension into the qualifying characteristic of some of its more recent and innovative elaborations.

Notwithstanding all this, various political realities and some signals coming from Social-Democratic political culture lead to a deeper analysis of the ways in which the SPD and its various components confront the Europeist choice both in terms of problems concerning a new reformist strategy in the wake of the early 1980s defeats and in terms of the evolution of international relations.

First of all, it is necessary to define the main issues of the internal discussion concerning the equilibrium between national, transnational, and local levels of such a reformist strategy. On the one hand, the Europeist orientation developed mostly by the leadership group during the past two decades constitutes a strong consensual base for the party; on the other, some lines of development of the party's present policy as well as some features of the elaboration that has accompanied the work of the programming commission prefigure what could turn out to be a new German model of national modernization for the 1990s. It is not a matter of a past residue, of a recycling of Helmut Schmidt's *Modell Deutschland*, concerning which today almost the whole SPD is extremely critical. Nor is it a matter of a purely trivial tendency whereby Europeist rhetoric would hide a new powerful tendency towards "national socialism," following the well-known contradiction between ideology and *Realpolitik*. Rather, it is a matter of a new national or local reformist outlook, which is politically innovative in terms of the ends sought but also skeptical or indifferent (if not altogether worried) with respect to European integration.

For various historical and cultural reasons, a party such as the SPD cannot accept a subaltern and opportunistic role with respect to European integration. This banal pragmatism has been and remains secondary in relation to the problem of European unity and the two classical reference points of SPD strategy: internationalism and the national state. It is impossible for any of the components of German Social-Democracy to deal with Europeism without resolving these questions. This difficulty is a common one within European socialism, but is particularly intense in the country which started two world wars and in the oldest party of the socialist movement.

During most of the past century, the history of labor parties can be seen as a tortuous process of "nationalization" in the double sense of, on the one hand, attempting to interpret their own country's specific history and to respect its socio-cultural specificities and, on the other, of becoming integrated with the national state in order to turn it into an agency of progressive policies

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(democratization, the welfare state, etc.). In fact, on the *national* level the national parties have become something more than class parties, i.e., pure representation of subaltern classes and advocates of socialism. They have gradually built social and political alliances, become political forces, and moved first in opposition and then in power. WWI and the two decades between the world wars have been crucial in this maturation: in the overcoming of a common threshold that only in Europe has resulted in the identification of the parliamentary Left with socialist parties and those of the labor movement.

Thus it is no accident that the first "Europeism" of the SPD developed during the 1920s. The party which, after the turn-of-the-century debate concerning reformism and the state (the Bernstein debate) saw its extraordinary organizational power disintegrate in the wake of its thorny dissensions concerning the approval of the 1914 war credits, reconstituted itself as the leading power in the Weimar Republic on the basis of a program supporting "The United States of Europe." Consequently, the party did not merely support Stresemann's and Briand's late-1920s efforts toward European unity. From the 1925 Heidelberg Program (drafted by Rudolf Hilferding — the party's major theoretician at that time) , it made it the focus of its own long-term strategy. European political and economic unity is seen as "necessary for economic reasons" and as the premise for peaceful international cooperation.

Today, in the first draft of its new program, the SPD proudly appeals to that precocious and long-term prefiguration of a European policy. But, as is well-known, in the 1920s such a policy did not have any realistic historical roots. Paradoxically, the SPD's emphasis on European cooperation during the Weimar Republic as a way out of the 1929 socio-economic crisis contributed considerably to its failure to elaborate a Keynesian *national* economic and employment program which, as the labor unions understood and other European socialist parties successfully learned, could have led the country out of the political and economic catastrophe of the early 1930s. Only after WWII did the SPD become aware of the fact that, for the immediate future, the road of socialist reformism had to follow the Swedish model, i.e., advanced socio-economic policies based on dynamic national compromises between the labor movement and capitalism. In fact, this was to become the policy of both Kurt Schumacher from 1945 to 1952, and subsequently of Erich Ollenhauer, the two SPD presidents during the period between reconstruction and the Bad Godesberg Program. Thus the first "Europeism" by the SPD turned out to be an abstract ideal, lacking any relation to the problems of a national reformist policy. Rather, it played a negative role, embroiled as it was in *laissez-faire* economics and the evolutionary orthodoxy of economistic Marxism.

This process whereby the SPD gradualy moved toward the kind of Keynesian economic policy had already been successfully applied on the Left by the Scandinavian Social-Democrats and the British Labour Party proceeded along with renewed emphasis on the national question. Thus, paradoxically, the newborn Federal Republic of Germany saw socialist internationalists transformed into

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apostles of the absolute priority of German national reunification, and the nationalists of Adenauer's conservative Right supporting NATO and the early versions of that European Community that eventually came into being. For more than a decade, the SPD considered the objectives of Western European integration under US hegemony incompatible with German reunification. Schumacher was partly successful in the struggle for Germany's "equal consideration" (*Gleichberechtigung*) on the international level, and, in the pacifist and neutralist campaigns against rearmament and NATO, primarily in alliance with the German churches. Strategically, however, the German nationalist line ended up defeated.

The SPD went through a further transition to a new conception of the relation between national and international politics with a veritable split between theory and praxis: while it approved a new Bad Godesberg Program that ignored Europe altogether, in parliament the party followed a new line of convergence in foreign policy between the opposition and the Christian Democratic government that was to lead, six years after Herbert Wehner's famous 1960 speech, to the "Grand Coalition of the CDU and the SPD (1966-69). German unification was no longer seen as a political objective. The party approved participation in NATO and, in this context, accepted the Common Market and the early versions of the European Community. Actual policy was thus split from strategy: although generally considered quite innovative, on this point the Bad Godesberg Program remained reticent and vague. It simply referred to "the existing tendency toward economic cooperation in Europe" and, when it came to dealing with Social-Democratic foreign policy, it recycled Schumacher's objective of "a peaceful European order" — translated as the need to overcome existing power blocs — and paid lip service to the classic concept of Pan-Europeanism. Thus the SPD's second "Europeism" (during the 1960s) can be seen as a convergence towards the center — a process of "adaptation to really existing European integration."

Already before the "Grand Coalition," however, Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt had began to elaborate what was to become a genuinely Sociald-Democratic version of West Germany's subsequent 1966-1980 Europeist policy: *Ostpolitik*. Brandt forged a third position between Schumacher's obsolete powerless outlook, and Herbert Wehner's *Realpolitik*. In his memoirs Schmidt rightly traces back to the 1960s the first signs of subsequent dissentions.[2]

From being a pawn in the Cold War, the German question provided the stimulus for a new policy of détente not merely on a German level, but on a broader European one. There was a break with the old taboos inherited from the "Adenauer era" concerning relations with the East European leadership,

2. Helmut Schmidt, *Uomini al Potere*, Italian translation (Milan, 1988). The former Chancellor emphasizes the connection between *Ostpolitik* and a pro-Western outlook as the center of divergence between him and Wehner on one side, and the iron couple of Brandt and Bahr on the other.

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and there were successive agreements with East Germany, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The concept of a "Pan-European peaceful order" was no longer the premise of political paralysis but of a new initiative that rendered West Germany's strategic location in the West — the presupposition for the end of the era of confrontation. *Ostpolitik* turned out to be fully compatible with the climate of East-West relations prefigured by Kennedy's and Johnson's policy of détente, and assigned to West Germany a central role. Brandt managed to transform the drama of the division of Germany into the basis for a European policy of peace.

Brandt's assumption of the Chancellorship in 1969, while he was simultaneously the SPD leader, contributed to harmonizing Social-Democratic and national policy. Brandt became actively committed to the construction of the European Economic Community by playing a determining role in the difficult 1969 Hague summit. Thus he contributed to a kind of "socialist Europeism" — the concept of a united Europe different from the Gaullist notion of a "Europe of Fatherlands" developed in the Fouchet plan for an interstates federation, or from Spinelli's radical federalism, or even from Jean Monnet's functionalist Europeism. From functionalism Brandt inherited the priority of sectoral politics, i.e., in this case, social policies; from federalism he inherited the demand for the democratization of the institutions of the European Economic Community; from Gaullism he inherited the need for a Europe able to confront the great powers and the challenges of the contemporary world as a protagonist. In his outlook, social and democratic aspirations take on the pregnant sense of the historical adherence of popular and democratic movements binding the working class to the idea of a progressive Europe and a "peaceful power." His concern with international challenges were further enriched with the posing of the primacy of issues of peace with the East and of the development of the Southern Hemisphere. His German peculiarity, as a man untainted by any possible patriotism, translated into a surplus of creativity and imagination in a context still branded by the painful rancor of old nationalist policies. Thus, what as late as 1962 led the main author of the Bad Godesberg text, Willy Eichler, to formulate as the basis of the SPD's opposition to West European integration was finally translated into positive proposals: the limitation to certain countries; the limitation to certain issues that left out the classical questions of socialism; the limitation of the democratic character of the Community's original institutions. Precisely for these reasons, the 1959 Program had been reticent concerning the question of European integration. Brandt turned this critique, today still accepted by some socialist parties (such as the Scandinavian and the Austrian parties), into strong new concrete proposals.

This is how, with the Social-Democrats, West Germany matured and became able to play, even more than in the past, a role of protagonist in the new season of European politics. *Ostpolitik* dragged all of Europe along with it: the decision to broaden to 9, and then to 12, the Community's members, was finally carried

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out; the first social policy programs were launched, it was decided to hold direct elections of the European Parliament based on universal suffrage; and the Community was seen as something more than a means necessary to eliminate nationalistic barriers and to construct a "common market" — an entity characterized by positive programs of economic, social, technological and industrial policy. Thus socialist culture, critical of *laissez-faire,* became productively engaged in the construction of Europe. Brandt was aware he was changing the character of the originally economistic and *laissez-faire* European Common Market. Consequently, he sought allies. This is why, moving close to the federalist tradition, he sided with those seeking to turn the Strassburg Parliament into "a permanent Constituent Assembly of Europe" (the 1976 Brussels speech). This is also why he also sought a dialogue with Pompidou in the name of a version of De Gaulle's old vision of a Europe able to confront the great challenges of our times and, implicitly, to challenge the leading role of the two superpowers. The recent speech of the SPD's honorary president in Münster reasserted this strong conception of Europeism without, of course, any dreams of the old grandeur, but rather focused to the two goals of building peace and developing the Southern Hemisphere.

Schmidt's long chancellorship (1974-1982) coincided with an extremely difficult phase for the economy and international politics: on the one hand the monetary, economic and oil crises; on the other, the end of détente became a difficult test for the Community's policies. Once again, it was external ties rather than the still unresolved internal dissentions that threatened the uncertain destiny of the European Economic Community (above all, the international shifts of the two superpowers on the basis of their respective national interests).

Both Schmidt and Giscard contributed to international stability during this period. The much-opposed 1978 constitution of the European Monetary System, even if in the flexible form of the monetary snake, launched the process of the unification of currencies. The 1979 decision to hold democratic elections for the European Parliament in Strassburg created an entity structurally interested in the process of political unification — an entity which, not accidentally, overwhelmingly favored the most advanced projects of political union such as the one advocated by Spinelli in 1981. While, during the 1970s, there was no real progress towards political integration, the tendency to react to crises either by backsliding into nationalism or by falling back on Atlantic subalternity have been checked by the growth of a common sense of belonging: by the emergence of a greater awareness of specific European interests in matters of economics and security.

Schmidt's Europeism was inextricably bound with his notion of *Modell Deutschland* as the motor of development for all of Europe and as a path also viable for other nations. The 1976 Dortmund Congress was indicative of the nexus that the chancellor saw between economic success, social security and what he called a "third way" for Europe between the US and the USSR. In this sense, it would be wrong to contrapose an idealistic Brandt to a pragmatic

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Schmidt: it was a matter of two different modes of governing based on different conceptions of the international role of the old continent. For Schmidt, Europe, which he would have liked to see as democratic and pluralist ("neither Christian Democratic nor socialist," as he put it in the Dortmund Congress) has to be an integral part of the West, understood in the sense of an alliance with the US. This is why, when toward the end of the 1970s serious conflicts emerged between economic and security interests of what were no longer (as Kennedy alone had wished) "the two columns of the Western alliance," and when the Europeans' subaltern and subordinate condition became evident, Schmidt saw no alternative to accepting what one of his closest ex-advisers called a "strategy of adaptation" (*Anpassungsstrategie*) — a strategy so costly for Social Democracy and for the German mark that it resulted in the SPD's and the chancellor's defeat in 1982. Thus Schmidt turned out to be Europeist to the extent that he was pro-Western, and when the two come into conflict, even if only briefly, he chose to modify the priorities of the Social-Democratic model concerning employment, economic and peace policies.

During détente and the Cold War, Schmidt could not see in the strength of German Social Democracy and of the European Left a potential basis for a new phase of Europeism, more independent of the two superpowers. Similarly, he also did not see European unity as a possible support for Social-Democratic reform policies which, when international impasses develop, simply stop and regress.

The "Irsee Draft" takes the international conjuncture as its point of departure. Schmidt's lucid perception that today's most important development is "the end of national economies and the beginning of an international one," however, is translated by the new SPD into a political project whereby the European dimension becomes the key to *avoid* a strategy of subaltern adaptation. The political strengthening of the European Economic Community should be the realistic path leading to regaining sovereignty over monetary policy and interest rates, economic policy as well as European security — a sovereignty nowadays definitively lost by individual national states. In other words, it should be a kind of shield *vis à vis* the new US policy, Japan's hard-nosed competition, and the oscillations of Soviet foreign policy. Furthermore, it should be a powerful tool to deal effectively, rather than in terms of solidarity and philanthropy, with the mechanisms of the world economy responsible for misery and hunger in the Southern Hemisphere. Finally, it should restore credibility to a socialist politics concerning old and new themes of reformism, which have become increasingly transnational and point to an immanent Europeanization of the problems of European civil society (from employment to ecology, technological development to schooling, etc.).

What Ehmke outlined in January 1984 as a "European self-affirmation" in international relations is fully internalized in the "Irsee Draft": "The European Economic Community must and can confer upon Europe a greater weight in international relations and thus represents an opportunity both for peace

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as well as for the realization of social democracy. The important objectives of social democracy are no longer realizable within the context of individual countries. The European Economic Community can open options for Europeans that the national state has been losing and will continue to lose in the future. The European Community thus can regain possibilities of active and self-determining interventions." The following typically Social-Democratic issues are seen as irreversibly Europeanized: peace and "common security" policies; employment and regional policies; monetary policies; policies regarding technology, research, environmental protection; co-determination and labor union rights; cultural cooperation and commitment to the Third World. Heidi Wiezorek-Zeul's Nuremberg speech followed this outlook, as did the various recent writings of the generation of new national leaders now between 40 and 50 years of age, groomed by Brandt — the real source of SPD renewal between 1982 and 1987 (Lafontaine, Voigt, Hauff, Duve, Hänsch, Schröder, Engholm, Glotz, Klose, Spöri, and many more). All of this leads to the conclusion that this strong notion of a socialist Europeism will remain the focus of the new 1989 programmatic text. It is not only a matter of a broader Europeist sensibility, but of a veritable strategic convergence of Europeism and socialism: Europe thus becomes the most appropriate arena for the values and programs of democratic socialism. Similarly, socialist strength and ideas are seen as furthering the process of integration, and channeling it in more advanced directions.

The distance separating this outlook from Schumacher's purely national socialism could not be greater. Even the abstract reference to the United States of Europe of 1925, or Schmidt's Western Europeism appear as distant echos. The various roots of Social-Democratic Europeism indicate that it is not a matter of rhetoric or ideology, or of the creation of a myth meant to substitute for real governing policies to propose to Germans *hic et nunc*. Yet the directions of the strategic reflection of the various components within the post-Schmidt SPD are so different as to raise the suspicion that this emphasis on Europe may also reflect a need to find a common terrain for compromise. The assumption that an upgrading of the tools available to politicians broadens the horizons of reformism, which today are so limited, can help avoid the devisive contradictions generated by the need to choose which area should be privileged: social and redistributive policies or the quality of life, the environment and the new structuration of free time, human and international solidarity for the underdeveloped world, or the construction in the middle of Europe of a rich green island, freer and more egalitarian than the rest?

Within the SPD panorama of new ideas and of new policies there is also room for proposals for the isolation of West Germany from other partners of the European Economic Community. This helps understand the difficult climate within which Europeism continues to develop as the dominant political culture. First of all, "national Keynesianism" is by no means dead. Decisive components of what have become once again, with their 7.7 million members,

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Europe's strongest labor-unions, still believe that the growth of national production and of the gross internal product (maybe above 3%), the high quality of labor and of German exports, and a new grand national agreement concerning the re-professionalization of labor-power, could allow a re-launching of the old Keynesian compromise fatally wounded by the crisis of the 1970s. The Münster Congress has revealed the relevance of this outlook, rooted both in the civil service as well as the large industrial labor unions, which seeks (with the help of more state intervention) to regain full employment. This view was most strongly advocated by those industrial sectors with surplus production, such as steel. This view, occasionally defended by a kind of Second International Marxism (e.g., Peter von Oertzen in Münster) demands more and not less national state, more state control over investments and consumption, and more protection of internal markets.

Interestingly enough, although disagreeing on so many points with this Keynesian labor-union tradition, the "ecosocialism" of the new Social-Democratic Left, notoriously strong in the planning committees, tends to share this worried evaluation of the ties that the European Economic Community imposes on West Germany. This time it has to do with the limitations imposed on the free projection of a society "modernized according to ecological criteria." They point out the enormous weight of France regarding nuclear energy, or the fact that in all areas of environmental protection West Germany is already years ahead of its Southern partners. Thus, for instance, Hauff's concrete proposal, accepted at the Münster Congress, to tax energy in order to encourage savings and rationalizations, and of taxing all ecologically toxic products is certainly popular in West Germany but impossible to extend today in almost all the countries of the European Economic Community.

Furthermore, with the unification of fiscal policies, 1992 may entail a serious regression for German Social Democracy: measures hitherto essential to encourage qualitatively different criteria of consumption and production are to be reconsidered or even abolished. The same can be said of social security and employment, in addition to the legal regulations of collective bargaining for which the European "minimal threshold" for all workers (as proposed by Delors), if implemented, would entail a net regression for West German workers. A good example of this is the case of transportation workers. They are the first affected by the imminent liberalization, risking massive unemployment because of their high level of benefits (wages, working hours, etc.) — benefits unknown in other countries of the European Economic Community. Not accidentally, the economist Fritz Scharpf closes his book on European Social-Democratic policies with a negative evaluation of economic and monetary unification. Thus, unless labor unions will be able to guarantee the same working conditions and collective bargaining (even at a European level), the projected 1992 unification will translate into a net loss for West German workers. The same can be said for the supporters of the extremely advanced options of West German radical ecological reforms. Thus most West Germans

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risk a lowering of the present living standards (and even more if the SPD were in power). Not accidentally, the Swedish model of Social Democracy — the last *national* model of reformist policies — is becoming increasingly appealing and popular to labor unionists and ecosocialists.

West Germany, however, is not Sweden, and the extremely advanced equilibrium between modernization and social democracy, between freedom and solidarity, reintroduced in Sweden in 1982, can hardly be transposed to the West's second industrial power, which is bound by much more important monetary, financial, economic and political ties. This becomes all the more clear if one examines foreign policy and security questions.

It is not appropriate to speak of German neutralism in relation to the SPD. Yet there is no doubt that the second *Ostpolitik* in the 1990s will not be predicated, as was the case with the first one, on a full harmony with US policy. Thus, for instance, what even in the context of the new governing majority has remained a "small détente" between the two Germanies, in the SPD perspective would have to be extended on the basis of the idea that "relations with East Germany must always be better than those between the two superpowers" (Bahr). The common documents between SPD and East Germany dealing with the creation of a zone free of chemical weapons (1985) and concerning the ideal principles which, within their reciprocal autonomy, regulate their respective policies (1987), are not indicative of a pan-German illusion (reunification), but of a willingness to pursue dialogue at all levels and of guaranteeing peace in the center of Europe. An "inter-German community of responsibility" (Irsee Draft) as the premise and first concretization of a "European peaceful order" is the concept which, with all of its pan-European pregnancy, was central even in Brandt's last speech in Münster.

Something altogether different, however, is the concept of *Mitteleuropa*, reproposed by Peter Glotz and various Eastern and Western intellectuals as a supra-national community for peace, which goes back to Karl Renner's idea (in reference to the Social Democracy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) of an "interstate internationalism" or of a multinational political reality. It was pointed out to Glotz that this would entail German hegemony within central Europe, in addition to weakening the political unity of the European Economic Community.

Although his speech was framed in a long-term perspective, Brandt did not refer to this outlook. Thus there is within the SPD a conviction that the requirement of a new dialogue with Eastern Europe, as well as a positive opening toward East Germany, must be not to create mistrust, but to become the basis for a more advanced conception of the European Economic Community: toward a "social union" of Europe, its democratization, a great opening outward, an active and autonomous role concerning the question of peace and the North-South relation. "The unity of the European Economic Community has its own dignity" said Brandt, after asserting that Europe does not stop at the Elbe river "but certainly it has not been invented to complicate future developments which constitute an advantage for the continent as a whole."

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Today the SPD leadership is able to manage pressures for more incisive policies in the area of peace initiatives and reforms, thanks to its capacity to reformulate creatively the Europeist outlook and by connecting it with Leftist values and interests. But this result today is the fruit of a process that remains open and which, as indicated, remains blurred by significant divergences of evaluation. Similarly, doubts concerning the dismantling of the traditional protective shield represented by the national state or references to the "Swedish road" are justified both by the present state of the European Community and by the enormous weight of factors which today limit the Left's working space.

Undoubtedly, West Germany's advances in social security, working conditions, environment, etc., constitute a challenge for the rest of Europe, which has yet to catch up on these matters. But it is clear that European cooperation is, for the various components of the internal German debate, an occasion to realistically think out the connection between objectives and compatibility, between levels of awareness and international ties. Even the integration of the various concepts within European socialism concerning these problems is obviously potentially conducive to further growth: the socialist parties of mediterranean countries have gradually come to a Europeist concept which, even in the case of the French Socialist Party, seems to be based on a series of critical reexaminations of earlier nationalist illusions. The path of Social Democracies to making decisions and political choices is embroiled, on the one hand, in ideal debates and, on the other, in the complications created by old and newly organized social interests. Each party must reach internal consensus in order to trace its own itinerary toward Europeism. The process of European unity may transform this wealth of experiences and variety of cultures into a common resource which would emphasize its solidity. But this depends on an awareness of the import and relevance of neo-national and neo-local tendencies, of the distance and the difficulties on the path to the kind of Europe of the 1990s presently taking shape.

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The Domination of Nature Revisited: A Critique of Edward O. Wilson

John Bokina

Introduction

The heat of the sociobiology debate has subsided, with the biological approach to human social and cultural life emerging with a substantial, if far from total victory. Initially, in his seminal work *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (1975), Wilson called for the "cannibalization" of psychology by neuropsychology and the absorption of traditional sociology by sociobiology.[1] But for the most part, Wilson's rhetoric cooled in his later works. *On Human Nature* (1978), *Genes, Mind, and Culture* (1981), and *Promethean Fire* (1983), the latter two works, co-authored with Lumsden, are replete with passages which suggest that the proper relation between the biological and the social-humanistic disciplines is one of mutual enrichment.[2] Yet as recently as 1984, in his book *Biophilia*, Wilson disparaged scholarly humanists as "the shamans of the intellectual tribe," and juxtaposed the work of these shamans to the unsung heroism of "the scouts and hunters" in the natural sciences.[3]

To date, psychology has not been cannibalized, traditional sociology remains unabsorbed, and sociobiology has failed in its quest to displace the shamanism of the humanities and the social sciences. But in a little more than ten years, sociobiology has moved from the status of a suspect theory on the periphery of the traditional disciplines to become an institutionally viable theoretical orientation within these disciplines. Within political science, for example,

1. Edward 0. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 574-75.

2. To cite just a few examples of this more conciliatory attitude toward the humanities and social sciences, see Edward 0. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 13; Charles J. Lumsden and Edward 0. Wilson, *Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 343-62; and Charles J. Lumsden and Edward 0. Wilson, *Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origin of Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 169-70.

3. Edward 0. Wilson, *Biophilia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 58.

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practitioners of "biopolitics" have founded their own journal (*Politics and the Life Sciences*), and have established an Organized Section within the American Political Science Association and a Research Committee within the International Political Science Association. Indeed, a recent APSA roundtable, including both adherents and non-adherents of biopolitics, centered not on whether biology offered an appropriate standpoint for research on political life, but rather on assessing the research achievements of biopolitics to date. One participant in the roundtable was Samuel C. Patterson, a non-adherent of biopolitics and the current editor of *The American Political Science Review*. Yet Patterson gave the imprimatur of established political science when he advised the advocates of biopolitics "to devote themselves to expanding their research program and disseminating their discrete research products."[4] The task of biopolitics, in other words, is no longer to establish the legitimacy of its theoretical program, but to develop biopolitical research alongside that of other established research programs.

Perhaps the incorporation and legitimation of sociobiology was inevitable. But the key to the partial triumph of sociobiology, biopolitics, and kindred tendencies was not the cogency of the biological position within the sociobiology debate. Rather it was the underlying and fundamental kinship between sociobiology and the established scientific approaches to human social life. This kinship proved to be stronger than the apparent and superficial differences which initially separated the two camps.

Whether Wilson's conception of sociobiology offers a genuine alternative to the established scientific approaches to the study of social and political life is highly questionable. Unlike many of the "nature vs. nurture" arguments which have characterized — and stymied — the sociobiology debate, on the surface Wilson's view that human life contains an important and indissoluble biological component appears comparable to the Frankfurt School's position.[5] Wilson's sociobiology and the "domination of nature" argument of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse can be compared on three issues: first, the extent to which these theories offer a genuinely new conception of human nature; second, the extent to which these theories offer a genuinely new conception of the relation between human beings and external, non-human nature; and third, the extent to which these theories reconceive the fundamental assumptions of Western science. A comparison of the two positions on these

4. John C. Wahlke, "What Does the Biological Approach Offer Political Science?," *Political Science* 29 (Fall 1986), p. 872.

5. Curiously enough, it was Wilson himself who first invited a comparison of his theories to those of Marcuse. In a rejoinder to his critics, Wilson denied the charge that a biological conception of human nature is always politically conservative by pointing to the distinctly unconservative biological conceptions of Marcuse and Noam Chomsky. See "Academic Vigilantism and the Political Significance of Sociobiology," in *The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on Ethical and Scientific Issues*. ed. Arthur L. Caplan (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 301-2.

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issues will demonstrate how Wilson actually contradicts the Frankfurt School's position to extend the reification of nature with a vengeance.

While the fundamental postulates of the Frankfurt School's philosophy of science provide a critical standard to judge the fundamental postulates of Wilson's sociobiology, this does not mean that the philosophy of science within critical theory is above reproach. Marcuse, for one, is especially susceptible to criticism for dissolving the nuances of particular schools of science in his sweeping generalizations about an undifferentiated empirical philosophy of science.[6] Moreover, a recent book which purports to defend the most radical and utopian aspects of Marcuse's conception of science can only do so by describing this conception as useful "rhetoric" which leaves open the possibility of a new relation to nature.[7] Indeed, Habermas has abandoned his predecessors' notion of the redemption of external nature as hopelessly romantic.[8] But in this essay, it is neither the details of critical theory's critique of empirical philosophy of science, nor the suitability of critical theory as a philosophical foundation for practical scientific research, which is at issue. What remains an important focus for discussion is the normative dimension of the conceptions of human nature, external nature, and social theory in critical theory. This normative dimension does pose a clear alternative to the norms of most empirical philosophies of science. Though it also bears a sufficient resemblance to the normative dimension of sociobiology, a close examination of the two will demonstrate the continued relevance of Critical Theory's critique of the domination of nature.

Science and Critical Theory

The central idea of the Frankfurt School's philosophy of science is that the theory and practice of enlightened Western science has been predicated upon the domination of nature. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that enlightenment via the domination of nature is not only a particular characteristic of 18th-century European philosophy and science, but is also a general characteristic of Western thought since the time of Homer's Odyssey.[9] In this conception, enlightenment has two simultaneous, yet analytically distinct components: the domination of internal, human nature and the domination of external nature.

The enlightened domination of internal nature entails the idealistic emancipation of the human being from its own natural appetites and instinctual desires.

6. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), and Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse* (New York: The Free Press, 1980), pp. 190-216.

7. C. Fred Alford, *Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas* (Tampa and Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1985), p. 65.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-177.

9. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1972).

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Human life comes to distinguish itself from other forms of natural life by the extent to which natural appetites and instinctual desires are subordinated to conscious, purposive objectives. This internal control of mind over sensuousness, emotion, and instinct is supplemented by the external control of leaders over followers. Knowledge becomes an instrument of elite control over the masses. In the advanced stages of the enlightened domination of human nature, the sciences of human nature, like their external counterparts, ultimately reduce their subjects to abstract mathematical equivalences. The dissolution of the particularities of human life in abstract mathematical quantities becomes the token of its scientific conquest.

In *Eros and Civilization* and later works, Marcuse admitted the need for instinctual repression, but introduced a pair of crucial distinctions.[10] Some repression was not basic to the preservation of human social life *per se*, but was an excessive "surplus" repression. This surplus repression buttressed a particular type of society, the society of the "performance principle." This performance based society excessively repressed the instincts in order to maximize efficiency and productivity. While he never minimized the obstacles to the elimination of surplus repression, Marcuse maintained that modern societies which had conquered material scarcity contained the objective possibility for a high degree of instinctual emancipation.

For Marcuse, the hard-won victory over material scarcity held possible consequences for external nature as well. In a period of material abundance, the possibility arises of nature becoming something other than the passive object of human action. Nature can become a "subject-object" whose subjectivity is that of one of its own creatures, the human being, who returns in emancipation to ameliorate the worst, the most blind and violent, aspects of nature. This amelioration may never be complete. But for Marcuse, modern science should move beyond the domination of external nature to reconciliation and amelioration.

A new understanding of the history of Western ideas is implied within critical theory. In their emphasis on mind over body, reason over emotion, purpose over desire, and history over nature, the dominant tendencies of Western philosophy and science have been collaborators in the domination of internal and external nature. Art has been one of the few refuges of an emancipatory conception of nature and biology. But an emancipatory conception of nature and biology has also maintained a subterranean existence within science and philosophy, occasionally slipping through the Promethean web of suppression to recall human beings to their biological nature.

Not every return of the repressed biology of human life in philosophy and science is an emancipatory tendency. Many of these bear the wounds of the domination of nature. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno

10. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), Herbert Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), and Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978).

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analyzed the case of the Marquis de Sade. In the 18th century, in deliberate contradiction to the rational ideals of the Enlightenment proper, de Sade depicted reason as a thin veneer covering an ultimately uncontrollable bundle of sexual desires and instincts. But de Sade's desublimation of human sexuality was merely a lapse into barbarism. De Sade's sexuality was one-sided and distorted, as it replicated, despite his oppositional intentions, the core characteristic of enlightenment: domination.

Science and Sociobiology

In the mid-1970s, biological nature was once again restored as an important element within social theory. The representative figure of this reemergent naturalism was Wilson, who still serves as the chief proponent of sociobiology. Wilson's sociobiology proclaimed itself as "the new synthesis." In his challenge, sociobiology was not just a new theory, but a new discipline which bridges the gap between the natural and the social sciences and humanities. Like critical theory, Wilson's vision of sociobiology called for a new biological conception of human nature, a new understanding of the relation between human being and external nature, and a redirection of social theory that is compatible with these changes.

In his works on human sociobiology, Wilson characterizes the prevailing theories of human nature as "environmentalist." From this viewpoint, the differences between behaviorist, cultural, historical, and Marxist conceptions of human nature are less important than their central point of agreement. All of these theories denigrate the biology of human beings, and instead offer an image of human life as a *tabula rasa*; lacking any innate predispositions to certain forms of social behavior, environmentalist theories view human nature as the open-ended product of interaction with the cultural environment. Freudian theory escapes the charge of environmentalism, but Wilson dismisses its tenets as surpassed by later scientific research. Wilson offers a new, materialistic, sociobiological alternative to both Freudian theory and environmentalism. Drawing upon recent research in evolutionary genetics, Wilson maintains that social behavior, like the social behavior of animals, is genetically determined. Some human social behaviors are determined in a strict sense, and here the resemblance to animal, particularly mammalian and primate, social behavior is most clear. Over generations, these social behaviors have proved themselves to be genetically fit, i.e., they enhance personal survival, personal reproduction, and the enhanced survival and reproduction of close relatives. These behaviors thus come to characterize the human species via the selfish reproductive choices made by individuals during the course of evolutionary time. Wilson believes that most of these strictly determined, genetically based behaviors can be traced back to the long epochs that human beings spent as hunter-gatherers. But Wilson also acknowledges that other social behaviors are not the direct products of natural selection for genetic fitness under the harsh conditions of hunting and gathering. Human culture, while retaining

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an ultimate genetic foundation, encompasses a somewhat wider variety of options. Culture is not the product of the human *mind* — a concept which Wilson for the most part treats as a metaphysical residue which vitiates environmentalist theories of social behavior — but of the genetically determined, expanded capacity of a biological organ: the human brain. The more varied and sophisticated behaviors of human culture are understood by Wilson as the products of the reciprocal *co*evolution of genetic and cultural factors.

In Wilson's conception of sociobiology, much of the traditional content of the behavioral and social sciences — indeed, of the humanities as well — is reinterpreted as the product of the genetic evolution and genetic-cultural coevolution. Wilson interprets the smile of infants and the fears of snakes, to mention only two examples, as genetically rather than environmentally determined. Whatever their scientific interest, however, it was not the proper interpretation of infant smiles and ophidiophobia which unleashed the storm of controversy over sociobiology. It was, rather, Wilson's argument that certain large-scale social and cultural phenomena — religion, language, art, and ethics, but also indoctrinability, the sexual division of labor, territoriality, warfare, and genocide — are likewise the genetic legacies of human life.

Against the enlightenment-environmentalist conceit of a conquered human biology, infinitely plastic and manipulable, Wilson describes distinct biological constraints to the extent to which social and cultural behavior can be changed by political means: "The genes hold culture on a leash."[11] This is a counsel of both hope and despair. On the one hand, there are biological safeguards against the manipulation of human nature by those in power. But on the other hand, the least desirable of these genetically based phenomena, war and genocide, for example, can only be eliminated by the imposition of unnatural and ultimately futile shackles on human nature.

Wilson also calls for a new understanding of the relation between human beings and external nature. He denies the enlightenment notions that human beings are radically distinct from external nature, and that human beings reign over external nature as its conquerors. Rather than an unbridgeable gulf between human beings and animals, Wilson notes their shared genetic heritage: "about 99% of our genes are identical to the corresponding set in chimpanzees, so that the remaining 1% accounts for all of the differences between us."[12] Furthermore, Wilson challenges the idea that human beings completely dominate nature. While Wilson admits, with reservations, that external nature is to be mastered, the deficiencies in our current biological knowledge postpone the conquest until sometime in the future.

Indeed, in *Biophilia*, Wilson expresses the hope that the domination of nature may never be complete. Wilson's reservations about the conquest of nature are

11. Edward 0. Wilson, "Comparative Social Theory," in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, ed. S. M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 1:64.
12. Wilson, *Biophilia*, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

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based on his sense of "biophilia," "the innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes."[13] *Biophilia* may be more personal and informal than Wilson's other works, but it is nonetheless important as a document of the latent utopian content of sociobiological theory. Here Wilson depicts his lifelong association with nature — from his youthful adventures as a snake hunter in Florida to his mature biological research — as an example of the intuitive affinity of biological life for biological life. Through his intuition of biophilia, Wilson recognizes that he is not only a cool and detached observer of nature, but also a part of nature, inexorably drawn to the organic life of plants and animals. Wilson the biophiliac cherishes the "green enclaves" which still lie beyond the ravages of industrial civilization. Drawing upon his sense of biophilia, Wilson calls for a new conservation ethic, where each assault on the natural environment, where each reduction in the number of animal species through human action, is simultaneously recognized as an impoverishment of human life. But biophilia alone will not make the new conservation ethic effective. Wilson buttresses the new conservation ethic by pointing to the material advantages which will flow from the preservation of nature. These advantages included the utilization of new species for food, breakthroughs in pharmaceutical research, and technical advances in industry and agriculture.

According to Wilson, the new sociobiological conceptions of human nature and of the relationship between human and external nature require a new understanding of social theory which must overcome both genetic and intellectual obstacles. Wilson believes that most human beings are genetically prone to indoctrinability. They are thus more responsive to the familiar shibboleths of superstition and religion than they are to the latest advances in science. But some people are genetically capable of undertaking the intellectual reform of social theory. Wilson addresses his diagnosis and prescriptions to these genetically capable individuals.

Wilson maintains that the existing social sciences are young and weak disciplines, "balkanized" by conflicting theories and subdisciplines. Moreover, there is presently a fundamental divide separating the natural sciences on the one hand and the social sciences and the humanities on the other. This divide is what relegates social scientists and humanists to the role of shamans, interpreting and transmitting wisdom about things which they do not deeply understand, while the natural scientists are scouts and hunters, whose knowledge of the world is only infrequently given the respect which it is due. Wilson believes that it is only through a reconciliation of this divide between the humanities-social sciences and the natural sciences, a reconciliation which recognizes the biological depth of social and cultural phenomena, that a way can be found out of the impasse of contemporary scholarship.

By looking at social and cultural phenomena through a "reverse microscope," i.e., by focusing not on the uniqueness and detail of these phenomena

13. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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but on their place within the continuum of animate life, Wilson offers the humanities and social sciences the virtues of the natural sciences. In the first place, a recognition of the pervasive biology of human life will simplify the needless complexity of these disciplines. Things are not so difficult as they appear to the humanists and social scientists. Secondly, human sociobiology will provide the foundation for a synthesis of knowledge about human life. Sociobiology will assist in the overcoming of the current balkanization of the humanities and social sciences. Thirdly, human sociobiology will be able to quantify phenomena which currently appear to be amenable only to qualitative description. Understanding behavior as the product of human biology will permit the application of mathematical models of genetic evolution. Indeed, it was because of the lack of these mathematical models that Wilson so warmly welcomed the collaboration of Charles J. Lumsden. Finally, human sociobiology will give the study of behavior and culture that ultimate token of the power of the natural sciences: prediction. Propositions will be raised from their ad hoc and descriptive status and subjected to this most rigorous test of the Western scientific tradition.

Wilson voices some reservations about the obviously Promethean overtones of his new conception of social theory. He notes that the ecological crisis has cast a shadow over the once confident Promethean spirit of science. Wilson himself is suspicious of Prometheanism in the guise of the "prometheangene-hypothesis." Advocates of this hypothesis believe that the human genetic ability to create culture has freed the human being from the other genes. Yet in the final analysis Wilson rehabilitates Prometheus as the patron of science. For Wilson, one of the hallmarks of the scientific ethos is "its repeated triumphs in explaining and controlling the physical world."[14] If any alternative to traditional scientific Prometheanism inhabits Wilson's work, it is hardly the Orphic/Narcissistic images of Marcuse's critical theory. Wilson rather describes the operation of the human brain in the contemporary jargon of high tech machinery and cybernetics. This biological organ is an "on-board computer," a "mechanistic process," which is "genetically hard-wired" and subject to "feedback loops" as it measures complexity by "bits of uncertainty" and "chunks" of information symbols to enhance storage and recall.[15] According to Wilson, this biological-cum-technological perspective on human social life will not only lend simplicity, synthesis, quantification, and prediction to the social sciences and humanities, but will also lead to practical benefits as well. Although Wilson denies the environmentalist notion of an infinitely plastic and manipulable human nature, he does maintain that sound biological knowledge will permit the "precise steering" of human nature within genetic options. The character and outcome of this steering cannot be determined in advance.

14. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

15. See Lumsden and Wilson, *Genes, Mind, and Culture*, *op. cit.*, pp. 346, 76, 62, and Wilson, *On Human Nature*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 63, 77.

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But it is Wilson's hope that "a more detached view of the long-range course of evolution should allow us to see beyond the blind decision-making process of natural selection and to envision the history and future of our genes against the background of the entire human species."[16] Wilson envisages this "nobility" as the outcome of the enlightened, detached, Promethean application of biological and sociobiological knowledge to the genetic substance of human life.

Conclusions

Like the theories of de Sade, Wilson's sociobiology attacks only the surface manifestations of the established scientific approaches to human life. Viewed from the perspective of the Frankfurt School's critique of enlightenment, Wilson's theoretical revolution merely replicates, deepens, and extends the domination of human and external nature.

His sociobiological conception of human nature presumes to restore the innately biological character of human life to social theory. But his restoration of biology denies the emancipatory element of biology which critical theory tries to salvage. Against the prevailing enlightenment tradition of subordinating the material, natural, biological needs of human beings to one or another form of self-denying idealism, the biological dimension of critical theory upholds the primacy of pleasure over duty, play over toil, gratification over sacrifice.[17] Despite its recognition of the necessity of instinctual repression, critical theory never wavers in its simultaneous commitment to this emancipatory moment of biological truth. This is not the case with sociobiology. Instead of the demand for human happiness, sociobiology only calls for the recognition of the limits and constraints on human life. The sociobiological reversal of typical enlightenment idealism thus deepens the domination of human nature by conceiving of the constraints on human life not in the idealistic — and therefore changeable — terms of duty, morality, or the idea, but as grounded in human biology itself. In sociobiology, human biology returns to social theory, but only to enhance the domination of human nature.

Despite the romantic overtones of biophilia, domination also recurs in Wilson's reconception of the relationship between human beings and external nature. This is not to question the sincerity of Wilson's affinity to nature, but it is to question the conceptual adequacy of biophilia as a means of expressing a genuinely new relationship to nature. Wilson challenges the enlightenment pretense of a conquered external nature, but only to describe this conquest as incomplete. In principle, only the wistful and ultimately ineffective intuition of biophilia stands in the way of the completion of this conquest by more advanced technology and science. Unlike the search for harmonious coexistence with nature in critical theory, unlike Marcuse's radical demand for the emancipation

16. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

17. Herbert Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory,* trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 159- 200.

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of nature as an essential element of the sensuous, biological emancipation of human life, Wilson waxes nostalgic about the natural environments and species which have fallen victim to the progress of civilization, and hopes that more sophisticated biological knowledge will lead to more effective types of nature preserves. Yet even this hope is tainted by domination. The conservation of nature in preserves — or zoos or museums — is just another token of its conquest. Furthermore, Wilson's translation of biophilia from a biological ethic to a source of material advantage reveals its conceptual poverty. Nature is to be even more tightly harnessed to the service of commodity production. Rather than conserving and preserving nature, it is precisely the use of nature for consumption, pharmaceutical research, and technical advances in industry and agriculture which has contributed to the current environmental and ecological crises. Ultimately, biophilia promises only more of the same.

Finally, Wilson's sociobiology is not a fundamental redirection of social theory. Wilson proposes, rather, the most thorough "scientification" (for lack of a better word) of the social sciences to date. The benefits which sociobiology offers to the social sciences are hardly new. Simplicity, synthesis, quantification and prediction are rather the existing goals of empirical social science, readily familiar to any student in a political science methods course, now dressed in the new garb of genetics. As for Wilson's misgivings about the Prometheanism of sociobiological science in an era of environmental and ecological crises, these only lend pathos to his rehabilitation of Prometheus as the once and still reigning patron of science. In the last analysis, sociobiology retains the elitism of enlightened Western philosophy and science. Sociobiological research is conducted by the genetic elite for the theoretical and practical use of the genetic elite. Echoes of the noble Odysseus steering ship and crew through the natural peril of the Sirens reverberate through Wilson's call for genetic planning: a "nobility" of perspective will permit the "precise steering" of the human genetic future through "the blind decision-making process of natural selection."

Despite the hubbub of the debate, sociobiology is just another step in recent attempts to justify a conservative interpretation of liberal capitalism, a literal reaction to the disturbances of the late 60s and early 70s. The beloved but endangered *status quo* in human relations is given a new foundational myth. The free market of genes supplants the outmoded and unreliable free markets of political rationality (Locke), economic interest (Smith), and ideas (J. S. Mill). The little contemporary political content that can be gleaned from sociobiology is directed at the Left. When Wilson cites examples of environmental-ecological abuse, he comes up with Castro's destruction of Blanco's Woods and the disastrous policies of Surinam's dictator Dési Bouterse, who was "schooled in Marxism-Leninism."[18] Apparently, he cannot find examples

18. Lumsden and Wilson, *Promethean Fire*, *op. cit.*, p. 43, Wilson, *On Human Nature*, *op. cit.*, p. 205, and Wilson, *Biophilia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-25, 143-44.

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closer to home. Ronald Reagan, James Watt, and Dow Chemical must only represent that healthy search for material advantage that Wilson so wholeheartedly endorses.

In his early works on human sociobiology, Wilson appeared to challenge the fundamental assumptions of Western scientific social theory. But as the years passed, and Wilson's rhetoric mellowed, it was the similarities between sociobiology and the established scientific approaches to human life which facilitated the growing rapprochement between the two camps. From the standpoint of the Frankfurt School's critique of enlightenment philosophy and science, both sociobiology and the established social sciences contain a theoretical interest in domination. Where Wilson perceives the enlightenment project of domination to be misconceived, i.e., in the deficiencies of the existing environmentalist conceptions of human nature, he proposes a biological reconception, albeit a biological reconception which only deepens the domination of nature. Where Wilson perceives the enlightenment project of domination to be incomplete, i.e., in the deficiencies of the existing conception of the relationship between human and external nature and of the existing conception of social theory, he proposes to complete it. Herein lies the inner dialectic of Wilson's theoretical work. Beneath the lyrics of novelty and innovation, "the new synthesis" hums the old familiar enlightenment tune of domination. Not for the first time, the apparently new is the eversame.

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ISSN 0010-7484

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The Demilitarization of the Soviet Economy:

Alexei I. Izyumov

To understand the problems of converting from military to civilian production in the USSR it is necessary to examine three things: the government's attitude toward conversion, the practical steps being taken, and the level of public awareness. While the economic need for conversion has long been evident, until recently there has been virtually no practical planning. The main arguments for this have been that, since the Soviet economy is planned, its military sector could be easily "replanned" for civilian production. Since there is a constant labor shortage, there are no problems with providing jobs for demobilized personnel, while a model is at hand in the successful reconversion of the Soviet economy after WWII and in the early 1960s.

A major shortcoming of the USSR's policy of conversion from military to civilian production is a lack of understanding of its social implications. The present government seems to be giving this problem no more attention than it received during the Khrushchev era. No thought has been given to the feelings toward conversion of those whose interests it affects the most — the workers and engineers of the military enterprises, their managers and administrators, the Ministry of Defense personnel who are losing their jobs or career officers who will be demobilized. Here one should distinguish between the different people employed in the military-industrial complex. Rank and file workers, engineers or researchers are no longer threatened by conversion. In the past years almost all the wages and fringe benefits they have traditionally enjoyed have evaporated, while the negative aspects of employment in the military-industrial complex, such as security clearance requirements, rigid work discipline and stricter work quality controls have remained. As a result, the military sector of the economy has lost its earlier attraction.

Administrative and managerial personnel, however, are in a different position. They also "suffer" from restrictions associated with the conditions of military employment and, from this viewpoint, they see the situation of their civilian counterpart as preferable (e.g., severe restrictions on foreign travel for people with security clearance, etc.). But the top priority accorded to the military-industrial complex still affords managers and administrators the best financing, ready

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access to scarce supplies, the most favorable conditions of work, social prestige, and a greater share of economic rewards, fringe benefits etc. Conversion means these people will lose all of these advantages and benefits. Thus a negative reaction to conversion on the part of this group is to be expected.

Another major social aspect of conversion is the position of Soviet military officers. It has been announced that about 100,000 officers will be demobilized in 1989-90. Yet there is no state agency entrusted with overseeing their retraining and helping them find civilian occupations. An even more difficult problem is the lack of housing. Already before the present cuts, more than 20,000 officers' families had no permanent housing. When the reduction of military personnel begins, another 40-45,000 officers' families will be added to the waiting list, while the Ministry of Defense in the next two years will only be able to provide 7,500 apartments.

The idea of exempting students from conscription is growing in popularity. Yet its opponents have hardly had enough time to change their views. So far, conversion has been mostly limited to the "digestion" of the results of the INF treaty and some initial consequences of the unilateral reduction of military production and the military budget. Thus trucks designed to transport the dismantled SS-20 missiles are being transformed into hoisting cranes by a joint Soviet-West German company in Odessa. (The first cranes were shipped out of the factory in January 1989). At the same time, three factories that produce missiles have switched completely to civilian production (e.g., metal-cutting machinery and equipment for drilling rigs, food industries, transformers, etc.) and have stepped up production of consumer goods (including washing machines, bicycles, baby carriages, etc.). Several missile-designing laboratories have also been converted to work on civilian projects.

In the military industry as a whole, significant changes are also taking place: many, if not most military enterprises are now expected to increase significantly the volume of their civilian output. It has recently been reported in the press that, while the current share of civilian production in all Soviet defense industries is about 40%, it will rise to 50% by 1991 and 60% by 1995. Already many military enterprises have undertaken the production of such badly needed civilian goods as equipment for food-processing industries, small-scale agricultural machinery, and various types of consumer durables.

Some military enterprises are not only stepping up civilian production but also taking the least efficient civilian enterprises under their control in the hope of making them more efficient. To Western economists, this practice of "inverse conversion" might look strange, since military enterprises in the West are usually characterized by lower efficiency than their civilian counterparts. The case of the Soviet Union, however, is somewhat different. While in the West the high cost and relatively low efficiency of military producers result from their work for the secure, non-competitive, government-provided market, in the Soviet Union the entire civilian economy operates under these non-market, non-competition conditions that entail a total disregard of the consumer. The military sector of

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the economy is in a very special position, since it has to serve not an ordinary weak consumer but a very powerful one: the Ministry of Defense. Because of this, military enterprises have significantly higher quality standards, a better labor force, and advantages in the quality of technology and material supplies. Thus, at least in the short run, the "fusion" of military and civilian enterprises is a sound step. It is important to stress "the short run" here, because, when economic reforms mature and market regulators of efficiency and quality in production replace administrative ones, such measures will become superfluous.

Conversion processes that began as a result of the December 1988 decision by Gorbachev to reduce Soviet armed forces by 12% (500,000), the military budget by 14.2%, and the procurement of military hardware by 19.5% are not limited to the military. The military sector is itself joining conversion efforts. It has been announced recently that the Soviet Air Force is establishing a special permanent service, which will take charge of the transportation of civilian cargo on military planes. In 1989 alone about 45,000 tons of such cargo will be carried by the Air Force. It has also been announced that military supplies and equipment usable in the civilian economy (automobiles, small ships, radio equipment, fuel etc.) totalling 500 million rubles will be put up for sale. The Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with the State Committee for Labor, is establishing a retraining program for discharged military personnel, and beginning in the Fall of 1989 most university students will no longer be drafted.

In spite of these success stories, though, there have been considerable drawbacks. To begin with, no preliminary planning for the conversion of military enterprises was made before the December 1988 decision. As a result, news about the cancellation or reduction of military production came to many military enterprises on very short notice — literally out of the blue. Managers were naturally unhappy, because the unexpected cuts in financing left them without adequate time to find new customers and suppliers, to redesign production processes, and to retrain personnel. Some openly voiced their frustration and concerns in the press.

If the disarmament process continues, in the future it will take much greater effort to redirect the resources being freed by reductions in the armed forces and military budgets. Thus the "*ad hoc* conversion planning" will become less and less adequate. The Soviet government has already organized special groups at the State Planning Commission and at various military-related ministries to design conversion programs.

Another serious problem is a continuing information blackout in military matters, especially military production. Neither the absolute scale of military production nor any other specifics (e.g., industry by industry breakdown, location of major enterprises, the number of employed, etc.) is known. The public is not even allowed in the vicinity of those factories currently being converted. This situation of continuing super-secrecy is not only incompatible with *glasnost*, but is also irrational, considering that most data concerning the Soviet military economy and its output is well known in the West. Thus Gorbachev's

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recent revelations concerning the size of the Soviet military budget is not all that helpful, for even when data on Soviet military production is available, it is often meaningless. The price system operating in military-related research, production, and services is either unrealistic or altogether irrelevant. Under such conditions, it is very difficult for anyone to come up with concrete proposals concerning conversion.

Despite the severity of the technical and economic problems, conversion will inevitably generate serious political and ideological problems. It is here that educated public opinion should play a role. But until recently there was no discussion whatever of conversion in scientific literature. The situation has improved only in the last year or two. In January 1989, a new economic commission was formed which will reportedly devote a good part of its efforts to analyzing and publicizing the conversion agenda. This task is assigned to a group of scholars and journalists involved in conversion-related fields. In the future this group is to develop into a full-fledged public commission on conversion, including representatives from the military, trade-union, business, and diplomatic quarters. What are the prospects for successful conversion within such a context?

Conversion can come about only as a result of a combination of five factors: 1) the political will of the government; 2) strong legislative support; 3) the active participation of labor in military-related enterprises; 4) the active participation of local authorities; 5) a high level of public awareness and strict public control. So far, only the first of these factors obtains. All others are either non-existent or only now coming to the fore. For example, Soviet trade unions and local authorities have been almost totally silent about conversion, while Soviet legislators have no experience in discussing the military budget. Ironically, in many countries whose leaders have been opposing or ignoring conversion, the other factors necessary for successful conversion are much more developed. In Italy, for instance, trade unions and local governments actively discuss conversion issues and have a network of working groups and monitoring committees dealing with the problem. In the US, a rather sophisticated "Bill on Conversion" is gaining strength in Congress, with good chances of being put to a vote in 1989. It is therefore clear that the Soviet Union must first catch up with other countries in the level of legislative and public support for conversion.

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*The Cat Knows Best**

Viacheslav Baskov

Before tasting the salami manufactured at the Moscow Salami Factory No. 1, I was warned that it is impossible to swallow the "sample slices." Nevertheless, having scorched my tongue with salt, I took two mouthfuls. Meanwhile, walking relentlessly behind us was a specially-assigned girl carrying a large cardboard box into which the previous tasters had spit out the partly chewed slices. It is rather unpleasant, of course, to spit out what one is eating. But when tasting these salami products, it always ends up this way. When a quarrel with an obstinate customer breaks out in the store, management brings out a more beautiful saleswoman: she patches up the dispute quicker than the others. Looking at a beautiful woman, what customer is not mollified? But the girl with the box had a pale, emaciated face. They foisted the box on her. Like a child making a fuss over a new toy, she pretended to treasure it in order to influence the members of the commission. But the Chief State Inspector on Quality of Commodities and Commerce, Galina Zakharovna Bursak, Senior Inspector Lydiia Fedorovna Gegina, and Inspector Ludmila Ivanovna Lebedeva were not moved. We had all been kept waiting for nearly two hours.

Inspectors are obligated to announce themselves in advance, so their presence was no surprise. When no one was able to authorize us to enter the factory, we were moved to a courtyard and held like criminals. They pushed the women on the other side of the turnstiles, and a big young man who presented himself as the acting supervisor of security, Igor Leonidovich Solodnikov, came alongside me. Those 15 minutes we spent with him in the courtyard could be turned into a separate article. Clearly intoxicated men entered the factory and even less sober men came out.

One woman, taking home a bag crammed full of bottles that would not fit into her overcoat, was allowed to pass. One worker was led away by force into a substation. For those like him no longer able to stand, a spacious open air cage had been set up, like in any police station. They were requesting that

* Originally published in *Literaturnaia Gazetta*, (March 23, 1988). Translated from Russian by Philip Moran.

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their passes be returned to them. The guard grasped the hands of a boy who came from the factory, held him by the collar and herded him into a substation where, for those like him who try to run away, there is a tiny windowless room where searches are conducted. There are also ordinary store scales for finding out the weight of the salami products found in people's pockets. The chunk of *stolochnoi* (stolen) salami found in the boy's pockets weighed about a third of a pound.

"Give me some thread," said the vocational school student in an offended tone, seeking to sew his sleeve.

"Get going."

Finally, the Vice-General Director of "Moscow Meat Production," Yuri Alekseevich Kiselev, appeared in the courtyard. We were cheerfully led to the doors leading to the factory where, however, Kiselev blocked the way. They will let us in, he said softly, only after General Director Yuri Aleksandrovich Tulupov himself gives authorization. Tulupov made no effort to conceal the fact that the inspectors were not to his liking: "There are thirty-nine inspectors here. All of them walk around and check!" He lost his temper because Galina Zakharovna Bursak had calmly pulled out from her purse a "sample of ham" produced at Salami Factory No. 1 and complained that it contained river sand. She added that a customer had provided this item for inspection.

"Well, you can go," Tupulov finally said, and the hitherto formal Kiselev immediately became our cheerful guide . . . . Metal, wood and cardboard rubbish, powdered with snow, covered the whole area right up to the gate. Inside the factory it was even dirtier. We did not run into a single person in a clean smock. Even more dirty and life-threatening, however, were the slippery tiled floors. We walked holding hands, as if tip-toeing in a bathtub. The quality department supervisor, Ludmila Nikolaevna Paradniia, no longer young, slipped and fell on her back. During the sample tasting, this same woman took out of her mouth a half-chewed piece of salami and, while gracefully placing it in the cardboard box, cheerfully said: "Oh, how tasty! Wonderful! Delicious! Good, good . . ." She blushed when told that even cats had stopped eating the salami.

"A cat is not a taster. Cats are becoming spoiled! This is insulting — to compare people with cats!"

Shortly thereafter, while digging a nail out of a different piece of salami — another "sample" brought by the Chief State Inspector of Quality of Commodities and Commerce — she explained: "Very, very good. Of course, there is a nail, but the salami itself is fine. It spoiled afterwards. It must have spoiled afterwards!"

The Chief State Inspector objected: "It is the horse itself that must have spoiled then."

Our cheerful guide also tasted the salami almost, as it were, from a kind of scientific viewpoint. He spit it out. He liked it because it was required by the plan to market it. He could not understand how one could regard defective products

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that had already been sent to stores. The plan may remain unfulfilled!

After several hours of testing, the inspectors condemned 200 kilograms of *Molochnoi* salami (the top brand), 160 kilograms of *Molodezhnoi* salami (the next best brand), the whole batch of *Russkie* sausages prepared for school buffets, and 400 kilograms of the meat from which they make the sausages. Some *Shkolnye* sausages were already packed in polyethylene . . . without labels. What were they made of, and in what quantity? Salami Factory No. 1 turned out some kind of "leftovers" of such low quality that no one even dared to chew them. The inspectors merely squeezed them between their fingers and held them as far away from their faces as possible. They squeezed some water out of them, smelled them squeamishly, and then threw them with disgust to the embarrassed girl with the cardboard box. These sausages had been manufactured especially for children, who are usually given the best ones. . . .

Some frightened workers, caught by surprise with these sausages, tried to explain. (One wonders why they did not hide them while we were stalled outside for two hours). The next day they hurriedly wrote the editorial office a strange letter signed by the acting supervisor of the Chief Management of Public Nutrition of the Moscow City Executive Committee, Raisa Vasilevna Fedorovna. It said nothing about the packages of sausages without labels, but pointed out that these sausages were not allowed beyond the factory walls without cellophane wrappings. Raisa Vasilevna also admitted that the weight of ten sausages in one package can be, as she put it, "nonstandard." The strangest thing, however, was that this suspicious letter seeking to legitimate deception begins hypocritically with the words: "For the purpose of improving the level of serving school children . . ."

We had come to the salami factory to discover why the most refined connoisseurs of salami products — cats — were not eating them. And we discovered why. As it turns out, cats apparently know that in boiled salami the "pure meat" has diminished. Previously, the top *Moskovskoi* brand consisted of 80% beef, 18% salted pork fat and 1% cow's milk. Now the beef was merely 65%. The 16% gap is made up by an "albuminous stabilizer" ("an unspecified combination of beef or pork left-overs") and starch, wheaten flour or casein sodium.

What is unclear to people is clear to cats. The "beef or pork left-overs" are what was previously thrown out as inedible: bones (previously used to make souvenirs), pork hide (used in making shoes). The factory has a consumer goods department, and next door there is Shoe Factory No. 5. Now the bones and hides are ground and boiled into a thickly salted brine and mixed in with the sausage meat. This albuminous mass needs the "albuminous stabilizer" to solidify the sausage meat: glue it together, as it were. Without it the sausage would fall apart. The starch from the flour also contributes to this end.

Casein sodium is a pure protein obtained from the curdling of milk. Its role in salami is not entirely clear. Some experts say it gives salami a "smooth milky taste," others openly admit it is simply filler: an edible product neutral to the taste. "Additives" also go in other salami and meat products such as sausages

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and chops, where "pure" meat is less than half.

Cats do not like albumin. They do not eat pure protein. Every cat owner knows that cats will only eat the yoke of an egg. The cat will walk around you, meow you to death, but will not touch the egg-white. The salami also fails to appeal to cats because of excessive amounts of salt and pepper. Actually, cats are mysterious beings — they are not bothered by sodium nitrate, which has always been added to boiled meat to preserve its red color (during cooking, however, the meat becomes grey), but they will not eat protein. Although sodium nitrate is inorganic, the cat will eat the salami as long as it smells like meat and tastes like meat.

Cats have not heard about the directive from the Ministry of Soviet Meat and Milk Industries (*Gosagroprom*), which allows protein additives. This directive specifies that the State Standard allowed additives only for the year 1984. Since, however, State Standard employees probably do not eat salami, a temporary allowance has become a permanent recipe — in 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and . . .

Experts claim there are no additives in the top brands of salami. Unfortunately, cats do not eat the best salami. And if they do, they will be sick for hours afterwards. Somehow cats also know that, in order to fulfill the plan at salami factories, the technology of preparing sausage meat has been violated. Before, the maturation of sausage meat took 24 hours; now, it takes 6 . . .

At any rate, the main cause for our salami losing its former glory has to do with dirt. Meat at salami factories comes in frozen blocks. According to subpoint three of point three of the OST 4966-74 directive, issued by the now defunct Ministry of Meat and Milk Industry, "for checking the conformity of frozen blocks . . . up to 10% of them are to be opened." 90% of the blocks are thrown into meat grinders without defrosting them. We saw these large meat bricks, weighing 65 pounds, black from dirt, with pieces of hair . . . . A man throwing these blocks into a meat grinder does not even strip off the paper labels frozen to the meat. Many *Alekseevsky* meat combine from the Belgorod region" labels must have been digested already . . . . According to the enlightened opinion of the previously mentioned Yuri Alekseevich Kiselev, one can unfreeze the blocks; it only takes a minute. But labor productivity would thereby decline. It is not so bad if someone gets in their salami paper, string, particles of dirt, etc., but there is also glass. Frequently, commonplace dirt is finely ground by the powerful blades of the imported grinders, and is not even felt on our teeth since it is larded over with strong brine. Besides being a preservative, salt can mask foul odors.

Dirty smocks, dirty hands, dirty floors, the knives and the mittens, crumbling plaster falls from the ceiling. Meanwhile, people hurry to Moscow for salami from other cities! They complain that to buy salami made in their native cities one has to go to the capital. If those who do not see the salami in their own hometown knew how fortunate they are that they do not eat it! The Moscow State Inspectors of the Quality of Commodities and Commerce every now and then condemn imported salami. In January and February 1988 in Volgograd,

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Lipetsk, the Kasimov Riazanskoi province and in Voskresensk, the Moscow state inspectors rejected 33 tons, 381 kilograms and 600 grams of salami of highest quality. The causes of the "condemnation" were identical to those for the salami of the Moscow enterprises: "a greasy taste, an unpleasant foreign odor, grizzle and fatty tissue, and the presence of cockroaches . . ."

"You are wrong. We have very good salami" — said Tamara Aleksandrovna Sergeevanot (chief salami expert for *Gosagroprom*) looking me directly in the eyes — "People do not understand how we have improved them. Fats are very harmful. People do not get sick from the protein we add. Without any question, proteins improve the quality of the salami."

But, to this day, Salami Factory No. 1 issues salami products without any protein supplements. Only some special chops have them. I tried those chops — I would have to call them not *Russkie* or *Molochnoi*, but a "pleasant memory."

"These chops are made just like the rest," Tamara Aleksandrovna declared with inspiration. Only, somehow, they taste like meat and are not covered with salt. They make them from another kind of meat — when there happens to be an abundance of meat in the country . . .

Everyone knows about the problems with meat. The logic of those who first decided to hide this is unclear: they began to dilute good, natural meat (only the devil knows why), with the excuse that this was an objective necessity! And this led to the appearance of a mass of meat products even cats cannot eat. Why do they bother to fatten the animals if their meat ends up spoiled in the final product? The recipe for salami was changed by a voluntary decision and has been in effect for several years. Has there been more meat in the country? Judging from available statistics — and not by "temporary" salami ingredients — the answer is no. But there have been an inconceivable amount of bad salami products.

Our experts think that we eat too much salami. But it seems that we are eating less and less. And, if everything continues along these lines, there will be an end to salami shortages soon. Taking their cues from the cats, people will also cease to eat them.

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*The Cat Does Not Know Best**

Someone can have an opinion on every issue, or no opinion at all. The Chairman of the Moscow City Agroprom Committee, Yuri M. Luzhkov (he is the First Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet) expressed two opinions on one issue probably, one might think, because he knew the issue very well. This issue was raised in connection with the fact that cats are refusing to eat salami bought in state stores. As far as the cats are concerned, on this issue they have only one opinion, which these silent creatures express by their behavior.

The author of the article, "The Cat Knows Best" (*Literaturnaia Gazetta*, March 23, 1988), Viacheslav Baskov, needed many words to unravel the mystery of the cats' behavior! But it was easy for him: the State Commerce Inspection helped him. Having appeared unexpectedly at Salami Factory No. 1, the inspectors fearlessly tried what the domestic animals rejected, and concluded that the salami was inedible by virtue of the fact that the factory was excessively zealous in using the permission of the State Standard of the USSR to add to its famous tasty salami what previously was used in the production of ivory figurines and shoes. Salt and pepper came to play a decisive role in the new salami so that nothing would remind one of the small sculptured articles and the various shoes.

The editorial office received more than three hundred letters about the article, "The Cat Knows Best." In each there was additional information about the quality of salami and invariably wrath about how meat is criminally (many readers insist on this word) diluted, given its present shortage. For example, S. Uraganov from Krasnogorsk communicates that, thanks to salami, he has replenished his supplies of household gadgets: he found a "metal bolt ten centimeters long" in his salami.

Comrade Luzhkov sent his official response about the article. In it he expounded (what has now become known) the first of his two opinions. It was circumspect, self-critical, principled: "The facts laid out in the article and the commission's conclusions were recognized as correct and timely. They carefully uncovered the extreme neglect of the meat branch of the food industry." Furthermore, Comrade Luzhkov enumerates new facts revealed by another commission created in connection with the article. These facts were related to

* *Literaturnaia Gazetta* (June 15, 1988). Translated by Philip Moran.

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the failure to observe rules of sanitation. We will not cite the long list of violations and organizational conclusions that were drawn. The guilty were made answerable to the Party and to the General Director of the Moscow Agroprom Association, Tulupov and to the Secretary of the Party Committee, P. Agafonov.

The editorial office was initially satisfied with Comrade Luzhkov's response. We were unaware that he expressed only one of his opposing opinions in his response. The more experienced commerce inspection turned out to be wiser. It decided to confirm not the words, but the deeds. So, it arranged for another sampling of the salami products.

A number of experts tasted the anonymous salami (this anonymity was needed for complete objectivity). Even with such an unbiased approach, the products of Salami Factory N. 1 turned out to be the worst. In the discussion of the results of the testing (which was not without danger for the inspectors' health) there were some positive results. It turns out that, after May 1, 1988, the USSR's State Standard and the State Agroprom categorically forbade including "protein additives" into boiled salami. Thus it was decided that hides must go for shoes once again, and the bones, horns (and the hoofs?) for figurines and the like. What was most surprising was that the tasters did not notice that this decision was to be implemented. Enterprises recycling meat from Ostankinsky, Cherkizosky and Krasnogvardeisky were allowed to make salami with "protein additives" as in the past. But the factory specifically discussed in "The Cat Knows Best . . ." seems to have managed to fully appropriate the "waste-free technology . . ."

In a document (authenticated by the press), "Resolutions of an Operational Congress," released by the First Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet, Luzhkov, on May 4, 1988, we found in point fifteen the following directive: ". . . prepare an order of the Moscow Agroprom on the regulation of the testing of enterprises conducted by various controlling organizations, which will include forbidding permission into the enterprise to workers from the State Commerce Inspection without the committee's agreement." That is the new mode of struggle for the high quality of salami production! The struggle with the unjust expenditure of scarce meat! Everything will improve if inspectors are forbidden permission . . .

There is, however, considerable doubt whether the cats will find out about the decisive point fifteen, whereby the taste of salami will improve if the factories which manufacture it are rid not of "additives," but of state inspectors.

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Praxis International is published in April, July, October and January
Subscription Rates Volume 9, 1989
Individuals: £19.75 (UK) £24.50 (overseas) US$42.00 (N. America)
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Reviews:

1992 or Bust!

Alain Minc, *La grande illusion* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1989), 266pp.

La grande illusion became a best-seller in France the moment it came off the press. Its author, Alain Minc, became a celebrity overnight, appearing on such influential talk shows as "Apostrophes," and being featured in journals like *Le Monde* and *Le nouvel observateur*, on the Left, and *éléments*, on the Right. Why should this polemic against "the myth of 1992" have caused such a stir? Why should Minc, the so-called *europessimiste*, have become a point of reference for all discussions relating to the European Community? Why, after public opinion polls had indicated overwhelming French support for the unified European market, was Minc's shrill warning taken so seriously?

The new European community is to be the largest trading bloc in the world, enabling the twelve separate nations to compete more effectively in international markets dominated by American and Asian multinationals. Eliminating frontiers and internal barriers to trade would also make the Community the world's largest single market, with approximately 320 million consumers. Savings from such a rationalization are estimated at $250 billion, and 2-5 million new jobs are to be generated. As if that is not enough, a new flag with twelve gold stars will be reproduced on a variety of commodities and souvenirs (Euro-pillows, Euro-ties, etc.). Is it all a big deception? Is it all public relations panacea, which will lead to such ominous consequences as, e.g., the invasion and balkanization of the unified market by American and Japanese multinationals; economic crisis for all the member nations except West Germany; a new wave of racism, xenophobia, and immigrant-bashing; the undermining of "Western" or "Atlantic" Europe and the weakening of France; and the inevitable hegemony of a resurgent, self-interested Germany within a reconstituted "Continental Europe"?

In the thinking of Jean Monet and others during the 1950s, a United States of (Western) Europe would overcome the debilitating nationalism unleashed during the 19th century and make another continental war impossible. This idea was premised on the postwar reality of the Cold War as a permanent feature of European politics, deviding Europe between East and West. Economic integration was conceived in terms of developing an Atlantic community; in the 1960s,

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first the European Steel and Coal Community and then the Common Market was viewed as the basis for political integration. Further efforts were stalled by the many economic crises of the 1970s (stagflation, unemployment, skyrocketing petroleum prices, recession). Community members generally reacted to these problems by pursuing nationalist economic strategies. The 1980s' initiatives regarding European integration have emerged in a different context and are less committed to the global vision of the 1950s. On the one hand, a hostile, divided Europe appears to be ending, and, on the other, economic integration appears to have a more competitive rationale with respect to the US and Japan. Initiatives for economic integration have come largely from the European business community interested primarily in competitive benefits, savings from economies of scale, mobility of capital, and investment opportunities resulting from a unified market. This was the background for the 1985 Single European Act that called for the creation of such a market in 1992 and the eventual establishment of a central bank, a common currency, coordinated tax rates, and uniform standards for health and safety, workers rights, welfare, etc.

As for Minc's book, the annoying hyperbole and sophomoric overuse of exclamation points (three to five per paragraph when Minc is in overdrive) is not enough to account for his notoriety. He warns French readers of an imminent "Darwinian nightmare" (*le cauchemar darwinien)* once the unified European market is created in 1992. There is practically no time left: "*Le grand marché n'est pas une bluette rhetorique; c'est une guerre . . . Il est minuit moins cinq*" ("The great market is not mere rhetoric, but a war. . . . It is five minutes to midnight"). Each of the seven paragraphs in Minc's preface begins with the refrain: "*Arrêtons de tricher*," which, loosely translated (and this is a text that only gains in translation) means "Let's not kid ourselves." This was no sensationalist flake, but a commentator to be taken seriously, despite stylistic excesses. He graduated first in his class at the prestigious *École Nationale d'Administration*, where France's technocratic elite is trained for the upper echelons of government. But Minc chose instead to enter the private sector and eventually joined the Italian financier-industrialist Carlo De Benedetti's holding company, Cerus (where he serves as general director), and participated in the unsuccessful hostile takeover bid for the *Société Générale de Belgique*. Despite his international business activity, Minc — at the age of thirty-nine — has managed to write four previous books, head an organization created to help finance *Le Monde*, and serve as one of the independent intellectuals within the Socialist orbit. He is one of France's best and brightest, a cultivated insider with vast international commercial experience so unusual among the notoriously parochial French managerial elite.

There is little new information in *La grande illusion*. What sets Minc's work apart from run-of-the-mill accounts of 1992 is a contentious analytic framework that challenges two of the interrelated common assumptions regarding European integration: (1) that Western Europe (or the Atlantic Community) has a secure future as a distinctive and unified geopolitical entity; and (2) that an economic community is the requisite means for ensuring such a future. What renders

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both assumptions problematic, in Minc's view, is the growing centrality of Germany. "Let's not kid ourselves. There is no European question, there is only a German question." In a new, distinctive post-Yalta era, Germany's "natural and legitimate evolution" would be away from the confines of a narrow Atlantic solidarity and toward a reclamation of *Mitteleuropa*, enabling it to both dominate West European economies and cultivate those in the East. West Germany's interest is no longer in *Europe occidentale*, but rather in an independent, autonomous, nuclear-free *Europe continentale*, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. Contributing to this "continental drift" or "continentalization of Europe" is the decline of American economic-political-strategic influence and Gorbachev's new economic and political initiatives, particularly his concept of *la maison commune européenne*, which also runs from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In Minc's view, attempts at economic integration alone will not stop this drift toward "continental Europe." First, as many others have already pointed out, there is a host of problems specific to the project itself: difficulties in coordinating taxes, working conditions, and social benefits among countries with different state structures and at different levels of development; what to do with "strategic industries" (defense, electronics, telecommunications), state-industrial complexes, and heavily subsidized sectors. A meaningful *contrat social européen* of the type proposed by Delors and Mitterrand is simply not possible without extensive developmental aid to the poorer southern countries provided by the richer northern ones. Yet which of the richer northern countries would be willing to pass new taxes or run greater deficits for such a purpose? This points to an underlying tension between, on the one hand, the logic of the market (the stimulus of unrestrained competition; the pursuit of "natural advantages" such as redeployment of production facilities in low wage, low social benefit countries; the maximization of profit and reinvestment opportunities) and, on the other, the logic of social protection (the reduction of unemployment and the extension of common standards regarding social benefits, environmental and consumer protection, etc.) which affects other areas as well.

According to Minc, there is also the problem of insufficient protection from American and Japanese multinationals, which would balkanize the newly-created market. Far from the purported image of Fortress Europe, the new European market would be less protected than American and Japanese ones. American and Asian firms have invested over $26 billion last year alone in new European operations (e.g., Whirlpool recently entered into a $2 billion joint venture to enter the European appliance market). Since only a limited number of European firms can compete with these foreign multinationals, a likely result of this "survival of the fittest" market would be a "Darwinian nightmare," whose political consequences, ironically, would be xenophobia, racism, and intensified nationalism — a fine new twist to European unity.

The second reason why economic integration alone will not stop the drift toward continental Europe has to do with the economic reductionism that characterizes such an approach: West European unity must also be based on culture

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and politics. Minc cites Monet, who said that if he could start over he would begin with culture because there simply is no West European cultural identity. "A *homo occidentalus* exists, but not a *homo europeanus*. There is no 'European' society: no institutions, no citizenship; Europe's public opinion is ambiguous and its elites are not really creating one." Where are the transnational "European" associations — political parties, trade unions, business groups, etc.? Even political professionals entrusted with enacting European integration share no transnational cultural bonds. "Europe for them is a beautiful idea, but it is not a second nature." Without cultural and political-strategic integration, the European community has no viable future.

The third reason economic integration will not stop the drift towards continental Europe is that West Germany no longer has any real interest in a unified West European Community. In the long run, its evolution is naturally oriented toward *Mitteleuropa*. In the short run, differences with the other eleven members of the European Community already have become apparent. West Germany is the only big-league industrial power able to compete internationally with the Americans and the Japanese. It needs and has sought little trade protection. To the degree that the Community eventually adopts necessary protectionist measures against outsiders, the impact of trade retaliation would be felt much greater in West Germany owing to its sizeable foreign markets. West German workers fear that 1992 might encourage employers to move production to southern Europe, possibly leading to wide-spread unemployment and certainly to a scaling-down of the exceptionally high level of benefits unmatched elsewhere in the community. German bankers are ill-disposed toward a European currency and a central bank, having little confidence in the fiscal policies, self-discipline and performance of the other members; the last thing they want is to bind the future of the mark to the other volatile currencies. Even German ecologists have little confidence that the standards of environmental protection they have achieved at home will be accepted by the other countries of the community, particularly the southern partners. Who, then, in West Germany would be for a unified Atlantic Europe, as opposed to some loose form of federation where German particularity and advantages could be preserved?

Minc's own responses to the challenges of Germany and of continental drift are most problematic. At the strategic level, France should offer to extend its nuclear protection (the *force de frappe*) to West Germany (in Minc's own bizarre formulation, "*Hambourg = Strasbourg; l'Europe occidentale = le monde atlantique*"). This would make an inter-German rapprochement and new eastward initiatives impossible, except on terms compatible with Franco-German relations. It would serve as a truth serum for the two parties: for France to show the reality of its *fibre européenne*; for West Germany, to demonstrate the authenticity of its ties to the West. At the same time, it would serve as a nuclear *allumette*, forcing an increasingly reluctant and retreating United States to enter any potential nuclear conflict in defense of the Atlantic community.

Needless to say, this is the most controversial aspect of Minc's book. It is

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based on obsolete Cold War assumptions and the likelihood that Gorbachev's reforms will fail, thus imprisoning Europe once again between two hostile economic-military blocs. Why in the world would West Germany want a French nuclear guarantee precisely at a time when German public opinion has never been more favorably disposed toward a denuclearization of central Europe, as well as a greater opening to the East? Just to show the French, in the absence of an objective threat, that they really care? Why would the United States necessarily enter a nuclear imbroglio started with French matches? Just because a superpower could not afford to sit out a nuclear war?

Minc's second answer to continental drift is no less dubious. If the Germans adopt a *Mitteleuropa* strategy, France should take the lead in reconstituting the Community based on Southern Europe, which would become the new European "economic motor" because of its favorable investment opportunities. Since when have Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece looked to France for economic leadership, as opposed to Germany, which has such desirable things as capital, technical expertise and markets? What in the world could *solidarité méditerranéenne* mean when this region itself is in a state of relative underdevelopment, for which France can offer little in the way of material assistance, trade concessions or technical expertise, relative to Germany, the US or Japan?

Minc's third response to continental drift makes much more sense and is based on his critique of the economic reductionist approach to 1992. Beyond an economic community, there must be other "communities" which would lead toward the development of a European cultural identity which today does not exist — particularly in education and communications. France could and should play a leading role in this. But it must re-order its priorities. It should forget about being a world power and concentrate on Europe. It should forget about national grandeur and the pursuit of corporatist policies such as its traditional support for agricultural subsidies. To be the Community's leader, France must set aside its uniqueness and become banal. "After all, this is a completely normal necessity: one can only lead what one resembles. In the world of today, it is no longer *grandeur* but banality which constitutes the condition of leadership." And yet, curiously enough, it is just this banality of Western culture, as well as the sterility of official Communist culture in the East, which has fed into that nostalgia for *fin de siècle* Central Europe, for *Mitteleuropa*, among European intellectuals who span the ideological spectrum (e.g., Alain de Benoist, Milan Kundera, György Konrad). For them, a common and genuine European culture lost its center of gravity when Europe became artificially divided; neither one of the blocs has a legitimate historical or cultural basis, and only central Europe, victim of the artificial division, can lead the way toward a lasting continental peace and true European identity. If this is little more than far-flung romanticism, it does, nevertheless, make Minc's cultural initiatives seem somewhat insignificant and, shall we say, *assez banal* . . .

Frank Adler

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Muddling the German Question

Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *The Two Germanies since 1945* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987).*

A political history of the two Germanies after WWII in 228 pages is a daring undertaking. The merits are easily summarized: the language is simple, the most important names and data are mentioned, a chronological structure makes the book understandable. It is much more difficult, however, to deal with the text's various shortcomings. The preface already provides a warning. The book is intended as an introduction for readers without access to German-language literature. Turner "makes no claim to definitude" and "many facets of German life . . . receive short shrift" (VIII). But one can ask whether this is not an understatement. Not only have primary sources been neglected, so have secondary ones. Facts as well as facets often receive short shrift. The book may be aimed at readers with no access to German-language literature, but the book leaves one wondering whether the author himself had access to these publications. The book does not contain a single quotation and no sources are provided in the text.

The first sentence is already false: The German Reich "had existed for seventy-one years" (1). The German Reich existed from 1871 to 1945 (if one includes the Weimar Republic, as Turner does) — 75 years. Such trifling details would not be worth mentioning were it not for the fact that this kind of sloppiness runs throughout the book. Consider only the following random sampling. Turner claims that West Berlin "has a voice in the Bundestag and Bundesrat through non-voting delegates chosen by the city's government" (38). First, West Berlin's delegates are sometimes voting, sometimes not; secondly Bundes*rat* members are chosen by the Senate (the government), Bundes*tag* members are elected by the Berlin House of Representatives. Then, discussing the economic miracle, he says, "Rising demand for labor pushed wages up rapidly" (60). But he does not provide any data. Reliable sources say unemployment in 1954 was still 7.1% and industrial wages in 1954 were roughly equivalent to the 1938 level.[1] Thus relatively high unemployment and low wages could be seen as financing the

* An earlier version of this review was printed in *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 22 (1989).

1. Rudi Schmiede, "Das deutsche 'Wirtschaftswunder' 1945-1965," in Bernhard Blanke *et al.* eds., *Die Linke im Rechtsstaat* (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1976), pp. 120 and 136.

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economic miracle up to the mid-fifties. But this may be too differentiated for an author who emphasizes that "mass joblessness rapidly gave way to full employment" (87). According to Turner, the late Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger "had worked during the war in a subaltern position in the propaganda ministry" (91). Another source highly favorable to Kiesinger says that by 1945 he was deputy director of the department of radio politics in the Foreign Office.[2] Meanwhile, Kiesinger's successor, Willy Brandt, is said to have "dropped to his knees and bowed his head before a Polish war memorial" in December 1970 (151). One could call it "a Polish war memorial." To be more precise, however, it was the monument for the Jewish victims of the Warsaw Ghetto. This makes a difference in a city which has recently been swept by an "anti-zionist" campaign. Turner also presents something novel to contemporary German history: He claims that the West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the East German Party boss Erich Honecker were "chatting at the United Nations in New York, 1975" (169). The apparent discovery of Honecker's first trip to the USA is unfortunately damaged by the fact that the accompanying photo shows both men in Helsinki, 1974.

This may be nitpicking. But Turner has missed an opportunity to write an interesting essay on contemporary German history. For him, history is made predominantly by men (Adenauer, Ulbricht, Brandt, Schmidt, Kohl, Honecker) and historical periodization follows their terms of office. Some evaluations are surprising: "The GDR's constitution closely resembled the Federal Republic's Basic Law" (51). This constitution has as its principle the concentration of powers, not the division of powers, as West Germany's Basic Law. It demands a planned economy, while all private monopolies (trusts, etc.) are prohibited.[3] Of course, one can debate what "close resemblance" means. Turner writes, "The political stability provided by the grand coalition helped the Federal Republic to weather the increasingly turbulent 1960s" (93). Maybe. Others argue that the grand coalition was one reason for the "increasingly turbulent 1960s." The grand coalition (1966-69) coincided with the first major economic recession, the emergence of the right-wing National Democratic Party, and the 1968 protest movement. Eventually it gave way to the social-liberal coalition government.

Near the end of the book, Turner writes: "The availability of Western radio and television programs throughout most of the GDR has ruled out the sort of thoroughgoing control of the media there practiced by the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe" (216). The availability of Western radio and television has not ruled out the creation of a highly centralized structure of media control with the East German Communist Party's department of agitation and propaganda at the top. Radio and TV are state institutions, the

2. According to Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition 1963-1969*, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), p. 263.

3. See *Die Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Berlin: Kongress-Verlag, 1949), pp. 18-19.

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press is distributed by the post office. That means a permanent ban for every journal or paper not on the *Postzeitungsliste*.[4] The last incident in media politics involved the permanent ban of the Soviet journal *Sputnik* in early 1989. The availability of Western media cannot be assumed to function as an alternative to a domestic *glasnost*.

There are more reasons to raise an eyebrow about this book. In the preface, Turner writes that neither of the two Germanies "can be viewed in isolation without omitting essential influences on their development" (VIII). I agree. But though "this volume attempts to demonstrate" this, it actually does not. Only the first 32 pages (postwar history) and pages 208-217 deal with the influence of the two Germanies on each other. Otherwise, each German state is treated separately for the periods under discussion. The Stalin-Note of 1952 (and its rejection by the West) is not linked to the Second East German Party Conference and the pledge to the construction of socialism and an East German army. The Wall is not mentioned in the chapter on West Germany from 1949 to 1969; in the chapter on the GDR, there is no discussion of its legitimation by a Warsaw Treaty decision. There is no mention of the economic reform introduced by the *Kombinate*, which many consider central to the current East German economy.

In his concluding remarks, Turner talks about the common problems of the two Germanies, such as environment, economy, etc., and a shared dilemma, e.g., management of mutual accommodation. But he does not use the opportunity to reflect upon reasons for the relative success of the two Germanies within their respective economic and military alliances. He does not consider the fact that they have lasted longer than any other German political system in this century. Nor does he reflect upon the "war structures" (the "civil war" structure between the socialist East and the capitalist West and the "frozen war" structure of Yalta). Consequently, he does not consider possibilities for peace.

The blurb for the book calls it "A marvelously clear, concise, and judicious survey that will be very instructive for the general reader and extraordinarily useful for courses dealing with post-World-War Two Germany." Not every reader will agree — particularly if one recalls the high professional standards for accuracy that Turner set when he violently attacked and destroyed the career of a young colleague for being sloppy.[5]

Volker Gransow

4. See Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, ed., *Das journalistische System der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik im Überblick* (Leipzig: Karl-Marx-Universität, Sektion Journalistik, 1981).

5. See "The David Abraham Case. Ten Comments from Historians," in *Radical History Review*, no. 32 (March 1985).

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The Marketing of Perestroika

Basile Kerblay, *Gorbachev's Russia* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 175 pp., $ 9.95.

The publisher must have decided he needed a book on *perestroika*, and fast. Kerblay must have offered his growing file of quotes and observations to the translator, Rupert Sawyer, who earlier translated Kerblay's carefully produced and widely read book, *Modern Soviet Society*.[1] Six months later, Kerblay attached what he calls "second thoughts," and the book was rushed to the stands. In addition to the larger structural shape of the book, several things suggest a hurried production. Internal contradictions remain, repetitions abound, and errors of translation and transliteration have not been weeded out. The index is a slapdash summary of only some of the items in the text.

It was a reasonable marketing decision. Everyone knows Kerblay from his earlier book, and public interest in Soviet developments is high. Thus specialists and the airport market might both pick this one up. With these fast-breaking developments, to wait might mean to lose the casual citizen-reader altogether. It is good to have Kerblay's judgments on these events, but a publishing house is responsible for better book production; it owes more to its loyal readers.[2]

Unfortunately, the hurried pace of publication cannot be blamed for all the problems. The translator has probably done about as well as he could when, for example, Kerblay's text reads, "thus the respective dynamics of the political, societal, and cultural spheres are not synchronized" (10). Fleeing from simplistic, doctrinaire models of social analysis, Kerblay has retreated to an all-too-loose, almost journalistic meaning of "society," still dressed in the language of sociology.[3]

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1. (New York: Pantheon Books,1983. The original French edition appeared in 1977.

2. At one point the text says that Soviet losses in the Afghan war equalled 2000 per year. At another it says that the eight-year totals were 13,310 dead, 311 missing, and 37,478 wounded. The second set of statistics yield either less than 1700 deaths or nearly 7000 losses per year (109). First a reference to the prosecution in 1986 of 200,000 corrupt officials (26-27) and then to the prosecution that year of 200,000 "black market dealers and distillers" (47) causes some confusion on a possibly astonishing bit of legal history.

3. It is surely the translator, not Kerblay, who fashioned the statement on social and cultural identity on p. 9. It is said that material objects serve as cultural identification "for members of a particular section of society, such as rugs and chandeliers" (9).

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Kerblay believes values and attitudes are the motive force of social change. At one point he offers something very near a tautology: "Society changes when the behavior of individuals is affected by a deep-seated change in social values. The new values can prevail only when they have the backing of social forces — whether they are classes or coalitions of interests — sufficiently powerful to ensure the triumph of their demands or aspirations" (39). This formula immediately precedes a sociological discourse that was almost bound to fail. Reasonably enough, Kerblay rejects official social designations in the USSR — worker, peasant, and intelligentsia. The peasantry, he says, is "no longer one of the main driving forces of society, nor is it any longer homogeneous" (40). *No longer?* Kerblay replaces the standard Soviet designations with a list that seems no better — the people, the elite, and "marginal elements."[4]

Kerblay says that ". . . youth is a transitional stage: it is neither homogeneous nor a social force" (57). Unfortunately, he says this in the introductory passages to his description of what he means by "marginal elements," the third of his substitute social formations. Soviet youth exhibit certain "shared characteristics," e.g., nonconformism, membership in groups, rock-and-roll, etc. One can overlook the delightful oxymoronic quality of nonconformism as a shared characteristic, but it cannot be allowed to pass when he includes youth in his third social formation in order to tell us that they are not a social formation. He knows also that dissidents and religious believers, whom he places in his third social category, are not best described as social formations.

Kerblay makes suggestive assertions about the influence of the Afghanistan mujaheddin and of the "ramified network of 1,800 unofficial mosques in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and the Urals" where nearly 2000 Sufi sects or communities wield an influence (63 and 111). Where the book fails to be rigorous in its sociology, it never fails to be interesting and informative. Everyone is now fascinated by the "national minorities," and Kerblay includes them in the third category of his social structure. Is a national or ethnic group a "social formation" at all? Only if it can be shown to have homogeneous social characteristics (rather than language, racial, ethnic or other such "national" characteristics). For example, we can no more call "Armenians" a social formation than we can call "Russians" a social formation. This does not mean that being "Armenian" has no definable influence on one's behavior in the face of *perestroika*. On the contrary, Kerblay is right — and so is every newspaper headline these days — that national groups may hold the fate of *perestroika* in their hands. Nothing more seriously threatens *perestroika* than independence movements around the

4. Readers of Kerblay's *Modern Soviet Society* (especially chapter 8, "Social Classes") will recognize this problem. There, just as here, Kerblay prefers vague taxonomic categories when he gets down to the actual description of the Soviet social hierarchy. On page 204 of *Modern Soviet Society*, after discussing a complicated array of options, he says that there are four social groups in the USSR, but he does not name them clearly. Moshe Lewin, in a good introduction, says that the book describes six "main components" of the Soviet social system (xxii).

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Baltic, Caucasian and Central Asian periphery of the Soviet Union. Yet distinctions among the varieties of human groupings must be drawn all the more carefully as they become all the more significant to our understanding of what is going on. The concepts of social class and nationalism ought not to be employed haphazardly at this level of analysis.

A social structure is defined by levels of relation to the production and distribution of valuables, wealth. Nationality is defined by shared feelings of "being born together," which can appear to unite widely differing economic groups or religious communities. If we do not remember that there are Georgian *apparatchiki* as well as Georgian orchardists, Georgian atheists, Georgian Christians and Georgian Jews, we will miss much of what is currently unfolding down the southern slopes of the Caucasus and everywhere else in the USSR. "Nations" are almost always highly differentiated according to a variety of taxonomic categories. To give another perspective, we all know that when Azeri murdered Armenians in Sumgait, it was no social struggle. There is no evidence that the Russophilic and reactionary organization *Pamiat* represents a social class. Stalin could be sloppy about these designations. All the "wreckers" of the 1930s, whether national independence fighters or Trotskyists, were said simply to be "bourgeois." We should do better than that.

Even here, as he raises the nationality question, Kerblay chose not to make a very important point clear when he quotes Obzhosa Suleimenov: ". . . the question of the nationalities has been resolved, relations between nationalities, on the other hand, are still tense" (65). Of course, Suleimenov's statement is not correct. The nationality question has not been resolved. But what is not spelled out here is the distinction Suleimenov was making between two very different sorts of "nationality" problems. The first is the vertical problem of the relation of the Soviet state to the many nations that live within the Soviet Union. This is a question of autonomy or national sovereignty versus union with or subordination to Moscow. The second sort of nationality problem, possibly the more troublesome right now, is the horizontal (or lateral) problem of the relations among and between these various nations themselves.

Neither of these two sorts of problems has been fully resolved, and they may bring *perestroika* down. But one should not lose sight of the distinction between them. Nor should we forget that, while regional separatist claims can challenge central authority, the resolution of these conflicts can also strengthen it. Progress in the troubled sphere of nationalities can flow from the more rigorous imposition of central Soviet authority. On January 20, 1989, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh were relaxed when the area passed from Azerbaijan administration into "special situation status" in which the central authorities took over and directly manage the disputed region.[5] The Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute might have strengthened Gorbachev's hand.

5. Paul Goble, Special Assistant for Nationalities Affairs, Office of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, presentation to the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (KIARS) in Washington, DC (January 23, 1989).

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If Kerblay opens with a problematic sociology, his "second thoughts" offer a more promising, and notably different, social analysis: "Soviet society is stratified into many different social groups, with distinctive lifestyles and levels of consumption, culture, political power, and status" (107). He follows however with a brief structural analysis which places heavy emphasis on "lifestyles" and very little emphasis on the solid economic, social and political characteristics of "social groups." In this second version of the Soviet social structure, the "top of the hierarchy" is the *nomenklatura*. This is more or less what Kerblay meant earlier by "the elite," only now he includes servants, chauffeurs, and others with access to the comforts of the elite; he also puts artists, writers, and performers in this "social group." All these have "caste" at the top of the social structure.

At the base of the social pyramid one finds the "mass of workers." Kerblay knows their plight well. 33% of these have incomes less than 100 rubles per person and 27% live in quarters of less than 5.2 square metres per person. A third social group is located between the *nomenklatura* and the laboring masses. This middle group is no longer described as "marginal elements," but as "petty bourgeoisie." These are the tawdry enthusiasts for personal possessions of the glitzy convenience-store variety (107-08). In Russian, they are said to be in the grip of *veshchizm*. (It is tempting to translate this as "stuffism," the most distinct 20th century contribution to the magnificent pantheon of 19th century isms). This later description of the Soviet social structure differs significantly from the earlier. For example, youth make only a very brief appearance, solely as a "transient social group." (The translator's choice of "transient" in this second reference to students, rather than "transitional" as in the first, was haphazard rather than deliberate).

There are these woolly moments, which seem to grow from the way the book was constructed of unfinished parts. But a number of significant things about the Soviet social structure are hidden in the fleece. When Kerblay implies that the Soviet military establishment and the *nomenklatura* represent a "social formation" more real in its class attributes than "peasantry" or "worker," every reader still under the spell of simplistic 19th century social formulae should stop and reconsider. What a shame that Kerblay has not been given the opportunity here to employ some of that classic 19th century social science to clarify the rare and remarkable class nature of the Soviet elite.

It would appear that the Party gives physical structure to the *nomenklatura*. The Party does not form itself by birth or by accumulated wealth. Kerblay should have rejected the popular but sociologically false use of "caste" to describe this formation. Even the word "class" is more misleading than helpful, though the Party does define itself by its relation to the "mode of production."[6] In the annals of social formations, it is more like the French First Estate (the clergy) than

6. On February 17, 1989, in a presentation to the KIARS, Vladimir Tikhonov, of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Moscow, bluntly stated that Soviet officialdom has too long "acted as both owner and proprietor" of agricultural land.

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the nobility, bourgeoisie or proletariat. In a remarkable act of egalitarianism, it has appropriated qualities of all these classes. It recruits membership very widely, even though privilege seeks to perpetuate privilege here as everywhere else. Peasants seldom become bishops, but the greatest original accomplishment of the 1917 Revolution, and the abiding Soviet ideal or myth, is that peasants can become first secretaries.

The *nomenklatura* has become a formation mobilized on the foundation of affirmation, education, training, and finally something like ordination rather than birth or (prior) privilege or wealth. It could be said that the economy bears some doleful resemblance to that of the old working monasteries. But make no mistake about it, the *nomenklatura*, embodied in the Party, is the economically dominant class. And the Soviet state is its "committee," much as Marx defined the state in the *Communist Manifesto*. Kerblay recognizes that the Party is the only organized *social force* in the Soviet Union, but he never quite articulates this (90).

Kerblay's most novel contribution to the discussion of *perestroika* grows out of his unfinished thoughts on the Soviet class structure. If this is correct, and if Kerblay himself is correct, Gorbachev's *perestroika* has four major components. First, the Party is being surgically separated from some of the most important institutions of state power, but with no intention to fully divorce it from its "committee." Thus the Party — especially in the provinces — is put at a greater distance from the institutions which administer people's daily social life. The irony here is that this is done in order to make the power of the Party — especially in Moscow — more effective. Kerblay quotes Anatolii Strelianyi's statement at a conference in Amsterdam in May, 1988: "Our problem is not to eliminate the Party from public life but to restore to it the power that it no longer effectively wields" (114). The Party is trimmed in order to make it more centralized and effective. Rumors are flying now about the abolition of KPSS departments which duplicate state bureaus (134).[7] In recent months, in another direction of reform, more than a dozen regional ministries have been replaced by departments directly under the Supreme Soviet's authority in Moscow; also, state investment to renew industry has been concentrated in the central manufacturing regions of the Union (111). This is not decentralization, but re-centralization.

While the Party is trimmed, the people are even given a parliament, the People's Congress, a transplant perhaps required by the surgery being performed on the extremities of the Party. Controlled "democratization" of state institutions is thus the second component of *perestroika*, and it is every bit as delicate an operation as that described under the first component. The May 23, 1988, Central Committee meeting produced theses which clearly addressed the need to strictly delimit Party responsibilities. The stagnant economy derived in part from the expansion of Party responsibilities and the decline of state administration. The elected soviets will "assert their preeminence over the executive organs" (127).

7. Kerblay goes so far as to say that Gorbachev hopes to "circumvent the Politburo" with his institutional reforms (132).

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Third, the state is brought into a more efficient and independent relation to the life of the people. Kerblay is most suggestive here. The power of the center must be restored, and the reformers seem to think this is best done through the classic European instrument of centralized authority, the modern state. At the 19th Party Conference in June, 1988, Gorbachev emphasized that economic results would follow upon the strengthening of the weak state structure (133). Although these four components of *perestroika* are not sequential, it appears that Gorbachev finds himself now between the second and third components in which it is essential to establish the new People's Congress, to get himself elected its president, and to embark upon the creation of effective political mechanisms.

Finally, the fourth component, and this the most quixotic: the people are to be freed from the dysfunctional varieties of interference in their economic and social life in an operation even more delicate than the surgery that separates sections of the Party from sections of the state. Yet how difficult it is to revitalize and strengthen state institutions and then pull them back a few notches from their natural work.[8] Gosplan and Gossnab reforms, reforms in pricing and other major economic reforms, are put off until the end of the current Five Year Plan. Here we confront at least two major problems. First, why should state *apparatchiki* be more willing to have their authority limited than the Party *apparatchiki*? Second, can the economy survive on its own? When state subsidies are removed, many enterprises will go bankrupt. Last year one-third of the nation's enterprises were in this position (48). And there will be layoffs. In 1986, ten railroad lines were shut down and 125,000 workers were fired. Over the next 15 years, it is estimated that 15-16 million jobs will be terminated, without any clarity as to what new employments might be created by economic *perestroika*. Services traditionally available at virtually no cost, like medical treatment, could now become expensive, especially for quality service. Kerblay warns of "undoing the achievements ascribed to socialism" (48).

Far from being a withering away of the state, or of the Party, *perestroika* thus appears to be a reform in the tradition of European welfare state building. In the Soviet Union this requires as much building down as building up, and thus the historical particularity of these events.[9] Gorbachev's *perestroika* consists of efficient restructuring rather than elimination of the control exercised by the economic owning class (the *nomenklatura*) over its committee (the state). Even in the case of the striking changes which allow the long-term lease of agricultural land it is essentially a substitution of financial control and exploitation of state property for the older, more direct administrative dominion over the land. At the

8. Readers should be warned that the economic liberalization that goes under the name *khozrashchet* is presented here as *khozyashchet* (75).

9. Leonid Abalkin, one of Gorbachev's key economic advisers and the Director of the Institute of Economics, speaking before KIARS, March 14, 1988, emphasized that the transition from the old to the new system of management would lay the foundation for the fundamental changes in the economy planned for 1991, when the 13th Five Year Plan will go into effect.

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same time, *perestroika* aims to free in some measure laborers in the employment of that class so they might produce more and better. Again, the income tax measures announced in *Pravda* on April 17, 1989 suggest that the Party is about to let incomes and markets thrive as never before since NEP, but that the state will maintain its advantage through progressive taxation rather than direct management of the whole market. Gorbachev, to put it another way, must strengthen and extend the authority of the state at the "commanding heights," while he limits the hitherto incomplete and overlapping, unchecked and arbitrary local power of Party and state.

Such a strengthened and extended state system is thought also to favor the welfare of the laboring citizenry of the Soviet Union — the "people." Gorbachev employs the social taxonomy Kerblay rejected earlier in the book, but he has as distinct a sense of tangible social formations and their forceful "interests" as anyone could ask. On July 15, 1987, Gorbachev was quoted in *Pravda* as saying that "society is made up of concrete forces: the working class, the peasants, the intellectuals, each of which has its respective interests. One cannot infuse dynamism into society or make it viable if one ignores the interests of these social groups, and if these interests do not influence our policy in return" (38). We do not have to read this too carefully to appreciate the clear sense of "we" and "they" here. In other words, there is a fourth concrete force with its respective interests: the central *nomenklatura* with Gorbachev its current leader.

It is not easy to predict the result when these three varieties of social "interests" and the *nomenklatura*'s policy of "infusing dynamism" are fully deployed with and against one another. Here it is better to follow Gorbachev, with his accent on "concrete forces," rather than Kerblay, with his accent on "values" and "lifestyles." In this sense, the discussions held in the Kremlin on April 11, 1989 between N.I. Ryzhkov, President of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, and his associate, the Minister of International Economic Relations, Katushev, with a large delegation of West German bankers and industrialists (e.g., representatives of *Westdeutsches Landesbank*, *Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft*, *Lufthansa*, *Volkswagen*, and *Opel*) is a more telling moment in the unfolding of *perestroika* than, e.g., meetings of youth clubs.[10] Our understanding of what is going on would be impoverished by ignorance of any of these trends, of course, but when the USSR engages West Germany in serious discussions of mutual economic ties and the future of the European Economic Community, they are talking turkey.

We might conclude that Gorbachev's *perestroika* is a Soviet New Deal, designed to salvage a wrecked economy, recognizing that to some limited degree the salvage costs must be borne by those who benefited from the old system and who have now run that old system into the ground. If there is any analogy, *perestroika* is a reverse analog to the New Deal. Gorbachev in a very loose sense is the Soviet mirror image of FDR because he must not only augment and extend state

10. On the Soviet-German meeting, see *Pravda* (April 12, 1989).

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power, but he must do that in order more carefully to limit rather than increase its intrusion into the life of society and the economy. The novelty in what FDR did was his extension of state power into American social and economic life; the novelty in what Gorbachev is doing is the loosening of Party and state power in the social and economic life of the USSR. In both cases, the goal is to preserve the system by changing it. Like the nephew of the good Prince of Salina, in Lampedusa's *The Leopard*, both FDR and Gorbachev at some point realized that if things are to remain the same they must change. They have both won the undying hatred and opposition of the very privileged groups whose failures presented the need for drastic measures and, in fact, whose larger and essential interests are best served by the reforms.

The tricky part of the whole *perestroika* may not be the struggle against old guard opposition. It may be this: once the instruments of state power are put under more efficient Party control, and once the state has been strengthened and extended throughout the Soviet Union, government then is expected to reduce its constant and suffocating presence in social life. This is a tall order, indeed. New guards quickly become old guards. The world might well hope that this will not be for Gorbachev, as it was for Lenin, a "last struggle."[11]

Kerblay knows the obstacles to the success of *perestroika* and is mindful of the long duration of historical experience within which the Gorbachev era so neatly fits. The historical parallels with earlier reform eras, even before the 1917 Revolution, serve as a *leitmotiv* to chapters four and five.[12] It could be that, like Peter Stolypin, Gorbachev is willing to wager on the sober and the strong in this game of chance called reform. The question may be, now as earlier, is everyone playing the same game?

Alan Kimball

11. The time is now right for the wider public to read and appreciate Moshe Lewin's *Lenin's Last Struggle* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968).

12. *Perestroika and glasnost* have served to reunite Soviet experience with the deep historical past perhaps more closely than Stalin with his wartime evocation of the "great Russian people." The search for the historical roots of Gorbachev in NEP, Peter Stolypin, Sergei Witte, the "Era of Great Reforms" of the 1860s, and even in earlier epochs has become a cottage industry among Russian historians. We suddenly feel that the past is able in this case to illuminate headlines about as well as Kremlinology. For example, in a presentation to KIARS, September 12, 1988, Theodore Taranovski said that there are "uncanny similarities" in two leadership transitions, Nicholas I to Alexander I and Brezhnev to Gorbachev. In greater detail, S. Frederick Starr spells out several continuities in the long-term history of "Reform in Russia: A Peculiar Pattern," *Woodrow Wilson Quarterly* (Spring 1989), pp. 37-50. The pioneer publication has to be W. Bruce Lincoln's "The Problem of *Glasnost* in Mid-Nineteenth Century Russian Politics," published four years before Gorbachev's ascension, in *European Studies Review*. vol. 11, no. 2 (1981), pp. 171-88.

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Springtime for Gorbachev

William and Jane Taubman, *Moscow Spring* (New York: Summit Books, 1989) 301 pp. $18.95.

The Taubmans' colorful, lively, and intelligent book recounts their intense impressions of the Gorbachev "revolution" as it unfolded during the first six months of 1988. The period culminated in the 19th Party Conference in June, marking the third year of the political and cultural storm set loose by the General Secretary in 1985. At the heart of the storm, as the Taubmans see it, is Gorbachev's program of radical reconstruction, aiming at a Western-style liberal democracy. Paradoxically, they note, such a plan for political participation from below must be put into effect from above; adherents to democracy need autocracy, while proponents of autocracy use the new freedom to appeal to an undemocratic and conservative public sentiment. "Gorbachev's revolution is a democratic revolution from above, a contradictory hybrid that explains both the force and the fragility of *Moscow Spring*. His power as leader of a still centralized Party allows him to ram through reforms against the wishes of not only his Party's entrenched apparatus, but many ordinary citizens as well. Everyone is supposed to be learning democracy. But meanwhile, as an American philosopher friend of ours puts it, 'Freedom is being used to reject freedom, and force is being used to impose it'." (19).

Moscow Spring is a book by American insiders who have studied and written extensively on Soviet life. Their good Russian language skills enable them to meet the Soviet intelligentsia on its own terms and take part in the current debates. By the time they left the Soviet Union in June, they had become TV personalities, finally forced to turn down daily invitations to speak to eager audiences about their views on change in the USSR and about America. In short, the Taubmans became participants in the story they now write about, surely an unusual development for Americans, but characteristic of these heady days of *glasnost*.

The authors make no apology for their partisan preferences in the new political drama. They advocate liberal democratization, while they attempt to assay its (and Gorbachev's) chances for survival. In this, the Taubmans observe, the Soviets have much to learn from American democratic experience. Believing that positive change today must be measured in terms of progress away from the

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Stalin dictatorship and ideological straightjacket, they remind Soviets that Stalin started the Cold War, and that his dictatorship snugly fits the classical totalitarian mold. What the USSR needs now — and what the Taubmans are ready to supply — is a "no holds barred argument in the virtues and vices of democracy." Gorbachev's experiments are trying to enfuse the Soviet Union with the new entrepreneurial spirit Americans appreciate; many of his supporters gravitate toward the Republic, whose "best aspects . . . show them not only what they are missing, but how to work politically to bring it about" (66).

It is this essentially democratic breakthrough in Gorbachev's "new thinking" that the Taubmans see as the "revolution" now being wrought by the General Secretary and his entourage. Understandably, nowhere is the enthusiasm for the revolution more visible than at the Institute on the USA and Canada, where its younger members, the vocal partisans of Gorbachev, "were caught up in *perestroika* in a way that reminded us of our contemporaries during the campus upheavals in the United States during the late 1960s. Suddenly, they saw themselves as citizens trying to remake their country" (65). Having discovered to their surprise that the Gorbachev reforms had the potential "to be more revolutionary than the Russian revolution itself," the Taubmans searched the intellectual terrain to discover and speak with the friends and foes of reform.

In their telling of the story, current Soviet life is caught up in the struggle between light and darkness, good and evil, radical liberating reform and narrow intolerant conservatism; Gorbachev and his band of angels (often very timid ones) against Ligachev and a panopoly of devils. "Democratization occurred before our very eyes [producing] . . . a virtual civil war between champions and opponents of change" (16). The authors would be the first to admit that it is far too early to tell if happiness will be won out of the claws of reaction. But as a first step in an effort to sample the mood, they spoke with "optimists" and "pessimists" among journalists, columnists, and editors (including Sergo Mikoyan, editor of the journal *Latin America* and son of Anastas Mikoyan) about the prospects for success.

When this did not produce clearcut answers, they began to read the Soviet press, where they encountered the proponents of reform: playwrights such as Mikhail Shatrov, as he meditates on the Stalin era and the sad state the Revolution has arrived at by the late 1980s; the novelist Daniil Granin, whose widely read novels about Soviet scientists have led him to ponder how the Stalin system turned its functionaries into men of stone or mute machines. Gavriil Popov, editor of *Questions of Economics*, echoes this thought when he concludes that Stalinism found its ideal in Leonid Brezhnev. Supporters of reform also spoke out in the *Ogonyok* symposium on the need for legal guarantees to prevent reversion to tyrannical rule. But these advocates of reform, the Taubmans concluded, had only shallow roots in popular thinking (144). A deep and dangerous divide seemed to be opening up between them and ordinary people.

Beginning with the notorius March 13 newspaper article by Nina Andreyeva, a chemistry teacher at Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, entitled "Why I Can't

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Waive Principles," the Taubmans also began to hear from the opponents of reform. The "conservatives" defended the Party and the nation against the liberal attack, while also criticizing corruption, which meant not only bribery and wrongdoing but the corrosion of morals, whose harm came primarily from unwanted Western influences. Patriotically defending Party leaders and the people they lead, the conservatives argued the virtues of Socialist Realism as a means to extol the heroism embodied in the struggle to build socialism and win the Great Fatherland War. What was needed was not more individualism and narcissism, but a return to ascetic sacrifice for the collective public good. In certain conservative quarters this point of view was buttressed by covert or overt anti-Semitism.

Thus, central to the political debate about democracy was a deeper issue about culture and basic values; a contest about the meaning of history and the quest for human freedom; a quarrel over the country's heritage. Perhaps no other event better acted as a catalyst for the debate than Tengiz Abuladze's film *Repentance*, with its proverbial final line about the dead end of modern dictatorship: "What good is a road that does not lead to a church?" The film, the Taubmans argue, is an important part of the struggle in the USSR over the historical memory and who owns it (88, 93). They seem to feel that some people have the right to "own" it and others not. For some, one might suppose, the film's concluding statement calls for a spiritual "rethinking," which is what the Greek etymology of repentance suggests. But the authors seem more to agree with the philosopher Igor Klyamkin, who contends in a *Novyi mir* essay, "Which Road Leads to the Church?" that the "church" is "a modern, liberal, democratic Russia," to quote the Taubmans (136). Such are the diverse possibilities for interpretation the film provides.

Several good chapters survey the skirmishes, clashes and major battles in the cultural war after Nina Andreyeva fired her opening salvo in mid-March. Although the pro-reform Soviet press fell into an uneasy silence awaiting direction from above, writers, poets and critics refused to be intimidated by the conservatives. To gauge the response, the Taubmans made the rounds of political and economic talks and symposiums sponsored by the Academy of Sciences and other institutes and attended cultural evenings devoted to important films (*The Cold Summer of 1953*). writers (particularly the Nobel prize winner Joseph Brodsky and, astonishingly, other emigre writers now resurrected and legitimated in the USSR), and critics such as Aleksander Tvardovsky. They attended a multimedia happening built around the film *Assa*, featuring the popular musical groups Aquarium and Sounds of Mu; other evenings were focused on the bard Aleksander Galich, best known for his ballads about Stalin. They even found time to attend a Peace Committee discussion club meeting devoted to "Freedom of Conscience." The point of these events and evenings, they concluded, was that writers and critics were defiantly celebrating their new freedom to show that they were not cowed by Andreyeva.

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The Andreyeva affair raised an issue that makes for an interesting aside in canvassing the public mood. Andreyeva had complained about the open discussion of sexual problems in the press, which provided Jane Taubman with a moment to consider gender issues. Feminism, or the lack of it, is a complex matter in the USSR, with many women adopting a distinctly conservative attitude. "One tentative hypothesis," she suggests from her conversations with women in a variety of settings, "is that the stifling bureaucratic hierarchy of Soviet society has indeed emasculated men, who have to kowtow constantly to their superiors in the workplace. From their wives they expect (and get) a great deal of emotional support, almost to the point of mothering" (207). "The kitchen remains women's domain — indeed, for many Soviet women, their only area of autonomy" (208).

On April 5 the writers and critics were rescued by *Pravda*, which published a blockbuster defense of *perestroika*. The article, the Taubmans affirm, "had at last found the right words. It condemned 'attempts to play on the dearest thing a person has — the meaning of the life he leads' " (188). The appeal that radical reform was the only way to redeem the labor and heroism of the past was the right way, the Taubmans felt, because it was precisely this language the conservatives employed so effectively. The pro-reform press suddenly sprang to life, taking the burden off the shoulders of the literary intelligentsia, while television now came out in support of Gorbachev, helping to prepare the ground for the Nineteenth Party Conference scheduled for June.

The Taubmans round out the account of their *Moscow Spring* with descriptions of trips to Leningrad, Tallin, and Odessa, the arrival of President Reagan for the summit, and their return home to Amherst in early June. The book ends with a short epilogue on the Party Conference that brought to a climax the events described in the book. By the end of the story, readers are left with a strong sense of vitality in the intellectual and political ferment of Moscow and other Soviet cities. This is a justification for the many anecdotes, episodes, and personalities recounted in the book. Perhaps by June the authors — somewhat bewildered — were becoming more skeptical about the prospects for success in Gorbachev's democratic revolution than they were in January, for they end by asking: "Can democracy really be promoted by such undemocratic means? In today's Soviet Union, can it be fostered in any other way?" (301).

As satisfying as the book is in many respects, a reader can still come away wondering why the many arguments advanced for and against *perestroika* take the forms they do. The Taubmans describe more than analyze the Soviet scene. We get a systematic review of the ongoing debate, a blow by blow account, but the generalizations and conclusions seem to flow more from the Taubmans' political and cultural preferences than they do from a deep probing of such different, often discordant centers of the "cultural heritage" as the theater, film, art, and literature. Typical is their depiction of the many events retrospectively commemorating the life of the popular singer and actor Vladimir

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Vysotsky. We learn that monuments are being erected to him, journalists write inspired articles about him, fresh flowers are placed on his grave, his writings are published in expensive illustrated editions, and a documentary tribute is spread over four nights of prime-time TV. But nowhere do the Taubmans explain the ideas or message Vysotsky sought to convey or why it should have such a strong appeal for a very broad spectrum of the Soviet public. Many passages such as the following substitute description for analysis, to provide conclusions: "Ilina and Karakin [a writer and a philosopher] made overwhleming cases, but they had chosen formidable opponents. They were still flourishing, but the continued strength of the conservatives and the tentativeness of reformers less combative than they help to explain what we came to call the "Yes, but" character of many cultural events we attended between January and March" (99). What were the "overwhelming cases"? Why were the opponents so "formidable"? We are left to ourselves to ponder such questions. The passage itself is almost incomprehensible.

Moreover, the almost Manichean dualism of democrats and conservatives begins to seem overly simple after a few chapters. Is the ground between them really a civil war? Or is it a debate primarily among the Russian (and more narrowly Muscovite) public about a future both sides fear might leave them surrounded by hostile non-Russians and outdistanced by powerful international rivals? Viewed against the background of a resurgent Islam or a revived Ukrainian Christianity, Gorbachev's attempts amidst millenial celebrations to open dialog with Russian Orthodoxy is not so different from the claims of the conservatives to gather and reconcentrate more effectively the spiritual resources of the country. The Taubmans seem genuinely perplexed that Russian churchmen "in their black robes and miters" should be sharing the stage with Gorbachev reformers at the USA Institute (105). In any case, they clearly do not believe there is a legitimate conservative tradition in Soviet society. In part, one suspects that the reason is their own strong missionary sense of purpose in bringing the message of American democracy to Moscow. Democracy, they believe, *is* the source of Russia's salvation. As William Taubman put it rather indelicately and angrily to one scholarly Soviet opponent: "Your job is not to rush to worst-case conclusions [about American actions]. . . . Your job is to try to explain to the Soviet people how the American system works" (268). Alas, so many Russians were just not getting it right.

Robert L. Nichols

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Must a Historicist be a Relativist?

Robert D'Amico, *Historicism and Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 174 pp. + xiv, $12.95.

William James observed that we are all absolutists by instinct and that, looking at the record, philosophers have turned that instinct into a nasty habit. So a book like D'Amico's *History and Knowledge*, which disabuses us of our absolutist tendencies, is always welcome. Certitude is felled by the book's main thesis: radically relativistic historicism is a more defensible philosophical position than any realist or non-relativistic alternative. It is tempting to say that D'Amico holds the historicist position to be true, except that his relativism throws a wet blanket over the very idea of truth.[1] While this deters dogmatism, does not radical relativism suffocate the pursuit of knowledge itself? In a self-reflective passage in his *Treatise*, the ironic David Hume compared the love of truth to hunting.[2] The real draw of hunting may lie in the action itself, but who would set out to hunt for nothing — or even for something trivial? Granted, as Quine observes, one does not need lions to go lion-hunting, but without at least the belief in lions the hunt seems pointless. By consigning all human knowing within the walls of arbitrary conceptual schemes, D'Amico takes the lure out of wisdom.

Intellectual hubris and its ugly associate, political authoritarianism, can be attacked with less blunt an instrument. William James distinguished two alternatives to absolutism, skepticism of the radical sort D'Amico defends and what James calls "empiricism": "the empiricists think that although we may attain it [truth] we cannot infallibly know when. To know is one thing, and to know for certain that we know is another. One may hold to the first being possible without the second."[3] Roughly, one might associate the Sophists with "skepticism," Socrates with "empiricism," and Plato with "absolutism." The empiricist alternative, which combats absolutism without gutting inquiry, is not taken up by D'Amico, though it appears to be a more hopeful position. It is a more plausible position on grounds D'Amico accepts, i.e, the rejection of transcendental arguments. For it is radically relativistic historicism that stands in need of a transcendental argument, not its "empiricist" alternative.

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1. "Historicism abandons efforts to prove the validity or rightness of concepts"(xi).

2. David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), Section X of Part III of Book II, pp. 448-64.

3. William James, *The Will to Believe* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), p. 12.

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D'Amico's position might be capsulized in three theses: there is a hermeneutic circle, it is inescapable, and it is vicious. In other words, all our "knowledge" is bounded by our particular historical frameworks, and we can neither judge one framework by another nor get to reality itself. D'Amico examines several sophisticated attempts to break out of this circle either through presuming a conception of rationality (Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, Foucault, Horton) or through transcendental arguments to outfox relativism (A.C. Grayling, Habermas). He includes Donald Davidson's criticism of the very idea of a conceptual scheme under the heading of transcendental arguments but, by freeing empiricism of its "third dogma," Davidson brings it in line with James' "empiricism."

D'Amico does not engage those philosophers — proponents of "philosophical hermeneutics" — who accept the hermeneutic circle as inevitable, yet contend that it is not vicious. Among others, this would include Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and MacIntyre. A companion volume in which D'Amico would carefully examine such authors would provide the opportunity either to reconsider his third thesis or to reinforce his case for radical relativism.

Some preliminary observations are in order. This is a philosophical book in the conventional sense. D'Amico is not interested in the history or varieties of historicism. He is fascinated by the bold hypothesis of radically relativistic historicism. When he asks why this historicism has reemerged today, he does not unearth political or economic forces that could account for its present magnetism. He simply finds it to be the most persuasive position. Though this radical relativism does away with any definitive distinction between internal and external in intellectual history, D'Amico's own account is strongly internalist in the ordinary sense. In fact, he sharply takes issue with Foucault's tying historicism to the modern *episteme*, which presumably shirks the need for compelling arguments and thereby dismisses historicism as a serious philosophical position.

At the outset of his first chapter, D'Amico pays Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism* a generous compliment: "no significant reflection on human knowledge can ignore Popper's detailed criticism and analysis of this doctrine" (2). But D'Amico's fine critique of Popper leaves one wondering about the fanfare. Moreover, though Popper is definitely opposed to relativism, his meaning of "historicism" has nothing in common with D'Amico's. Popper is attacking historicism of the scientistic variety: "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or 'patterns,' the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history" (23).

D'Amico clears away the misunderstanding that Popper thought Marx' theories (e.g., the falling rate of profit) were unfalsifiable, hence not scientific. On the contrary, Popper argued that they had been falsified! But D'Amico deftly shows why Popper's criticism (e.g., of the labor theory of value) either fails or is inconclusive. The key to Popper's refutation of Marx lies in his judgment that Marx's putative science of history involved essentialism: "an assumption that all theories should strive to describe the 'essential nature of things' and in doing so

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these theories are neither in need nor susceptible of further explanation: they are ultimate explanations" (12).[4] So "essentialism" is a brand of absolutism in James's sense, and, for Popper, the direct link to totalitarian politics. Popper's own critical rationalism goes beyond "empiricism's" belief in truth to assert that refutations can be made with certainty. That is the rub for D'Amico.

Not much can be salvaged from Popper's critique of Marx, but that really is not D'Amico's concern. He is out to show that Popper's philosophy of history helped to inspire the current trend toward relativistic historicism. How does Popper propose we study human societies? The "zero method" — his prototype of rational reconstruction — takes fully rational behavior as the standard, or zero-coordinate, and sees how actual behavior deviates from the rational norm. Popper leans heavily in the direction of D'Amico's historicism when he insists that rational reconstructions are always provisional; new conjectures regarding the situation of a historical agent are encouraged. However, Popper will not countenance handing the standard of rationality — falsificationism — over to the vagaries of historical change. To this D'Amico replies: "against Popper's confidence in a single scientific methodology in the history of science, historicism takes its sweetest revenge — it historicizes it" (31).

The term "conceptual scheme," D'Amico tellingly observes, "probably has Neo-Kantian origins" (32). Kant's Copernican revolution, according to which the world is partly constituted by the knower, resounds throughout the exploration of the conceptual scheme notion in Chapter 3. If one does not already own one, after reading D'Amico it will be necessary to buy a copy of James Conant's *Science and Common Sense*: "I doubt that there is a another book so little read today yet so crucial to understanding how recent issues in philosophy were shaped and formulated" (33). Kuhn's teacher at Harvard, Conant shows how conceptual schemes become naturalized and defend themselves from refutation: there are no crucial experiments. The border between conceptual scheme and common sense is difficult to draw. In a postmodern phrase, Conant describes science as a "frantic chase after new concepts" (86). And with a phrase to which D'Amico approvingly returns at the end of his book, Conant characterizes his historicist rejection of scientific realism as a "skepticism without sneers" (35).

D'Amico's account of Lavoisier's "discovery" concludes that it makes no sense to talk of oxygen apart from the conceptual scheme that overtakes phlogiston chemistry and that "conceptual schemes are constructed, not discovered" (48). This Kantian sensibility recurs in Quine's reference to science as a "man-made fabric," in Ian Hacking's talk of standards of truth and falsity being *produced* by "styles" of reason, in Feyerabend's insistence that the given is not natural but *constructed*, and in Duhem's assertion that the domain of evidence varies with human efforts at knowing. *Homo faber* thinking here penetrates epistemology — with the Kantian twist. The Copernican hypothesis comes with this

4. D'Amico rightly notes: "there is a great deal of evidence that Marx did not hold to a theory of inexorable stages of historical evolution" (164).

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proviso: an objectivity even partly constituted by the knower cannot be identified with things in themselves.[5] Insight into the active epistemic role of the subject can breed skepticism.

Imre Lakatos shares Popper's hostility toward "essentialism" as well as his determination to steer rationality clear of relativism. He renews his mentor's strategy of rational reconstruction and identifies its proper object as the "research program": "the idea of research programs stresses that rationality concerns the overall evolution of a tradition, its responses to successes and failures in context, and its historical alternatives" (53). The "hard Popperian teeth" that Lakatos puts into evaluating research traditions come to this: a *progressive* tradition keeps predicting novel facts; failure to do so means a tradition is *degenerating*.

D'Amico shares Stephen Toulmin's reservation about rational reconstructions — they presuppose "20/20" hindsight: "historians who take the present state of knowledge as their reference point can 'reconstruct' the history of science as a pattern of growth and degeneration . . . If the present changes, then the reconstruction changes and our so-called 'solutions' to historical problems are revealed as ideological — that is, reflecting an historical prejudice or bias" (61). Here D'Amico's three theses are in action: Lakatos wrongly presumes he can break the vicious hermeneutic circle — and turns dogmatic in his attack on Toulmin for regarding all rational reconstructions as provisional.

Chapter 5 presents Foucault as another critic of realism and "privileged representations." Like Conant, "Foucault reminds us of how what is habitual in the present seems natural; how common sense conceals interpretation by identifying itself as direct contact with the object" (81). D'Amico illustrates these lessons in terms of Foucault's early studies in the history of medicine. Foucault is depicted as holding a kind of "weak Kantianism": "knowledge is fixed in various ways (thus historical), but at any given moment what is empirical is constituted by a system of concepts (thus *a priori*)" (90). D'Amico notes that Foucault parts company with Kant not just in multiplying the systems of concepts but also in rejecting the notion of a transcendental subject as the constituting agent.

Foucault claims to have corrected the bias of the traditional, teleological history of ideas with his own "archeological" studies. D'Amico detects here the same difficulty as with Popper and Lakatos: "Foucault's own criticisms must reflect some other — but ultimately — arbitrary arrangement" (92). There is no exit from the vicious hermeneutic circle.

Under the heading "Objective Knowledge," D'Amico links Foucault's antisubjectivistic notion of "discursive formations" with Popper's "third world" of intellectual entities, ontologically distinct from physical objects or mental states. For D'Amico, both fail to fend off radically relativistic historicism. On the one hand, Foucault goes too far in "de-anthropologizing" knowledge: "without subjectivity there may continue to be statements already recorded in books and

5. D'Amico notes this connection on pp. 131-2.

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libraries, but there can be no problem situation for reconstruction"(105-6). But even if Foucault's desubjectivizing efforts succeeded, that would "not also block the argument that knowledge is a vast cultural ideology" (106-7).

Against Popper's "third world" defense of objectivity, D'Amico lines up several arguments and makes a now familiar point: "reconstruction assumes that the distinction between psychological and rational . . . is fixed simply by adopting the present as the unchanging reference point." He admits that no other argument is possible, still, "the best that rational reconstruction can provide is a provisional and perspectival understanding" (117).

In their rational reconstructions, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan (who uses a "problem-solving" standard of rationality), and Foucault all fall back on the orthodox distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, whereby the present context is surreptitiously identified with an imagined, ahistorical context of rational justification. The transcendental argument, an alternative strategy for eluding historicism, is sealed off by D'Amico in chapter 7. Habermas's intellectual development can only discourage us from setting foot on the transcendental path. He has repeatedly backed off from the confident expression of the three knowledge-constituting interests defended in *Knowledge and Human Interests*. As for the turn to "reconstructive sciences" such as "universal pragmatics," D'Amico finds the distinction between "reconstructive" and empirical science unsupportable in practice. Besides, Habermas' readiness to treat reconstructions as hypotheses undoes any special force they might have. An undogmatic transcendental argument is not transcendental at all.

Inspired by Davidson, A.C. Grayling endeavors to show that the very notion of radically different understandings of the world is unintelligibie. Arguing retrospectively rather than prospectively (as in Kant's transcendental deduction), Grayling insists that physical objects and persons are humanly necessary presuppositions. Spotting a new form of dogmatism, D'Amico wonders whether any philosophy can establish even such meager epistemological constants as these. With Grayling, D'Amico construes Davidson's critique of the very idea of a conceptual scheme as a transcendental argument against radical relativism. But I believe that Davidson, like Hegel,[6] puts the shoe on the other foot. Rather than offering a transcendental argument of his own, Davidson rejects transcendental arguments and points out that it is radical relativism which requires one. Instead of solving the dilemma of relativism, Davidson dissolves it — in the spirit of Berkeley's remark that skeptics kick up a dust and

6. D'Amico briefly considers Hegel and Marx in the context of Habermas' treatments of them in *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Unfortunately, Hegel is swiftly dismissed for his claims to absolute knowledge. Since his Introduction to the *Phenomenology* is a strong challenge to Kantian and other forms of skepticism (having much in common with Davidson, D'Amico notes), it would be valuable to see if its arguments can be disentangled from absolutist claims. D'Amico unsympathetically rehearses Habermas' reading of Marx as a neo-Kantian. But he does not put forward an alternative view, having treated Marx in his first book, *Marx and the Philosophy of Culture* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1981).

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then complain they cannot see. Davidson writes: "Neither a fixed stock of meanings nor a theory-neutral reality, can provide . . . a ground for comparison of conceptual schemes. It would be a mistake to look further for such a ground if by that we mean something conceived as common to incommensurable schemes. In abandoning the search, we abandon the attempt to make sense of the metaphor of a single space within which each scheme has a position and provides a point of view" (128-9). The point here is that conceptual scheme relativism assumes that there is such a reality — only it is as unapproachable as the far side of Sisyphus' hill.

Davidson encourages us to call off the ghosthunt for the *Ding an Sich*: "If," Davidson argues, "no sense can be made of an unintelligible 'outside' which is yet the object of all attempts at presentation, then, by dismissing this Kantian division between schemes and an inaccessible reality, we are simply left with reality itself" (129). D'Amico writes off Davidson's supposedly transcendental argument as "verificationist," but one would like to see a more extended argument at such a crucial point. Are there legitimate demands for verification or are they all "verificationist"?

We should appreciate how much Davidson has in common with D'Amico. For it is Davidson's objective to rid that least dogmatic philosophical tradition, empiricism, of its "third dogma." As the above text shows, D'Amico at times grants that Davidson is explicitly anti-Kantian, anti-transcendental.[7] But Davidson's famous conclusion is more than D'Amico can swallow: "In giving up the dualism of scheme and world we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false" (129). For D'Amico, Davidson relapses into naive realism for which the actual metamorphoses of "knowledge" are unfathomable.

D'Amico's rightful resistance to such naive realism rests upon mistaken assumptions regarding Davidson's conclusion. Why assume that Davidson denies any mediation between the knower and the known? Davidson's position is designed to head off the dogma that we are not in immediate touch with reality, not to propound the new dogma that we are *only* immediately related to it. By being situated in the world, we are immediately *and* mediately present to it. As a model of this approach, take the "semiotic" philosophy of George Berkeley, which incorporates immediacy and mediacy in its key concept, the sign. C.S. Peirce distinctively developed a "semiotic" conception in his philosophy of "firstness," "secondness," and "thirdness." D'Amico assumes that to have direct knowledge of reality means that "knowledge comes at once and all in a piece"(130), which *would* make the history of human error

7. Davidson's opposition to Kant, who held that all human knowing is governed by one common conceptual scheme, is clear in this sentence: "Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the sway of the scheme concept; even monotheists have religion." "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 183.

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absurd. D'Amico believes that, despite Davidson's statement that there is no "theory-neutral reality," he "leans on the myth of the given" (130). But to claim that reality is given is not to claim that it is given in final form or all at once. Something is given; why insist it is not reality?

Relativistic historicism cannot elude the age-old criticism of relativism as "self-excepting." In his article "Going Relativist," D'Amico replies to Plato's logical criticism of relativism this way: "As with any purely logical attack, this criticism depends on a 'set up' relativist . . . who stupidly says things like 'all knowledge is relative.'"[8] Nonetheless, D'Amico defends historicism in such uncompromising terms: "Historicism is a position about the limits of knowledge, how human understanding is always a 'captive' of its historical situation" (x). The "always" of this sentence — repeated throughout the book — is D'Amico's ace against Popper, Lakatos, Foucault, and others. He neither criticizes their theories of rationality nor points out their particular historical limitations. Nor does he need to; he cannot lose with his historicist "always." If "Foucault's own criticisms must reflect some other — but ultimately — arbitrary arrangement," why should D'Amico's historicism escape this "must"?

What does it take to know that there is an "always," a "must"? How does one so definitively draw in the limits of knowledge? That is just the job for transcendental arguments. In fact, D'Amico calls attention to historicism's Kantian ancestry: both acknowledge the subject's role in constituting its world. But, for historicists, "the world as appearance changes in the manner of a cultural convention or alterable arrangement" (132). D'Amico's rejection of proofs for an immutable system of constitution distances him from Kant, but not from transcendental claims which are secreted in radically relativistic historicism. James' or Davidson's "empiricisms" are actually more skeptical than D'Amico's, since they jettison relativism's transcendental claims; yet, disciplined by the experience of change, they retain a healthy suspicion of any present theory.[9]

Since D'Amico relies on a neo-Kantian notion of conceptual schemes, it is worth examining his assumptions regarding them. To begin with, *the historicist limits to knowledge are only as well defined as the boundaries of the mutating conceptual schemes.* Davidson aside, the difficulties in identifying the schemes appear intractable. Is empiricism a conceptual scheme? Rationalism? Do they share one? How about Marxism, positivism, phenomenology? What of Kantian ethics, scripturally-based ethics, virtue ethics? What of feudalism, patriarchy, or

8. Robert D'Amico, "Going Relativist," *Telos* 67 (Spring 1986), p. 139.

9. Davidson differs from James' empiricism in arguing that "successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true, view." But the following passage indicates that Davidson's position may still be classed as empiricist: "We suppose that much of what we take to be common is true, but we cannot, of course, assume we know where the truth lies. We cannot interpret on the basis of known truths, not because we know none, but because we do not always know which they are." See "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 200 and 200-01, respectively.

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Eurocentrism? Should languages or language groups count as conceptual schemes? Is common sense a conceptual scheme? Recall that Conant and Foucault stressed how difficult it is to isolate science and common sense. How are we to round out the proper list of candidates? *And from what standpoint?*

Foucault writes of his candidate for conceptual scheme status, the *episteme*: "In any given culture and at any given moment there is always only one *episteme* that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge" (91). D'Amico appears to rely on such an assumption (42). As implausible as that appears, the alternative maze of criss-crossing conceptual schemes may be even less attractive.

Like Epicurean gods, conceptual schemes seem to relate to "reality" and to one another with frictionless detachment. Justifications are always *internal* to a conceptual scheme, D'Amico frequently reminds us. This makes no allowance for a scheme's transforming itself in the face of refractory experience or an alien point of view; one conceptual scheme just replaces another. In his examination of Lavoisier, D'Amico insists that there must be two discourses for such a breakthrough to occur. But where did Lavoisier's new discourse come from? How did he break out of the prison walls of the prior discourse?

Does D'Amico push to an extreme the claim that "conceptual schemes are constructed, not discovered" (48)? Responding to Plato's famous "butcher" metaphor (knowing is like dividing reality at the joints), D'Amico writes: " 'cutting up' experience is constrained neither by the subject (the *a priori*) nor by the world."[10] Is experience really so mute? That our knowledge is *under*-determined by experience does not exclude experience as a determining factor. Yet D'Amico regularly describes conceptual schemes as "arbitrary" and "conventional," as if anything goes. A close study of the various conceptions of making within the *homo faber* tradition would be valuable here.

For D'Amico, there is objectivity and rationality, but only within a particular framework — never across frameworks. Sticking to this requires a sharp distinction like that between Kuhn's normal and revolutionary science. But, like Habermas' dichotomy of the reconstructive and the empirical, that distinction proves hard to sustain in practice. One other defense against historicism taken by Marxists, pragmatists, and even Foucault is to turn to practice. In his article, D'Amico points out several problems with this turn. One overriding difficulty Foucault indicated is that practices are as conditioned by deep-seated frameworks as are theories. In addition, Marx's appeal to practice was premised upon his residual Hegelian absolutism; pragmatism and instrumentalism uncritically adopt extant cultural values, making them unsuitable standards for truth. These objections may not be insuperable if we adopt "empiricism" rather than relativism regarding theories and frameworks; either recognize that Marx, unlike Lukács, was not a residual Hegelian in this sense or else revise Marx and reinvigorate pragmatism with a more biting social analysis.

10. D'Amico, "Going Relativist," *op. cit.*, p. 138.

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Where does D'Amico's radically relativistic historicism leave us? He concludes "Going Relativist" with this: "all 'going relativist' cures is traditional theory's quest for certainty — no more, no less."[11] But at what cost? D'Amico's relativism appears to "cure" us of passion for truth or justice. Hume keenly sized up both the problem of dogmatism and the dangers involved in curing it: "The passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that though it aims at the correction of our manners and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination and push the mind with more determined resolution toward that side which already *draws* too much by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage and endeavor to confine our pleasures within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy, like that of Epictetus and other Stoics, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment."[12]

Has D'Amico reasoned us out of virtue when he concedes the postmodern point: "there is no emancipatory discourse"?[13] Has he reasoned himself into misplacing his own desire to emancipate us from dogmatism and authoritarianism? D'Amico puts ethics in the same historicist boat as science. Recognizing that our ethical judgments are contestable is an important corrective, but are they arbitrary? D'Amico himself does not hesitate to make moral judgments about the likes of Pol Pot and Idi Amin. But by pushing historicism into radical relativism, he creates apparently insuperable difficulties for morality.

When D'Amico faults Richard Wolin for his "popular leftist criticism," namely, "the hidden truth of postmodernist glorification of the 'end of man' is to be found in the brave new world of systems theory [and] cybernetics,"[14] he is right to point out that postmodernists like Lyotard and Derrida are anything but champions of this reductionistic logic. Right again, citing the example of Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason*, that an attack on subjectivism does not amount to a defense of scientism. Still, these rebuttals fall short of settling matters favorably for postmodernism. Proclaiming the deaths of the subject and the author may not be scientism, but does it open up any morally fruitful conceptions of the person or community? Does postmodernism provide any foothold for moral or political resistance to systems theory? If not, has Wolin hit upon postmodernism's "hidden truth" after all?

Renouncing emancipation makes for a discouraging close to the story of historicism. D'Amico describes Conant as a kind of critical theorist for breaking down "the undeserved authority and certainty that certain frameworks acquire" (36).

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11. *Ibid.* p. 115.
12. David Hume, *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1955), p. 54.
13. D'Amico, "Going Relativist," p. 145.
14. *Ibid.* pp. 135-6.

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On that same note, the book closes with Kant's remark that the skeptic is a "benefactor of human reason in so far as he compels us . . . to keep watch, lest we consider as well-earned possession what we perhaps obtain only illegitimately"(149). Likewise, talk of "prejudice," "bias," "falsifying projections," "ideology," turns up throughout the book. But how are we to make sense of a conceptual scheme's "undeserved authority" if we accept D'Amico's radical relativism? Does the charge of "bias" lose its sting when all conceptual schemes are "arbitrary"?

Midway through the book, D'Amico poses the central question: "Can our present standards be bracketed or suspended?" (73). His answer is, simply, "no." Conceptual schemes are repeatedly imaged with the *Phaedo*'s metaphor for the body, the prison. But the ability to detect bias casts doubt upon this metaphor. We are capable of transcendence, of bracketing our present standards, even if we can never extinguish all standards or attain some impossible, imagined standard.

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates suggests a relation between "misology" (hatred of reason) and misanthropy.[15] This book conveys a deep unease with our historical condition. In the second part of his *Discourse on Method*, Descartes relates a rationalist fantasy: how would our minds function if reason — not appetite and custom — had governed since birth? Judgments would display a purity impossible for us now to achieve. This passage is immediately preceded by another regret: "I thought that the sciences found in books . . . have grown up little by little by the accumulation of the opinions of many different persons, and are therefore by no means as near to the truth as the simple and natural reasonings of a man of good sense, laboring under no prejudice concerning the things which he experiences."[16] A similar rationalistic dream — if only we were not mired in these constraining cultures, languages, histories — measures D'Amico's disappointment with human knowing.

In his film, *Manhattan*, Woody Allen responds to the challenge: "Who do you think you are? God?" by saying: "I have to model myself after someone." The modern preconceptions regarding objectivity, notably, that there is "one true world," are dependent upon a (rationalistic) conception of the "God's eye view." Though proclaiming the "death of God," Nietzsche prophesied that the "shadows of God" would stalk the earth for centuries. The other of relativism, that ineffable "reality" that human knowing never touches, is the shadow of God that remains after rationalist hopes of cribbing divine ideas are abandoned.

Radical relativism not only "checkmates" emancipation and critique, it threatens its own *telos*, namely, to turn us away from dogmatism. How does one digest the news that every view I might possibly adopt is "ultimately" arbitrary?

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15. D'Amico's writing reveals a love of reasoning; it is the book's conclusion that seems to lead to "misology."

16. René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, in *Discourse on Method and Meditations*, trans. by Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960), p. 11.

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Do I play it safe like Hume's sage and trim my beliefs down to a vanishing point? What do we do *after* awakening from rationalist dreams? It is characteristic of the empiricist tradition, from the time of Bacon's doctrine of the idols, to correct rather than extirpate appetites and customs. Recognizing that we surely will continue to believe, judge, and act, Hume furthered his struggle against narrowness and enthusiasm with guidelines for *reasonable belief* and for the correction of our sentiments. (Historicism itself supplies such a general rule: Watch out for cultural, historical biases.) The real problem of dogmatism concerns how beliefs are fixed. While skepticism undermines rationalistic support for dogmatism, dogmatism does not always rely on a rationalist's certitude. The question is: When am I being unreasonable in sticking to a particular belief? A blanket indictment of certitude does not help at this point. After *episteme* (in Plato's sense) is gone, we still need a workable conception of *phronesis*.

Defining dogmatism in terms of the feeling of belief opens up a range of different — but not unreasonable — dispositions to believe, from the conservative Hume to the "anarchists" Feyerabend and Lyotard. Without detracting from skeptical arguments, we could address the cultural, political, and economic factors that provoke a readiness to entertain new beliefs. Moreover, if Davidson is right that the conceptual scheme idea is a "dogma" of empiricism, we could explore the historical factors that give rise to the present fascination with it. I imagine that among those considerations would be: the colonial and post-colonial guilt of Western nations, the widespread loss of faith in the progressiveness of either capitalism or communism, failures of the "New Left" and the resurgence of orthodox Marxism at the end of the sixties, and the generally disheartening or gruesome outcomes of national liberation struggles.

A defense of reasonable belief is needed to make further headway against dogmatism. Many of the authors D'Amico considers put forward accounts of rationality, and several link rationality with social structure and intellectual culture.[17] D'Amico generally does not evaluate these accounts, except to say that they are held dogmatically. But if Hume's point is right that a "second front" must be opened in the battle against dogmatism, D'Amico may want to reexamine some of these authors in developing the "reconstructed defense of objectivity" he mentions in closing.

Patrick Murray

17. For example, Robin Horton distinguishes between an "open predicament" and a "closed predicament." The former is conducive to rationality by its dissociation of science from social life; conversely, in a "closed predicament" scientific innovation is retarded because science is too entangled in social institutions.

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Sartre Revisited

David Detmer, *Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1988), pp. 262.

Barthes' prediction that Sartre would be "suddenly rediscovered, soon, in a completely natural way," shows signs of coming true after all.[1] While not exactly sudden and by no means unproblematic, judging by some of the recent literature, a reevaluation may be in the making,[2] which may have important consequences for the way Sartre's thought is interpreted as well as his impact on philosophy. Detmer's *Freedom as a Value* makes a valiant effort to recover a coherent Sartrean ethics from a body of texts that have been long dissociated from a formal ethics and have, for the most part, suffered from vituperative treatment by mainstream philosophers.

Technically speaking, philosophers have made much of the fact that, while alive, Sartre never published a work on ethics, despite the concluding promise of *Being and Nothingness* (*BN*). All the same, since 1943, this has not daunted scholars from inferring an overwhelmingly negative view of ethics in *Being and Nothingness*; and once *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (*CRD*) appeared in 1960, Sartre's alleged "Marxism" refueled rejections of both *BN* and *CRD* from a stream of critics tenaciously clinging to their previous repudiations of Sartre's existentialism. This mostly analytic and predominantly Anglo-Saxon criticism is Detmer's target.[3] His book earns high marks for defending the legitimacy of Sartrean ethics.

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1. "Sartre at Seventy," An Interview with Michel Contat, *The New York Review of Books* (August 7, 1975), p. 14.

2. Christina Howell's *Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) deals with issues similar to those dealt by Detmer. Among new Sartre biographies, see John Gerassi's *Jean-Paul Sartre: Hated Consciousness of His Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and Ronald Hayman, *Sartre: A Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). While clearly sympathetic and admiring, Hayman's first volume still epitomizes the type of traditional biography that, for crucial, i.e., philosophical reasons, Sartre rejected through Roquentin, the hero of *La Nausée*. Although broad and fast-paced, it is ultimately "anti-Sartrean" in spirit. It does little to dispel (or justify) the usual, rigidly oppositional readings of Sartre's "contradictions," "phases" and "*coupures*" provided by non-biographical commentators.

3. Documenting this criticism requires separate study that hardly equals the frustration and penalties for working against it. In rough terms, "the mainstream"

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The obvious question such a book raises is: why now? Or: has something happened since Sartre's death in 1980 that has altered our perspective on what he was trying to do in 1943, 1960, 1975, or anytime in-between? Detmer's answer is a baffling "no." Little seems to have changed with Sartre's posthumous publications which, paradoxically, may prove inconsequential.

The appearance of Sartre's *Cahiers pour une morale* (*Morale*, 1945-7) and the commentaries on his 1964 "Rome Notes"[4] have provided scholars with fresh motivation for reconstructing a Sartrean ethics and evaluating it against his two major philosophical works. Neither of these works nor the handful of other posthumous volumes[5] by Sartre and de Beauvoir should be considered "inconsequential." In addition to documenting two extraordinarily rich lives, they teem with the kind of material "academic careers" are made of.[6] In evaluating a body of thought, however, we must recognize certain internal constraints that, unless held in the perspective of a thinker's intentions, may damage the integrity of his enterprise. The fact is that Sartre never intended to publish an ethics and consistently described such materials as "abandoned and, for the most part, lost."[7] How then can one justify the recent use of Sartre's *Morale* in a

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comprises an excessively idealistic, abstract, misanthropic and rootless assessment of human freedom in the early Sartre, and, depending on the critic's personal ideology, undergoes a litmus test against *CRD*: at that point the mainstream includes all works that consider *CRD* as Sartre's radical conversion to Marxism and then forks out into 1) sympathizers (who usually reject the early Sartre with relief) or 2) confused detractors who either take shelter in the early Sartre or vilify him for his now-manifest closet Bolshevism/atheism/abstract anti-liberalism, etc. For a detailed study against both brands of *CRD* critics, see my unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "Sartre's Contribution to the Phenomenology of Marxism" (Boston University, 1973). My own view of *CRD* as a phenomenological-Marxian approach to an anti-Marxist study of social and historical praxis (premised on *BN*'s ontology of contingency) underlies and documents the following reviews: "Sartre, Phenomenology and the Study of Social Existence," *Greek Review of Social Research* (Greek National Centre of Social Research), no. 24 (1975), pp. 198-207; "Three Books on Sartre," review of Peter Caws, *Sartre*; Douglas Collins, *Sartre as a Biographer*; Gila J. Hayim, *The Existential Sociology of Jean-Paul Sartre*, *Telos* 49 (Fall 1981), pp. 212-16; and, "Anna Boschetti, *Sartre et "Les Temps Modernes"* in *Telos* 69 (Fall 1986), pp. 175-89.

4. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Cahiers pour une morale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983). For first impressions from the "Rome Notes," see R. V. Stone and E. A. Bowman, "Dialectical Ethics: A First Look at Sartre's Unpublished 1964 Rome Lecture Notes," *Social Text*, 13/14 (1986), pp. 195-215.

5. Most notable among Gallimard's other recent publications are: Sartre's, *Les carnets de la drôle de guerre* (1983), (*The War Diaries*, Q. Hoare trans. [New York: Pantheon, 1985]); *Lettres au Castor* (2 vols., 1983); Simone de Beauvoir's, *La Cérémonie des adieux & Entretiens sur la politique* (1981). For the English edition of the *Cérémonie* only, see *A Farewell to Sartre*, P. O'Brien trans. (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

6. Nonetheless, I thoroughly agree with Zygmunt Bauman's trenchant comments on the function of the "established wisdom class"; cf. his "Strangers: The Social Construction of Universality and Particularity," *Telos* 78 (Winter 1988-89), pp. 7-42.

7. Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Sicard, "Entretien," *Obliques*, no. 18/19, (1978), pp. 9-29, p. 14.

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reconsideration of works that clearly disavow any attempt toward *defining* an ethics? Why has this unintended publication now made it "legitimate" for philosophers to search for an ethics in the *ontology* of *BN* or the Marxism of *CRD*?

The thrust of Detmer's book is that, dispersed or couched in philosophically ambiguous terms, Sartre's thought from *BN* to *CRD* contains a coherent theory of ethics. Consequently, the book embarks on a critique of mainstream interpretations that have treated *BN* as a philosophy of nihilism, of solipsism, of idealistic, abstract, rootless and murky ethics and as a work irreconcilable with Sartre's alleged Marxist conversion.

From Sartre's own definition of freedom as both a value and "the source of all value" (*BN*, pp. 627-28), Detmer takes on a litany of interpretive mistakes and misundertandings through an analysis of the two formulations on consciousness ("it is not what it is" and "it is what it is not"). He meticulously brings out the role of imagination, perception, facticity, relations with others, the practico-inert and the whole host of categories that, from *BN* to *CRD*, hinge on an ethics of freedom. To stress its limitations, Detmer turns to the related, perennial hurdle of Sartre's purported radical break (in the guise of *CRD*). The notion of such a break is dismissed as a mystification (102-19, 135, etc.). This position is also the cornerstone of Detmer's rejection of all literature that has misconstrued Sartre's ontology, i.e., the *description of contingency* in *BN*, as a normative ethics, in disregard of Sartre's distinctly ethical call: to exercise one's freedom to order to alter contingency.

That this is a difficult choice (and difficult even to acknowledge) is the key to Detmer's forceful discussion of Sartre's purifying reflection, authenticity, and the abandonment of comforting values, beliefs and attitudes ("bad faith" and the "spirit of seriousness"). In short, while requiring a personal conversion to keep making choices in the name of freedom, all human choices (including blindly following accepted values) are predicated on the existence of freedom as a value — one we are also free not to choose.

In developing this argument, Detmer's first chapter, "On Freedom," systematically reinterprets the central terms and categories of *BN*. This is followed by a section on "Values," paving the way for his final chapter on "Freedom as the Highest Value." Addressing objections to Sartre's philosophy, he exposes the crucial links between Sartre's ethical subjectivism and his later critique of socio-historical reality in *CRD*. By arguing for the philosophical validity of the subjectivity of values, Detmer discovers in Sartre's less arbitrary foundation for value choices.

Since Sartre's views on ethics have triggered charges of extreme subjectivism, Detmer sets out to give them a place long-denied in philosophy. Objectivist value theories point to the universally shared, common sense validity of a whole range of values in whose absence human existence and communication would be absurd, e.g., freedom, health, comfort, peace, vs. unfreedom, sickness, and so on (135ff.). Against these theories, Detmer measures Sartre's definition of values as "lacks," his notion of "the project," his strict separation of facts

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from values, and the argument for the non-existence of God (which Detmer judges irrelevant to ethical objectivism [153-55]).

The discussion on Sartre's subjectivism can be summarized by a well-known example of a moral dilemma (155). In brief, one of Sartre's pupils, son of a collaborator and brother of a war victim, approached Sartre with a personal dilemma: should he join the Free French Forces in England (which might mean either death or a frustrating desk job), or should he stay home to care for his aging mother? Sartre explained that this plight could not be resolved on the basis of either Christian doctrine (which would side with the mother) or Kantian imperatives (to treat others as ends) since that would mean using those fighting at the front toward a personal end. In Sartre's view, "You are free, therefore choose — that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality can show what you ought to do."[8]

The story epitomizes many of the ethical misunderstandings Sartrean expressions have spawned. Since the call to invent has condemned Sartre's ethical injunctions to oblivion for excessive vagueness and empty formalism, the moral dilemma provides Detmer with clear objectives. Thus, in order to tone down Sartre's ethical subjectivism, he must stress its "objectivist" strains as well. He must also connect this early, apparently groundless idea of freedom, with the later ethics of *CRD*. In justifying these connections, Detmer relocates Sartre's conversion and commitment to freedom to the place Sartre himself had always assigned it — the period from 1943 (*BN*) to 1947 (when he started the *Morale*).

Detmer does this very carefully and thus makes a contribution to contemporary ethical theory. Since this type of philosophical investigation sacrifices much of Sartre's complexity in the name of rigor, however, it weeds out nodal aspects of Sartre's work. The problems lie in two of Detmer's central themes, both related to invention: A) Best intentions notwithstanding, Detmer's use of Sartre's notion of "play" to highlight the dialectic of invention and discovery manages to reintroduce into Sartre's development a new dichotomy. By treating play as an ethic of the early and/or unserious (frivolous?) Sartre of *BN*, who only later becomes serious, Detmer distorts Sartre both before *BN* and in the works before and after *CRD*. As a result, this playful vs. a serious account of Sartre's evolution trivializes his "conversion." B) Detmer treats intuition as a rigorous epistemological tool. Since, however, he makes no effort to relate intuition to Sartre's "non-savoir" and "savoir" — two key notions in Sartre — it becomes merely a tool for professional philosophers to justify Sartre's ethical claims. According to Detmer's argument, Sartre's advice to invent becomes an invitation to play in a game with no rules. Detmer seems to have found a clever device for thematizing "absolute freedom." But on closer reading, this extremely brief segment from *BN* yields a different interpretation, particularly in view of Sartre's pre-war work.

8. Cf. Detmer's citation from Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, P. Mairet trans. (New York: Haskell House, 1977), pp. 35-36.

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It is not that play is unimportant. Detmer is resourceful to employ Sartre's reference to play toward his own dialectic of invention and discovery. But he is wrong in seeing it as anything more than a dramatization or an *analogy*. It is not a desirable way of living. Sartre is not proposing that the absence of pre-set rules in play *produces* freedom; quite the contrary: the experience of freedom-as-anguish turns the choice to invent into an exercise (of freedom) *as easy as* play.[9]

Freedom-as-anguish can be either dissolved (by conforming to pre-given norms) or resolved in the choice to invent. Once that choice (invention) is made, *then* the subsequent steps feel like play. Therefore, play is not the thing, so to speak, but rather the unintended lightness of freedom inventing its rules within particular contexts. To return to the case of the earlier moral dilemma, what Sartre is saying is that both choices are equally unjustifiable since they cannot address the pupil's concrete situation. Once he chooses to see his case as a dilemma and a source of personal anguish, the pupil is free to choose within *those* constraints. To invent just any value or act will not do in *his situation*.

A further reason for claiming that Sartre is perfectly serious about play and that he is far from advocating a "baseless creation of values" (206) concerns the function of play *before BN*. This is not the place to show how Sartre's skepticism about an *eventual* rejection (at the moment of conversion) of living or writing in an imaginary or play mode hinges on its deflectionary effect on real action. Sartre's entire pre-conversion opus from *Transcendence of the Ego* (1936) to the war writings revolves around the problem of turning the passive spectator (including the writer) into an actor.[10] This theme, in turn, leads Sartre to theories of literature, theater, language and aesthetics that illuminate the impasses of imagination in the absence of a declared commitment to freedom. But the absence of an express commitment to freedom (conversion) at this stage does not make for a groundless choice of values. The conversion, catalyzed by the war experience, loses all moral portent unless it is grasped as a *moment* as opposed to a *cause* for re-directing Sartre's life by resolving, not dissolving, the problematic of his past.

Last but not least, Sartre has written enough against "bad faith" and the "spirit of seriousness" to justify the view here that play must be handled seriously at all times. In a nutshell, the case of falling into "bad faith" or of conforming to

9. Says Sartre: "As soon as a man apprehends himself as free and wishes to use his freedom, a freedom, by the way, which could just as well be his anguish, *then* his activity is play [emphasis added) . . . . The point of these remarks, however, is not to show us that in play the desire to do is irreducible. On the contrary we must conclude that the desire to *do* is here reduced to a certain desire to be. The act is not its own goal for itself; neither does its explicit end represent its goal and its profound meaning; but the function of the act is to make manifest and to present to *itself* the absolute freedom which is the very being of the person." See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel Barnes trans., (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), pp. 711-12, original italics.

10. Among the variety of genres that revolve around this problematic, see *La Nausée*, *L'Imaginaire*, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?*, *Situations* I, II, IX., and several *Oeuvres romanesques* (Paris: Pleiade, 1981).

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the "spirit of seriousness" is actually predicated on the search for inventing a self, hence play-acting in the name of free self-expression. Here Detmer glosses over the whole dimension of Sartre's anti-Freudianism — a much bigger issue than play in *BN* (to say nothing of this issue in previous and/or subsequent works). The omission might appear irrelevant to play. But, in effect, the problem of inventing for Sartre is one of resisting any behavior or system of knowledge that fixes morality, the self, character, or social class. The critical elucidation of the irreducible categories of Freudian psychology and, later on, of Marxism were major challenges for Sartre. Understanding to what extent personality or social reality are truly or falsely pre-determined is synonymous with searching for the place and meaning of freedom; it is also what propels all of Sartre's post-1945 work and culminates in *CDR* and in *L'Idiot de la famille*.

Detmer is correct in placing *CRD* in the context of a confrontation between freedom and an evil reality of scarcity, need, class inequality and alienation. Except for rare references, however, his failure to address the relation of play and determinism(s) in works before and after *CRD* impoverishes Sartre's ethical framework. In the later Sartre, the will to convert to an objectivist search for morality in an intolerable world that must be altered transforms the dialectic of invention and discovery into one of volition and intuition. Developing it succinctly, Detmer demonstrates that intuition is "always *necessary* to knowledge" as well as "*sufficient* for the acquisition of knowledge"(189). Thus it is indispensable for establishing the validity of moral judgements and values, and instrumental in enabling us to see that freedom is indeed the highest value, as Sartre claims. Detmer's use of Lewis Carroll's deceptively naive argument in "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles" offers brilliant evidence that, while deductive knowledge can increase certitude, it cannot replace intuition as the source of that knowledge. Unless we can see something in the first place, logically connected propositions about it will not help us apprehend it (188-96).

Through a lucid, tightly-reasoned section on needs — a major social and economic category of practical freedom — Detmer further vindicates freedom as the highest value: since both Sartre and de Beauvoir claimed that human needs are "innumerable," it would be impossible to imagine a social order predicated on their generalized, quantitative and/or qualitative expansion without its being intrinsically committed to freedom as the highest value (181-86).

Detmer's account of needs is consistent with formulations in *CRD*. However, in fairness to Sartre, it is only fortuitously consistent with the classification of values in the *Morale*. Detmer reports (180) that Sartre "calls for" this classification on page 16 of his *Morale*, but he neglects to acknowledge that Sartre actually worked it out on page 486. This is less of a quibble than it sounds, since this inadvertent omission fails to credit Sartre with a fully delineated ethical scheme as early as 1949 when Sartre posited a hierarchy of values bearing in an asymptotic direction toward freedom. At the lowest end of this hierarchy are values that "crush freedom under *Being*," e.g., "purity, innocence, race, sincerity." "Intermediate and social" values finally culminate in "values of subjectivity" that

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enhance freedom as they range from passion to responsibility, creation and, at the top, generosity. Sartre's point is that these values have to be assessed by the degree that each *enlarges* freedom in a given situation. In this sense, resolving conflict between two or more values (or needs) pivots on an original will to choose the one that increases freedom *in this particular instance*. As Detmer puts it in his compelling discussion on moral dilemmas: "I might one day find myself in a situation in which I can prevent a murder only by lying" (160).[11]

Detmer is right to propose that intuition, set in motion by the conversion (a compelling volition to be free), illuminates the thorny path to choosing an unspecified value. Thus it is no accident that in the note immediately following the above classification, Sartre once again defines conversion as: "non-accessory reflexion (*réflexion non complice*). . . . Absolute goal: human freedom as given foundation for the world's existence. But this goal is not given, it is *willed*. Difference between duty and will. Inside and outside."[12] However, having missed this section already, Detmer also misses the next and final sentence of the (very serious) definition of conversion. This reads: "*And the revelation of Being: joy*."[13] Now, unless Detmer wants to argue that the conversion is not a serious business, what Sartre is making here is a *clear*, *serious* allusion to play! Despite Detmer's claims, it is thematically closer to the *early* Sartre of *BN*, i.e., it cannot be justified as the later objectivism Detmer ascribes mostly to *CRD*. In other words, play emerges as a consistently serious analogy that describes rare moments of freedom. Insofar as the conversion transforms the pursuit of freedom into a will that seeks to define practical, i.e., *political* freedom,[14] Sartre's ethics emerges as far more objectivist by the time of *CRD*. Nevertheless, this does not make *freedom* (*as* play) any less serious at *any* time, early or late. Detmer has thus missed the whole point of play as an analogy by confusing it (and with it, freedom too) with an unaffordable *luxury*. "The later Sartre, however, is far more serious. People are starving to death. The world is at the mercy of ruthless dictators. These are the evils which must be addressed and remedied. Now is a time for *work*, not play . . . . The poor have to expend so much time and energy struggling to stay alive that it is impossible for them to engage in the creative, self-expressive exercise of their freedom that is play" (214, Sartre's italics.). Obviously the poor have to do all that! Does poverty (an inadequate definition of "work," at best) *exempt* the poor from the experience of moral dilemmas, the necessity of choosing values or defining needs? Is Sartre's ethical theory addressed to the *rich?*

11. Perhaps this conception of acting in-situation in the name of freedom will put in a different light some of Sartre's polemical works or gestures that have provoked rage (if not self-righteousness) among detractors, judging them *ex post facto* and far from the "moment" when Sartre had to make them.

12. Sartre, *Morale*, *op.cit.*, p. 186.

13. *Ibid.*, my emphasis.

14. The distinction between philosophical and political freedom is a problem that harks back to — but does not exactly parallel — Montesquieu's thought. Cf. Hannah Arendt's comments in *The Life of the Mind: Willing*, (New York: Harper, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978) pp. 198-200.

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None of this should minimize the sound and stimulating framework of *Freedom as a Value*. What makes for a rigorous framework in a case like Sartre's may also tend to leave many other things out. Consider intuition. How has Sartre used it? Has it served to elucidate how freedom, determinism and/or determination intersect? Clearly, yes. But since Sartre intentionally chose to explore this outside his formal philosophical texts, it can be found, for the most part, in writings that philosophers all but dismiss. Sartre's insistence on "non-savoir" and/or "savoir" motivates all of his work from *BN*[15] to the Genet, Baudelaire and Flaubert "biographies," the dozens of works on literary theory, the occasional lectures on writers, not to lose sight of its role in *Search for a Method*. In the final analysis, it is *precisely* as "non-savoir" that existentialism will give "Marxist thought . . . the human dimension . . . as the foundation of anthropological knowledge . . ."[16]

Sartre *always* had a theory of ethics made necessary by his ontology and *partially* made concrete in *CDR*. By the same token, all of Sartre's work is philosophical. Frequently, pieces ostensibly dealing in aesthetic criticism encapsulate the quintessence of his moral condemnation of bourgeois values and solipsism.[17] The metaphysics inside the multitude of genres Sartre felt compelled to inhabit illuminate contemporary modernity as immersed in practical dilemmas and unintended consequences. Focusing mostly on *BN* and *CRD*'s *relation to BN*, Detmer makes this point, despite the fact that he pays *minimal* attention to the *Morale* or to works before or after *CRD*. But *Freedom as a Value* raises questions as to whether rigorous philosophy, while rehabilitating Sartre as a "legitimate" ethical philosopher, really does justice to his projects. As long as philosophy continues to close itself off from critical, i.e., lived social experience, the insights of Sartean ethics will remain distorted: banished from the domain of legitimate philosophy. The enormous balance of Sartre's work runs the perennial risk of remaining sequestered in literature, sociology, psychology or theater "specialists," regardless of their enthusiasm for ethics.

Eleni Mahaira-Odoni

15. See the critical section on Freud, Part Four, ch. 1, pp. 591-94; also, ch. 2, on the Flaubert discussion and "understanding the project," pp. 713-35.

16. Cf. Sartre, *Search for a Method* (New York: Vintage, 1963), p. 181. Also, part 3, "The Progressive-Regressive Method" pp. 150 ff; or *Questions de méthode*, p. 60ff., in *Critique de la raison dialectique*, I (Paris: Gallimard, 1960).

17. Cf. Sartre, "Le Sequestré de Venise," *Les Temps Modernes* (Nov. 1957) on Tintoretto's Venice. For the English version, see the four pieces on "The Venetian Pariah," in Sartre, *Essays in Aesthetics* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963).

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Wittgenstein at 100

Joachim Schulte, *Wittgenstein: Eine Einführung* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1989).

Wittgenstein would have been 100 years old on April 26 this year, and it is inevitable that there should be much public attention to his life and work. It is an effort to which Wittgenstein himself gave little assistance. Withdrawn and somewhat secretive by temperament, he was difficult and demanding in his personal relations. Certain papers — most notably his early notebooks from WW I, and some remarkable papers that turned up just this year in Innsbruck — seem to have survived only because his instructions to destroy them were not carried out. He was no more helpful with his work than with his life. He regarded his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as a definitive solution to philosophical problems but left its publication largely to others. After that one publication, he allowed only one short article to be printed during his lifetime, with the consequence that the many volumes of "his" work that have appeared in recent years have in fact been prepared for publication by others. How are we to find this "Wittgenstein," who seems to be so famous and so important, if he is so reluctant to show himself to us?

Schulte spends nearly a quarter of his short book on this question. The results are surprisingly rewarding. Given some time to think about the matter, most of us would assume that the *person* was not likely to be portrayed with both completeness and accuracy — none of us could be — but that the works could. At least the works which have been published by his faithful literary executors. The argument Schulte marshals against this assumption of the integrity of the texts is impressive. Not a single publication since 1929 escapes with a clear title to being an authentic work of Wittgenstein's. None of those volumes has been published intact and on its own by the executors. His constant dissatisfaction with any version, and constant reworking of ideas — sometimes through minor changes in the wording and nearly always through changes in the order of their presentation — is a vital part of philosophy *à la* Wittgenstein. The common notion that the published volumes are "works" of Wittgenstein therefore contains a serious misunderstanding of his philosophy — indeed a betrayal of his philosophy and his philosophical method, and by those who have seemed his most loyal friends.

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This is Schulte's first theme. It is a kind of conspiracy theory, and hence intrinsically requiring caution and suspicion on the part of a serious reader. How reliable is Schulte in his complaint against Wittgenstein's executors and posthumous editors? What he says is never based on conjecture but always solidly on documentation. Beyond the specific instances he presents to exemplify this or that charge — charges never stated in vague terms, but confined to what can be specifically documented. Nor does he extend his indictment beyond what is reasonable: he does not say that the executors *could* have done better by proceeding in some other way, nor that the editing and publishing mischief has made Wittgenstein's work altogether unintelligible. The executors were admittedly faced with an enormous and unprecedented task, and the charge that their work now needs to be radically amended and thoroughly supplemented does not entail that there was a better way to begin, nor a way that would have brought us any sooner to an adequate publication of Wittgenstein's writings. Though the editors/executors are not likely to appreciate this gadfly's sting, there is every reason why they should take careful account of Schulte's points as they proceed with further publication.

Schulte's exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy is not likely to be any more welcome among the standard expositors of Wittgenstein than his account of the status of "Wittgenstein's work," but it is equally sound. The first question needing to be faced by those who seek a perspective from which to see Wittgenstein's work as a whole is how the *Philosophical Investigations* is related to the *Tractatus*. The common view is that the *Philosophical Investigations* refutes the earlier work. Not only is the later work completely different in style; it also directly challenges some of the key contentions of the earlier work. Within the domain of semantics, for example, the later work explicitly abandons a) the notion that vagueness impugns sense, b) the conception of absolutely "simple" objects, and c) the presumption that making "pictures" of facts is the primary use of language. Very often this view is elaborated — most recently by Malcolm and Pears — by attributing an uncritical metaphysical realism to the early work. The later work is then seen as an astonishing personal achievement: the development of a second philosophy which thoroughly overthrows the first philosophy, through detailed refutation of its main doctrines. That this makes Wittgenstein into the supreme philosophical narcissist seems of no concern to an ardent admirer like Malcolm.

Schulte will have nothing to do with this common view, which does not mean that there are no significant differences between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. It means seeing the differences as explained by Wittgenstein's continuing to strive toward the same philosophical goal, but now in a wiser and more reasonable manner than in the exuberance of his youth. The resultant picture is of a philosopher who has something to say to us, rather than just to himself, something which he never believed he had found quite the right way to say but which he said somewhat better in his later than in his earlier work. *Philosophical Investigations* is therefore seen as a perfection or refinement

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of the *Tractatus* rather than a refutation of it.

One key issue concerns the alleged metaphysical realism of the *Tractatus*. Since there is obviously no such realism in the *Investigations*, but instead trenchant attacks on such ideas, the later work would naturally be assumed to refute any realism actually existing in the earlier one. With respect to this question, there is no altogether satisfactory discussion in the literature. The *Tractatus* says, "the world is made up of facts — it breaks down into facts, not things" (1.1) — and the substance of the world consists of "objects" (which are absolutely simple). It seems at first as though the facts and the objects must have the same status. Thus Malcolm and Pears argue that the simple objects must be real because the world is real. McGuinness, on the other hand, argues that the facts cannot be real, nor the world either, since the objects certainly are not real. Though this sounds, when so baldly stated, like the very model of a sterile metaphysical dispute, it needs to be seriously considered, both because metaphysics is an unavoidable component of the *Tractatus* and also because it directly affects one's overview of Wittgenstein's work.

In this dispute Schulte is closer to McGuinness than to Malcolm and Pears, which is all to the good, since is helps to see the continuities in Wittgenstein's philosophy. But why must the world and its substance have the same metaphysical status. The world has to be real, since its facts are something we cannot alter and to which we must accommodate ourselves. This was a part of Wittgenstein's moral outlook, which he expressed explicitly in the *Notebooks* and which underlies the remarks at the end of the *Tractatus*. The substance of the world reflects and is reflected by the way we picture the facts to ourselves — by our symbolism — and there is no reason why we cannot alter details of our symbolism; indeed, there is no reason, metaphysically, why there need be any symbolism at all. And if there were no symbolism, there need be no substance. This is because the dualism of Wittgenstein's early work (world vs. substance) is based on the need (as he, following Frege, then saw the matter) to have a foundation for meaning independent from the foundation for truth. With respect to these dual problems, it is obviously truth that matters most, and that requires (or seems to require) a thoroughly realistic foundation. Meaning requires an independent foundation, since false statements must be meaningful; but the only necessary condition on it is that its lack of realism not threaten the stable character of truth. Such a requirement obviously tolerates a great deal of variation in our symbolism (hence in substance too), for we can easily envisage alternative ways to express the same truth.

Wittgenstein continued to believe that matters like the substance of things are connected with symbolism rather than reality. "Essence is expressed by grammar" (PI 371). This continuity is one that one cannot see properly — perhaps not at all — if one concurs with Pears and Malcolm.

These essences are only for humans, for only humans master the use of languages with complicated grammars and hierarchies of levels of significance. Thus Wittgenstein's philosophy is deeply humanistic. When he characterizes

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different language-games — for example by insisting that knowing and doubting belong to the same language-game, so that what cannot be doubted cannot be known either — he is throwing light on our human way of life, our *Lebensform*. Grammar involves certainty but not knowledge, so Wittgenstein is discovered to belong to that line of critical philosophy which distinguishes sharply between knowledge or science, on the one hand, and meaning, philosophy, and certainty, on the other. But he differs radically from the Vienna Circle (who share that view), since he in no way disparages grammar or meaning or philosophy; Wittgenstein's critical philosophy is closer to Kant's than to Carnap's.

One can glimpse these and other important continuities through Schulte's presentation. There remain very many deep obscurities, not only about just what Wittgenstein meant but even about what he actually said. No book which makes the puzzles vanish could possibly be a sound introduction to Wittgenstein. This book can be recommended as a first-rate introduction to the man and his work, to the surprising understandings they bring, and the enduring perplexities they engender.

Newton Garver

Péguy's Socialist Utopia

Jean-Michel Rey, *Colère de Péguy* (Paris: Hachette, 1987), 128 pp.
Charles Péguy, *Oeuvres en prose complètes*, vol. 1, edited and annotated by Robert Burac (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 1935 pp.

Charles Péguy, turn-of-the-century Catholic socialist author and editor, would scarcely feel at home today in his native France. An uncompromising political commentator, friend, and later critic, of Juarès (founder of *Humanité*), Péguy was angry and disaffected with the "modern" world. But he was no mere reactionary. On closer scrutiny, he established at least a momentary, personal equilibrium between the disparate forces that have shaped modern French history. But these forces have become increasingly disjointed. Which Catholicism would Péguy appeal to? The silent, mysteriously uninvested spirituality awaiting a new body while "changing culture and politics" in the pages of *Esprit*, or the triumphant fundamentalism (*intégrisme*) out of which Lefèbre and his flock emerged? And is socialism really recognizable in what has been called

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"Gaullism with a human face"?

The diversity of causes in which Péguy has been posthumously enlisted has already received some comment in the considerable body of works devoted to the Péguy legacy. Unusable by either the Left or the Right during his lifetime, this rather irascible mystic became everyone's champion after he died.[1] His "conversion" (return to the faith he was raised in) in 1908, and his death on the battlefield in the first year of WWI, conspired to encourage a Rightist interpretation of his life and work. But his texts contain other potential directions, particularly those which spoke eloquently for a pre-war socialism. Péguy's nationalism, however, was based on a narrow, historically specific concept of work and family all too easily assimilable by the Vichy regime, and the attribution to the "people" of a virtue that was not only pre-revolutionary, but medieval. Yet his concept of patriotism defined France as a country defending a truth which transcended the immediate or materialist interests of the national entity bearing its name. Both moralist and politician, Péguy took a position frequently nuanced and hard to define in words other than his own. For a socialist, he is very nationalistic; for a Dreyfusard, very pro-army; for a Catholic, very Bergsonian. The attempt is now underway in Péguy scholarship to make some sense of all these interpretations.

Jean-Michel Rey's *Colère de Péguy* is quite different from anything previously published on the subject.[2] Like Jean Starobinski's reading of Rousseau, Rey's interpretation of Péguy is an attempt to locate and underscore the crucial moments or impasses in the texts, and to show how these recur in other guises. Rey listens to the tone of Péguy's writing and notes an unusual combination of anger and analytic acuity. Péguy's well-known use of repetition has been the object of considerable facile sarcasm (*echolalia*, quips one critic), but Rey sees this as a "critical re-evaluation" of contemporary issues, addressed to the readers of *Les cahiers de la quinzaine* to reveal "the other side of things." This was a hidden side, one which showed all that was reprehensible about the modern world, the intellectual coteries, politics, bourgeois mores, and money. The tone of Péguy's critique, as Rey emphasizes, is not one of calm neutrality. He was a man very much in the thick of things, reacting with his entire sensibility,[3] his sense of what once was (the people, the wholesome dream of a simple faith), and of what could be in a socialist utopia (as described in *Marcel, De la cité harmonieuse*).

Rey's book thematizes Péguy's anger and associates it with the Jewish "*Rûach*,"

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1. Cf. Jean Bastaire's thorough and well-balanced account of Péguy's life and work, *Péguy l'insurgé* (Paris: Payot, 1975), especially the conclusion, which reviews the metamorphoses of the Péguy legend up to that point. More recently, Henri Guillemin's *Charles Péguy* (Paris: Edition de Seueil, 1981), a detailed and virulent debunking from the Left, is of interest for the wealth of biographical information it provides.

2. Jean-Michel Rey, *Colère de Péguy* (Paris: Hacheho, 1987). Rey teaches philosophy at the University of Paris VIII.

3. "*le sommeil et la veille, le travail et le peu de repos, le lit et la table, la soupe et le boeuf, La maison et le jardin, La porte et la rue. . .*", from Péguy's "L'Argent," (1913), in *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, vol. 14, no. 6.

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the breath of the Old Testament. He notes Péguy's refusal to separate political from moral issues. This is what gives Péguy's prose its particular flavor, for he rarely talked politics in a strategic, partisan sense (although he closely followed politics). He was concerned about keeping the moral aspect of the Dreyfus affair alive in the minds of his readers, but was quick to point out that the politicians had made it into a purely political matter (particularly the socialists, whose ranks were for a time split on the issue). Rey points out that the role of the modern historian was, in Péguy's eyes, the most reprehensible of all, as history had come to take the place of God in the modern world. History had become the absolute. Deviations were mistakes, progress a positive reality, and eternity — that other time, the time of Joan of Arc and of miracles — was forever banished from human experience.

Rey's book was published at the same time as the first of the three volumes of a new edition of Péguy's works.[4] This first volume contains Péguy's prose up to May, 1905: his childhood writings, never intended for publication; his writings as a young socialist, such as *Marcel, De la cité harmonieuse* and *Pierre, Commencement d'une vie bourgeoise*; his contributions to *La revue blanche*; and the first six series of *Les cahiers de la quinzaine*. These were the years of the Dreyfus affair and of the pure, utopian vision. Marcel is also the name of Péguy's son, and this long description of a future utopia is no doubt the world the idealistic father projected for his son. In Péguy's harmonious city, no unhealthy work shall be performed; it is not right that consumers should be provided with luxury items at the expense of the workers' health. Adolescents, the elderly, the infirm, the lazy, women and animals are to be excluded from work. (Apparently, Péguy believed women's energies should be totally taken up with homemaking). Health is a key word for Péguy. It seems to furnish an absolute term on the basis of which any particular phenomenon is judged. The harmonious city is not the just city, nor the city of equality, since those two concepts require calculating the value of work, which cannot be calculated. It is based on a harmony of wills. This concept of an ideal society based not on external imperatives — a discipline to be followed — but rather on a reformed volition, a harmonious collectivity of good will, stood in sharp contrast to the contemporary German socialist ideal. There should be no rivalry, no prices, no salary for work.

A remarkable aspect of Péguy's *pays de cocagne* is the insistence on the total oblivion into which the earlier, unharmonious past will be plunged. Péguy is firm in the lines he draws: future mathematicians will accept the conclusions of their predecessors, but not those of psychologists or sociologists. The conclusions drawn from studies in these areas are considered invalid in the harmonious city, for they were conducted at a time of disharmony.

In this text, which moves forward with a monotonous rhythm of purity and harmony, Péguy appears to anticipate some possible objections. For example,

4. Charles Péguy, *Ouevres en prose complètes*, vol. I, Robert Burac ed. (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1987). Henceforth all references preceded by *OP* will be to this text.

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he makes the point that strong emotions will be absent from the harmonious city because the virtues of spirited resistance and dissent, of struggle and even of charity will be unnecessary. Nevertheless, there will be plenty of other strong emotions. In this as in all utopias, boredom is a problem. Péguy's answer seems to be that people's sensibilities will have changed in such a way that feelings now considered mild will be felt so much more acutely that there will be no dearth of affective life. There will still be, on the negative side, absence, doubt, separations and death. The only strong feelings named are the pain of separation and the joy of reunion. It is not difficult to discern here a homology with the Christian mystic's thematization of the presence and absence of God.

Péguy's objection to voting, merit and equality (as well as to money) all stem from the same fundamental impossibility of calculating volition (*c'est déjà démériter que désirer ou que vouloir mériter*). It would not be an exaggeration to say that for Péguy consciousness itself becomes a problem — not consciousness of the past (memory of evil days), but of the faculty of calculation and assessment, without which the modern world is hardly conceivable. But Péguy's focus is not on a lost (Biblical) paradise destroyed by knowledge, nor on a classical Golden Age in which spontaneity reigned. In the most harmonious of worlds, virtues that developed in response to hardship have become obselete.

The harmonious city is not perfect, but merely as perfect as we are capable of desiring. It differs from other communities in that it seems to have no outside (". . . because it is not proper for there to be living beings that are strangers.") Animals, who are "adolescent souls," are included. He introduces the notions of individual and collective souls. The latter did not begin in the harmonious city, for there were collective souls (families, countries, etc.) in the not-yet-harmonious city. The only mention of Christianity appears in this context. "There was a soul of France," Péguy asserts, "and there *had been* a soul of Christianity." Clearly, this use of the pluperfect implies that Péguy, at 25, considered the height of France and Christianity to be past.

Péguy's thought introduces a complete break, then, with the notion of continuous progress toward perfection — the ideal of Taine and Renan of the perfectibility of man through the accumulation or capitalization of experience and truth. His ideal world is cut loose from history, not really a part of the earthly temporal line: it is not only a utopia, but a "*uchronia*" (timeless entity) as well. It is based on an alternative humanity. Péguy intended to follow up this statement of ideals with another dialogue, which would show how we should proceed to hasten the arrival of the harmonious city, given present conditions. Is it possible that he realized there was no bridge that could connect his ideal world to the real world of France's Third Republic?

Michael Smith

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